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Preface and Acknowledgements  
For the first time in recent memory, acquisition reform has emerged as a significant 
topic in Presidential discourse.  While procurement surfaced occasionally as a second-tier 
issue in last fall’s debates, its importance has increased considerably in the current 
economic crisis.  The massive federal spending of recent months has highlighted the need 
for cost-savings elsewhere, and the President has announced acquisition reform as a 
priority of his Administration to help achieve those savings. 
That our new President would use his “bully pulpit” to advance acquisition reform 
should be good news for the nation.  Too often in the past, champions of reform have lacked 
the political standing necessary to bring about substantive and enduring change.  If the 
President, with his own party in control of the Congress, is unable to successfully lead such 
an effort, we may rightfully despair that anyone can. 
Of course, students of acquisition know only too well that such comprehensive 
change must be led by leaders who grasp and can address the complex interplay of 
interests and issues faced by the various institutions and organizations that make up the 
acquisition culture.  Accordingly, the discourse of today’s reform agenda must rise well 
above the “sound-bite” level of so-called “no-bid” contracts which seems to dominate the 
popular media.  Rather, the reform agenda must reflect the experiences and judgments of 
the “best and the brightest” from government, industry, and academia, many of whom are 
convened at this Symposium.  We sincerely hope that the Administration will be open to 
their voices.   
Such “informed reform” is a primary goal of the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Acquisition Research Program (ARP).  Established in 2003, the ARP provides leadership in 
innovation, creative problem solving and an on-going dialogue, contributing to the evolution 
of Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition strategies. The program continues to grow and 
mature with the number of projects, products, collaboration opportunities and 
faculty/graduate student participation continuing to increase substantially. Our goals remain 
the same as noted below: 
• Position the ARP in a leadership role to continue to develop the body of 
knowledge in defense acquisition research 
o Over 300 published works since inception 
o Sponsoring an annual Acquisition Research Symposium, the first of 
which was held in May 2004, which draws the thought leaders of the 
DoD acquisition community. 
• Establish acquisition research as an integral part of policy-making for DoD 
officials. Some processes informed by this research include: 
o Contract close out procedures; 
o The impact of spiral development in the acquisition process; 
o Cost estimating for new design Ballistic Missile Submarine 
o Termination liability clauses for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
o Contractual language and context to incorporate Open Architecture in 
weapons system contracts 
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o All completed research is published in full text on the ARP website, 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, allowing ready access by any and all 
parties interested in the DoD acquisition process. 
• Create a stream of relevant information concerning the performance of DoD 
Acquisition policies with viable recommendations for continuous process 
improvement.   
o The body of knowledge on the DoD acquisition process has been 
greatly increased. 
o Faculty researchers routinely give multiple presentations, in both 
national and international fora, featuring their research work—thereby 
increasing exposure to a broader audience. Typical audiences include 
the London School of Economics, the Federal Reserve and the 
International Procurement Conference. 
o With the launch of the ARP’s International Journal of Defense 
Acquisition Management (IJDAM), the ‘”reach” of our products has 
increased substantially. In addition, the IJDAM provides another forum 
in which acquisition scholars might publish and recognize the 
globalization that is occurring in the defense industry. 
• Prepare the DoD workforce to participate in the continued evolution of the 
defense acquisition process.  
o The ARP plays a major role in providing a DoD-relevant graduate 
education program to future DoD officials. Synergy between research 
conducted and course content delivered enhances both the teaching 
and learning processes. 
o The number of students engaged in focused acquisition research for 
their MBA project continues to grow dramatically.  These students 
have the benefit of being able to immediately apply their newly 
acquired acquisition skills to real-world issues. 
• Collaboration among universities, think tanks, industry and government in 
acquisition research.  
o Over 50 universities/think tanks participated in the 5th annual 
Acquisition Research Symposium as a result of a focused effort to 
create a Virtual University Consortium.   
o Emerging collaborative research efforts continue to bring new scholar 
and practitioner thought to the business issues facing the DoD as was 
demonstrated by the large response to our second Broad Area 
Announcement (BAA) in support of the OSD-sponsored acquisition 
research program. As we write this, our third BAA is being prepared 
for release. 
o The International Journal of Defense Acquisition is attracting scholars 
from the United Kingdom, Canada, Nigeria, Singapore, The 
Netherlands and Australia.  
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We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Office of Naval Air Systems Command PMA-290 
• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management Policy & 
Program Integration) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army  
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generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
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The Acquisition Research Program Team 
Rear Admiral James B. Greene, Jr. USN (Ret.)—Acquisition Chair, Naval 
Postgraduate School. RADM Greene develops, implements and oversees the Acquisition 
Research Program in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. He interfaces with 
DoD, industry and government leaders in acquisition, facilitates graduate student research 
and conducts guest lectures and seminars. Before serving at NPS, RADM Greene was an 
independent consultant focusing on Defense Industry business development strategy and 
execution (for both the public and private sectors), minimizing lifecycle costs through 
technology applications, alternative financing arrangements for capital-asset procurement, 
and “red-teaming” corporate proposals for major government procurements.  
RADM Greene served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) 
in the Pentagon from 1991-1995. As Assistant Deputy, he provided oversight, direction and 
budget development for worldwide US Navy logistics operations. He facilitated depot 
maintenance, supply chain management, base/station management, environmental 
programs and logistic advice, and support to the Chief of Naval Operations. Some of his 
focuses during this time were leading Navy-wide efforts to digitize all technical data (and, 
therefore, reduce cycle-time) and to develop and implement strategy for procurement of 
eleven Sealift ships for the rapid deployment forces. He also served as the Senior Military 
Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) from 1987-1990; as such, he 
advised and counseled the Under Secretary in directing the DoD procurement process.  
From 1984-1987, RADM Greene was the Project Manager for the AEGIS project. 
This was the DoD’s largest acquisition project, with an annual budget in excess of $5 
billion/year. The project provided oversight and management of research, development, 
design, production, fleet introduction and full lifecycle support of the entire fleet of AEGIS 
cruisers, destroyers, and weapons systems through more than 2500 industry contracts. 
From 1980-1984, RADM Greene served as Director, Committee Liaison, Office of 
Legislative Affairs followed by a tour as the Executive Assistant, to the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics). From 1964-1980, RADM Greene served as a 
Surface Warfare Officer in various duties, culminating in Command-at-Sea. His assignments 
included numerous wartime deployments to Vietnam, as well as the Indian Ocean and the 
Persian Gulf.  
RADM Greene received a BS in Electrical Engineering from Brown University in 
1964; he earned an MS in Electrical Engineering and an MS in Business Administration from 
the Naval Postgraduate School in 1973.  
RADM Greene received the 2009 Richard W. Hamming Annual Faculty Award for 
Achievement in Interdisciplinary Activities. The selection is based on his work in leading and 
administering the Naval Postgraduate School's Acquisition Research Program. 
Dr. Keith F. Snider—Associate Professor of Public Administration and Management 
in the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, where he teaches courses related to defense acquisition management. 
He also serves as Principal Investigator for the NPS Acquisition Research Program and as 
Chair of the Acquisition Academic Area.  
Snider has a PhD in Public Administration and Public Affairs from Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, a Master of Science degree in Operations 
Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Bachelor of Science degree from the 
United States Military Academy at West Point. He served as a field artillery officer in the US 
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Army for twenty years, retiring at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He is a former member of 
the Army Acquisition Corps and a graduate of the Program Manager’s Course at the 
Defense Systems Management College.  
Professor Snider’s recent publications appear in American Review of Public 
Administration, Administration and Society, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Journal of Public 
Procurement, Acquisition Review Quarterly, and Project Management Journal.  
Dr. Snider received the 2009 Richard W. Hamming Annual Faculty Award for 
Achievement in Interdisciplinary Activities. The selection is based on his work in leading and 
administering the Naval Postgraduate School's Acquisition Research Program. 
Karey L. Shaffer—Program Manager, General Dynamics Information Technology, 
supporting the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business & Public 
Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. As PM, Shaffer is responsible for operations and 
publications in conjunction with the Acquisition Chair and the Principal Investigator. She has 
also catalyzed, organized and managed the Acquisition Research Symposiums hosted by 
NPS.  
Shaffer served as an independent Project Manager and Marketing Consultant on 
various projects. Her experiences as such were focused on creating marketing materials, 
initiating web development, assembling technical teams, managing project lifecycles, 
processes and cost-savings strategies. As a Resource Specialist at Watson Wyatt 
Worldwide in Minneapolis, Shaffer developed and implemented template plans to address 
continuity and functionality in corporate documents; in this same position, she introduced 
process improvements to increase efficiency in presentation and proposal production in 
order to reduce the instances of corruption and loss of vital technical information.  
Shaffer has also served as the Project Manager for Imagicast, Inc., and as the 
Operations Manager for the Montana World Trade Center. At Imagicast, she was asked to 
take over the project management of four failing pilots for Levi Strauss in the San Francisco 
office. Within four months, the pilots were released; the project lifecycle was shortened; and 
the production process was refined. In this latter capacity at the MWTC, Shaffer developed 
operating procedures, policies and processes in compliance with state and federal grant 
law. Concurrently, she managed $1.25 million in federal appropriations, developed 
budgeting systems and helped secure a $400,000 federal technology grant. As the 
Operations Manager, she also launched the MWTC’s Conference site, managed various 
marketing conferences, and taught student practicum programs and seminars.  
Shaffer holds an MBA from San Francisco State University and earned her BA in 
Business Administration (focus on International Business, Marketing and Management) from 
the University of Montana.  
A special thanks to our editors Jeri Larsen, Jessica Moon, Breanne Grover and 
Adrianne Malan for all that they have done to make this publication a success, to David 
Wood, Tera Yoder, Jordy Boom and Ian White for production, web and graphic support, and 
to the staff at the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy for their administrative 
support. Our program success is directly related to the combined efforts of many.  
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Announcement and Call for Proposals 
The Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School 
announces the 7th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium to be held May 12-13, 2010 
in Monterey, California.   
This symposium serves as a forum for the presentation of acquisition research and 
the exchange of ideas among scholars and practitioners of public-sector acquisition.  We 
seek a diverse audience of influential attendees from academe, government, and industry 
who are well placed to shape and promote future research in acquisition.   
The Symposium Program Committee solicits proposals for panels and/or papers 
from academicians, practitioners, students and others with interests in the study of 
acquisition.  The following list of topics is provided to indicate the range of potential research 
areas of interest for this symposium: acquisition and procurement policy, supply chain 
management, public budgeting and finance, cost management, project management, 
logistics management, engineering management, outsourcing, performance 
measurement, and organization studies.   
Proposals must be submitted by November 6, 2009.  The Program Committee will 
make notifications of accepted proposals by December 4, 2009.  Final papers must be 
submitted by April 2, 2010. 
Proposals for papers should include an abstract along with identification, affiliation, 
contact information and short bio for the author(s).  Proposals for papers plan for a 20 
minute presentation. Proposals for panels (plan for 90 minute duration) should include the 
same information as above as well as a description of the panel subject and format, along 
with participants’ names, qualifications and the specific contributions each participant will 
make to the panel.   




May 12 - 13, 2010  
Monterey, California 
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Primary objective is to attract outstanding researchers and scholars to 
investigate topics of interest to the defense acquisition community. The 
program solicits innovative proposals for defense acquisition management 
and policy research to be conducted during fiscal year (FY) 2010 (1 Oct 2009 
- 30 Sep 2010).  
Defense acquisition management and policy research refers to 
investigations in all disciplines, fields, and domains that (1) are involved 
in the acquisition of products and/or services for national defense, or (2) 
could potentially be brought to bear to improve defense acquisition.  It 
includes but is not limited to economics, finance, financial management, 
information systems, organization theory, operations management, human 
resources management, and marketing, as well as the “traditional” acquisition 
areas such as contracting, program/project management, logistics, and 
systems engineering management.  
This program is targeted in particular to U.S. universities (including U.S. 
government schools of higher education) or other research institutions 
outside the Department of Defense.  
The Government anticipates making multiple awards up to $120,000 each for 
a basic research period of twelve months.  NPS plans to complete proposal 
evaluations and notify awardees in early September 2008. The actual date of 
grant award will depend on availability of funds and the capabilities of the 
grants office.  Prior year awards occurred in the November – January 
timeframe. Awardees may request approval of pre-award costs (up to three 
months), or they may request adjustments in the grant period of performance. 




BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT 
 Acquisition Research Program 
Open until 4:00 pm PDST 30 June 2009 
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Panel 1 - Plenary Panel - National Security Acquisition 
Agenda for the New Administration 
 
Wednesday, 
May 13, 2009 
Panel 1 - Plenary Panel - National Security Acquisition Agenda for the 
New Administration 
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 a.m.  Chair: Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, Director, Center for Public Policy & Private 
Enterprise, University of Maryland; former Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
Discussants:  
Lieutenant General Ross Thompson, III, US Army, Military Deputy, Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology) 
Dr. Nancy Spruill, Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis, Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
Ms. Susan L. Coté, Vice President, Corporate Contracts, Pricing & Supply 
Chain, Northrop Grumman Corporation 
  
 
Chair: The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, is a Professor and holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and 
Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. He is also the 
Director of both the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and the Sloan Biotechnology 
Industry Center. As the third-ranking civilian at the Pentagon from 1997 to 2001, Gansler was 
responsible for all research and development, acquisition reform, logistics, advance technology, 
environmental security, defense industry, and numerous other security programs.  
Before joining the Clinton Administration, Gansler held a variety of positions in government and the 
private sector, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material Acquisition), Assistant 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics), Executive Vice President at TASC, 
Vice President of ITT, and engineering and management positions with Singer and Raytheon 
Corporations.  
Throughout his career, Gansler has written, published, and taught on subjects related to his 
work. He recently served as the Chair of the Secretary of the Army’s “Commission on Contracting 
and Program Management for Army Expeditionary Forces.”  He is also a member of the National 
Academy of Engineering and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. 
Additionally, he is the Glenn L. Martin Institute Fellow of Engineering at the A. James Clarke School 
of Engineering, an Affiliate Faculty member at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, and a 
Senior Fellow at the James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership (all at the University of 
Maryland). For 2003–2004, he served as Interim Dean of the School of Public Policy. For 2004–
2006, Gansler served as the Vice President for Research at the University of Maryland.  
Discussants: 
Lieutenant General Ross Thompson, III, US Army, was assigned as Military Deputy, Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) in November 2006. LTG Thompson 
previously served as the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, HQDA, G-8 from 
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October 2004 through November 2006. From 2001 to 2004, he served as the Commanding 
General of the US Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command. Prior to his current 
assignment, he held a wide variety of command and staff assignments, including three years as the 
Military Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, HQDA, G-8.  
Thompson is a distinguished military graduate of the College of William and Mary. Initially assigned 
to the 82nd Airborne Division, he served as a Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer and 
Company Commander from 1975 to 1979. After receiving a Master’s degree in operations research 
from George Washington University, he attended the Ordnance Officer Advanced Course. From 
1980 to 1983, he served in Germany in the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), as a 
Company Commander, assistant brigade S-3, and brigade S-4. 
Thompson’s staff assignments include tours as Operations Research Analyst in the Military 
Personnel Center and Strategic Defense Command from 1983 to 1986. After graduating from the 
College of Naval Command and Staff in 1987 with a Master’s degree in national security and 
strategic studies, he was assigned to Korea as the Executive Officer of the 194th Maintenance 
Battalion. LTG Thompson then served on the Armor Anti-armor Task Force in the Office of the 
Chief of Staff; as the Materiel Development Team Chief in the Armored Systems Modernization 
Coordination Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; and as the 
coordinator for the Chief of Staff’s weekly Requirements Review Council. 
From 1991 to 1993, Thompson commanded the 27th Main Support Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division. 
He graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1994. For the next two years, he 
was the special assistant to the Commanding General, Army Materiel Command. From July 1996 to 
July 1998, he commanded the 45th Corps Support Group (Forward), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. 
LTG Thompson’s awards and decorations include the Army Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of 
Merit with third oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with fourth oak leaf cluster, Army 
Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, Department of the Army Staff Identification 
Badge, senior parachutist badge, and ranger tab. 
Dr. Nancy Spruill is a native of Takoma Park, MD. After receiving Bachelor of Science Degree in 
Mathematics from University of Maryland in 1971, she joined the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). 
From 1971 to 1983, she held a variety of positions on the CNA staff, including Technical Staff 
Analyst, Professional Staff Analyst and Project Director. In 1975, she earned her Master of Arts in 
Mathematical Statistics from George Washington University followed by her Doctorate in 1980.  
Spruill served on the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1983 to 1993. Initially, she 
was the Senior Planning, Programming, and Budget Analyst in the Manpower, Reserve Affairs and 
Logistics Secretariat. Later, she served as the Director for Support and Liaison for the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel. Then, she served as the Senior 
Operations Research Analyst in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program 
Analysis and Evaluation. 
In 1993, she joined the staff of the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), serving as the Chief of 
Programs and Analysis Division for the DMA Comptroller. Subsequently, she served as Acting 
Deputy Comptroller and was a member of the Reinvention Task Force for the Vice President's 
National Performance Review.  
In March 1995, she was selected as the Deputy Director for Acquisition Resources for the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. In February 1999, she was appointed 
Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis (ARA) for Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)). In this capacity, she is responsible for all aspects of 
AT&L’S participation in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), the 
Congressional process, and the Defense Acquisition System. She serves as the Executive 
Secretary to the Defense Acquisition Board and is responsible for the timely and accurate 
submission to Congress of Selected Acquisition Reports and Unit Cost Reports for Major Defense 
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Acquisition Programs. She manages the Defense Acquisition Execution Summary monthly review 
of programs, monitors cost and schedule status of high-interest programs, and conducts analyses 
of contract and program cost performance—including analysis of the effective use of Integrated 
Program Management principles through the use of Earned Value Management. Spruill performs 
systemic analysis to improve acquisition policy and education, and conducts special analyses for 
the Under Secretary. She leads the Department in developing plans to manage Property, Plant and 
Equipment, Inventory, Operating Materials and Supplies/Deferred Maintenance and Environmental 
Liabilities. She proposes modifications to, or acquisition of, new DoD feeder systems, in support of 
achieving an unqualified audit opinion on DoD Financial Statements as mandated by the Chief 
Financial Officers (CFO) Act. She also manages the studies program for OSD, oversees USD 
(AT&L)’s office automation system and manages its information system network, and conducts 
special analyses for the Under Secretary.  
Spruill has been a member of the Senior Executive Service since 1995. She is a certified 
Acquisition Professional and an active member of the American Statistical Association. Her many 
honors and awards include the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service, the 
Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service, the Secretary of Defense Medal for 
Meritorious Civilian Service, the Hammer Award, the Acker Skill in Communications Award and the 
Presidential Rank Award. She has contributed papers in publications of the statistics and defense 
analyses communities and authored articles in the general press on how politicians use—and 
abuse—statistics. 
Susan L. Coté is Vice President of Corporate Contracts, Pricing and Supply Chain at Northrop 
Grumman Corporation. In this role, she is responsible for corporate business management 
functions including contracts, pricing, supply chain and government financial relations. Coté is 
responsible for maintaining an effective risk-review process, providing corporate-wide policy, 
direction, training and oversight of contracts and pricing matters and ensuring that all Northrop 
Grumman sectors meet acceptable performance standards in these areas. She serves as the 
principal interface with the Defense Corporate Executive regarding all governmental accounting, 
contract and pricing matters, government procurement policy and oversight. She also leads the 
corporate government financial relations function. 
She develops and implements company-wide supply chain strategies and key processes. She is 
also responsible for enterprise socio-economic business planning, strategy and compliance relative 
to the organization’s supply chain. She chairs the Supply Chain Leadership Council, which serves 
as the principal governance body for the supply chain function, comprised of sector supply chain 
vice presidents. 
Previously, Coté was Vice President of Corporate Contracts and Pricing. Prior to that appointment, 
she was Sector Vice President of Contracts, Pricing and Programs Business Management at the 
Space Technology sector. She has worked on NASA, US Air Force, commercial and classified 
programs.  
Prior to joining Northrop Grumman, Coté held various contracting positions within the United States 
Air Force. She served at HQ Space Division (Los Angeles AFB), HQ Air Force Systems Command 
(Andrews AFB), and HQ USAF (Pentagon). She entered government service through the 
Presidential Management Intern Program. 
A graduate of Principia College, Illinois, Coté earned a Bachelor’s degree in political science and a 
Master’s degree in Public Administration from the University of Arizona. Coté is an active member 
of the National Contract Management Association and currently serves on its board of advisors. 
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Panel 2 - Advances in Resource Decision-making 
 
Wednesday, 
May 13, 2009 
Panel 2 - Advances in Resource Decision-making 
11:15 a.m. – 
12:45 p.m. 
 
Chair: Joseph L. Yakovac, Jr., LTG, USA, (Ret.), Naval Postgraduate School; 
former Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics & Technology) 
Discussant: Paul L. Francis, Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing 
Management, Government Accountability Office 
The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA): Rethinking the 
application of Cost-effectiveness Analysis, Multi-criteria Decision-making 
(MCDM) and the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) in Defense Procurement 
Francois Melese, Naval Postgraduate School 
Programmatic Complexity & Interdependence: New Predictive Indicators 
of Development Resource Demand 
Robert Flowe, Software Engineering and Systems Assurance, Office 




Chair: Joseph Yakovac spent the last 16 years of his active duty military career in the Army 
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Abstract 
Our primary goal is to improve public investment decisions by providing defense 
analysts and acquisition officials a comprehensive set of approaches to structure an 
“Economic Evaluation of Alternatives” (EEoA). This study identifies a significant weakness in 
the Multi-criteria Decision-making (MCDM) approach that currently underpins many 
contemporary AoAs. While MCDM techniques, and therefore most AoAs, correctly focus on 
lifecycle costs and operational effectiveness of alternatives, “Affordability” is often only 
implicitly addressed in the final stages of the analysis. In contrast, the adoption of EEoA 
encourages decision-makers to include affordability explicitly and up-front in the AoA. This 
requires working with vendors to build alternatives based on different funding 
(budget/affordability) scenarios. The key difference between the traditional MCDM approach 
to AoAs and the EEoA approach is that instead of modeling alternatives from competing 
vendors as points in cost-effectiveness space, EEoA models alternatives as functions of 
optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely funding (budget) scenarios. The Decision Map offered 
to practitioners to structure EEoAs provides a unique opportunity to achieve a significant 
defense acquisition reform—to coordinate the requirements generation system (JCIDS), 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and PPBE process, to lower the costs of defense 
investments, and improve performance and schedules.  
Introduction to the Problem: Making the Case for 
“Affordability” 
Our nation’s security, billions of taxpayer dollars, and the survival of our soldiers can 
all hinge on an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).1 Routinely conducted by the US Department 
of Defense (DoD), the AoA is a key component of the defense acquisition process. 
Investment decisions supported by AoAs help shape future forces, influence defense 
spending, and occasionally transform the defense industry.  
                                                
1 This study often uses the term “Analysis of Alternatives” (AoA) in its broad, generic sense. Although 
focused on defense acquisition, the results of the study apply to any public-sector procurement. It 
should be clear in context when the term AoAs references major defense acquisition programs 
(MDAPs) as opposed to the acquisition of major automated information systems (MAISs).  
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This study points to a significant weakness in the Multiple-criteria Decision-making 
(MCDM) approach that underpins many contemporary AoAs. The weakness is that while 
MCDM techniques, and therefore most AoAs, correctly focus on lifecycle costs and the 
operational effectiveness of individual alternatives, “Affordability” is an after-thought, often 
only implicitly addressed through a weight assigned to costs.  
In contrast, the approach recommended in this study encourages analysts and 
decision-makers to include affordability explicitly in the AoA. This requires working with 
vendors to build alternatives based on different funding (budget/affordability) scenarios. 
Supported by a static, deterministic, multi-stage, constrained, optimization micro-economic 
production (procurement auction) model described in Section 3 (with the math relegated to 
the Mathematical Appendix available upon request), this “Economic Evaluation of 
Alternatives” (EEoA) explicitly addresses affordability up-front. The key difference between 
the MCDM approach to AoAs and the EEoA approach is that, instead of modeling decision 
alternatives from competing vendors as points in cost-effectiveness space, EEoA models 
alternatives as functions of optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely funding (resource/budget) 
scenarios. Given the current financial crisis and future public-spending challenges, 
affordability is a growing concern. As a consequence, it is imperative that the DoD gets the 
best value for every dollar it invests in major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) or 
major automated information systems (MAISs).  
A brief review of the DoD’s high-level, fiscally constrained budget development and 
acquisition systems highlights the key role that affordability needs to play up-front in any 
AoA. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process is the principal 
decision support system used by the DoD to provide the best possible mix of forces, 
equipment, and support within fiscal constraints. Two other major decision support systems 
complement the PPBE process: a requirements generation system called the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS).  
Based on strategic-level guidance (the National Security Strategy, National Military 
Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, Strategic Planning Guidance, etc.), the 
requirements generation system reviews existing and proposed capabilities and identifies 
critical capability gaps. To fill those capability gaps, senior leadership examines the full 
range of “doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and 
facilities” (DOTMLPF) (CJCS, 2007, p. A-1; USD (AT&L), 2008, p. 14). 
Whenever a “materiel” solution is recommended, prospective military investments 
are identified that serve as the basis for AoAs that underpin the development of new 
acquisition programs in the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). The DAS provides principles 
and policies that govern major defense acquisition decisions and milestones. To ensure 
transparency and accountability, and to promote efficiency and effectiveness, various 
instructions (e.g., FAR, DFARS, DoD Directive 5000.01, DoD Instruction 5000.02, etc.) 
specify statutory and regulatory reports (e.g., AoAs) and other information requirements for 
each milestone and decision point. 
The primary purpose of PPBE is to make hard choices among alternative military 
investments necessary for national security within fiscal constraints. As we identify 
alternative materiel investments that can fill current capability gaps, the requirements 
generation process (JCIDS) naturally fits into the Planning phase of PPBE. 
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The first step in any investment analysis is to identify the derived demand for a key 
capability, program, or project. This is accomplished through the DoD’s requirements 
generation system (JCIDS). Ideally, user demands are expressed and refined in the 
Planning phase of the PPBE process. MDAP and MAIS proposals that emerge from JCIDS 
and the Planning process enter the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) and are incorporated 
in the Programming phase of PPBE. 
The Planning phase of PPBE establishes fiscally constrained guidance and priorities 
for military forces, including readiness, sustainability and modernization. This guidance 
provides direction for DoD Components (military departments and defense agencies) to 
develop their individual program proposals or their Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 
in the Programming phase. The POM details resource-allocation decisions (funding, 
personnel, etc.) proposed by each Component for its programs, projected six years into the 
future. DAS data for major defense acquisitions generally includes lifecycle cost estimates 
that project well beyond the six years of the POM. 
Senior leadership in the OSD and the Joint Staff subsequently review each 
Component POM to ensure it satisfies the Planning guidance, and that it can be integrated 
into effective and affordable overall defense programs. The Budgeting phase of PPBE 
occurs concurrently with the Programming phase. 
The Budgeting phase converts the Programming phase’s (output-oriented) view into 
the (input-oriented) format required by Congressional appropriation structures. While the 
DoD’s biennial defense budget projects funding only two years into the future, it includes 
more financial detail than the POMs. The Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller and the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) are responsible for reviewing budget submissions 
to ensure programs are affordable, i.e., satisfy current fiscal constraints. The GAO 
recognizes the major challenges faced by the DoD to “achieve a balanced mix of weapon 
systems that are affordable” (GAO, 2009, p. 5).2 
The primary focus of Multi-criteria Decision-making (MCDM), as traditionally applied 
in AoAs, is to evaluate the lifecycle costs and operational effectiveness of alternative 
defense investments. “An AoA is an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, 
suitability, and Life-Cycle Cost of alternatives that satisfy established Capability needs” 
(DoD, 2006, July 7, Section 3.3). This study emphasizes another key aspect—“Affordability.” 
In helping generate investment alternatives, and illuminating advantages and 
disadvantages of those alternatives, AoAs have the potential to contribute to requirements 
generation in the Planning phase of PPBE, and through DAS decision milestones, also in 
the Programming phase of PPBE. However, according to the GAO: “while JCIDS provides a 
framework for reviewing and validating needs […] the vast majority of capability proposals 
that enter the JCIDS process are validated or approved without accounting for resources 
                                                
2 According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), over the next 5 years, the DoD plans to 
spend more than $357 billion on development and procurement of major defense acquisition 
programs (GAO, 2009, p. 4). 
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[funding, budgets] […] that will be needed to acquire the desired capabilities” (GAO, 2009, p. 
6).3  
We believe the GAO’s results reflect a weakness in the way AoAs have traditionally 
been structured. While AoAs provide a sharp focus on cost and effectiveness estimates of 
competing alternatives, the affordability (funding/budget realities) of the overall program is at 
best implicit, and usually conducted ex-post.4 This is reflected in the GAO’s concern that “at 
the program level, the key cause of poor outcomes is the approval of programs with 
business cases [e.g., AoAs] that contain inadequate knowledge about […] resources 
[funding] […] needed to execute them” (2009, p. 7).   
Yet DoD Directive 5000.01 explicitly states that, “All participants in the acquisition 
system shall recognize the reality of fiscal constraints […]. DoD components shall plan […] 
based on realistic projections of the dollars […] likely to be available […and] the user shall 
address affordability in establishing capability needs” (USD (AT&L), 2007, Enclosure 1, p. 
5). 
For all major (ACAT 1) defense acquisition programs, an AoA is required at key 
milestone decision points (i.e., A, B, C). Affordability assessments are required at Milestones 
B and C for major defense acquisition programs and automated information systems (USD 
(AT&L), 2008, Enclosure 4, p. 40).  
According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, the purpose of an affordability 
assessment is to demonstrate that the program’s projected funding requirements are 
realistic and achievable.5 “In general, the assessment should address program funding over 
the six-year programming period, and several years beyond. The assessment should also 
show how the projected funding fits within the overall DoD Component plan” (DoD, 2006, 
July 7, Section 3.2.2.).6  
                                                
3 “A 2008 DoD directive established nine joint capability-area portfolios, each managed by civilian and 
military co-leads […]. However, without […] control over resources [funding/budgets], the department 
is at risk […] of not knowing if its systems are being developed within available resources 
[funding/budgets]” (GAO, 2009, p. 11). 
4 “Typically, the last analytical section of the AoA plan deals with the planned approach for the cost-
effectiveness comparisons of the study alternatives” (DoD, 2006, July 7, Section 3.3). Note that there 
is no mention of “affordability,” but instead only an ex-post cost-effectiveness trade-off that implies a 
concern for affordability. Moreover, this trade-off occurs at the end of a process in which alternatives 
under consideration have been developed independently of any cost/budget/funding/affordability 
constraint. The US Marine Corps (PA&E) has a similar approach to structuring an AoA. 
5 Since this assessment requires a DoD Component corporate perspective, the affordability 
assessment should not be prepared by the program manager nor should it rely too heavily on the 
user. It requires a higher-level perspective capable of balancing budget trade-offs (affordability) 
across a set of users (2006, July 7, Section 3.2.2). 
6 A first step in the program’s affordability assessment is to portray the projected annual 
modernization funding (RDT&E plus procurement, measured as TOA) in constant dollars for the six-
year programming period and for twelve years beyond. Similar funding streams for other acquisition 
programs in the same mission area also would be included. What remains to be determined is 
whether this projected funding growth is realistically affordable relative to the DoD Component’s most 
likely overall funding. The model in this study proposes structuring the Economic Evaluation of 
Alternatives not only for a most likely budget but also for an optimistic and pessimistic budget. 
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The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) essentially embeds an explicit 
affordability assessment into an AoA. In preparing affordability assessments, one possible 
source of data is the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).7 According to the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook, affordability assessments should provide details as to how excess 
funding demands will be accommodated by reductions in other mission areas, or in other 
accounts.8 This Opportunity Cost Approach is the last of six ways proposed in this study to 
structure an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA). 
Nesting the Requirements Generation and Defense Acquisition Systems within 
PPBE suggests formulating the military’s acquisition problem in terms of identifying and 
funding specific defense investments that maximize value (performance or effectiveness) for 
a given budget. If AoAs were framed as a constrained optimization—i.e., maximizing 
performance subject to a budget constraint (or alternatively minimizing costs subject to a 
given level of performance)—they could be used to support resource-allocation decisions in 
the Programming phase of PPBE.9 These dual constrained-optimization approaches 
represent the first two of six ways proposed in this study to structure an Economic 
Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA). 
Unfortunately, MCDM techniques typically applied to structure an AoA do not easily 
lend themselves to this interpretation. As a consequence, instead of being constrained by 
budgets, budgets are more often the output of an AoA, generating and/or supporting so-
called “funding requirements.”  Our third approach to structuring an Economic Evaluation of 
Alternatives (EEoA) turns this on its head. 
Instead of generating a budget through the AoA process, we propose that decision-
makers or analysts forecast an optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely budget as part of the 
PPBE process, and then approach vendors to generate alternatives that fit within that 
budget envelope.10 This offers an alternate approach to defense investment decisions based 
on explicit funding (resource/budget/affordability) scenarios. This also supports the “long-
                                                
7 An output of the DoD’s PPBE process, the FYDP is an OSD database that contains future budget 
projections. 
8 Note that in the “off-year” of the biennial PPBE process, DoD Components are restricted to the 
second year of the biennial budget and are required to submit Program Change Proposals (PCPs) 
and/or Budget Change Proposals (BCPs) to account for any program-cost increases, schedule 
delays, etc. PCPs address issues over a multi-year period, whereas BCPs address issues focused on 
the upcoming budget year. Moreover, to stay within fiscal constraints, BCPs and PCPs must identify 
resource reductions in other programs to offset any cost growth. This is similar in spirit to the 
“opportunity cost” approach that we propose as one of six ways to structure an EEoA. 
9 Translating the budget implications of these decisions into the usual Congressional appropriation 
categories (Military Personnel, Procurement, Operations & Maintenance (O&M), Military Construction, 
etc.) generates the defense budget and Future Year Defense Program (FYDP). 
10 This is in the spirit of the Department of the Army’s Acquisition Procedures, which explicitly state 
that “Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) applies to all defense acquisition programs [….and] 
treats cost as an input to, rather than an output of, the materiel requirements and acquisition 
processes.” The Army guidance emphasizes “CAIV is focused on […] meeting operational 
requirements with a solution that is affordable […and that does] not exceed cost constraints [and to] 
establish CAIV-based cost objectives (development, procurement, and sustainment costs) early in the 
acquisition process.”  Moreover, the “RFP must […] solicit from potential suppliers an approach […] 
for meeting CAIV objectives” (DoA, 1999, July 15, p. 63). 
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standing DoD policy to seek full funding of acquisition programs, based on the most likely 
cost” (DoD, 2006, July 7, Chapter 3.23). 
The primary goal of this study is to improve defense decisions by bringing the 
taxpayer up-front alongside the warfighter in the defense acquisition process. This is 
accomplished by explicitly introducing an affordability assessment in EEoA through 
optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely funding scenarios. Unlike traditional MCDM 
approaches to AoAs that focus on cost and operational effectiveness, an EEoA adds a third 
dimension. It makes a clear distinction between the “lifecycle cost” or “price” of an 
alternative, its operational effectiveness, and “funding” (budget or resources) available. 
The EEoA approach responds to two fundamental challenges highlighted by the 
GAO that continue to face the DoD’s Defense Acquisition System: “(1) [to make] better 
decisions about which programs should be pursued or not pursued given existing and 
expected funding; [and] (2) [to develop] an analytical approach to better prioritize capability 
needs” (GAO, 2009, March 18, Highlights).  
In stressing affordability, EEoA offers an analytical approach that begins to resolve a 
major concern expressed by the GAO:  
DoD’s processes for identifying war-fighter needs [JCIDS], allocating resources 
[PPBE], and developing and procuring weapon systems [DAS…] are fragmented 
[…so that] DoD commits to more programs than resources [budgets] can support 
[…]. DoD allows programs to begin development without a full understanding [of] the 
resources [budget/funding] needed.11 (2009, March 18, Highlights)  
Whereas funding decisions for major programs take place through the PPBE 
process, the GAO finds that: 
[T]he process does not produce an accurate picture of the department’s resource 
needs [funding/budget requirements] for weapon system programs [...]. Ultimately, 
the process produces more demand for new weapon system programs than 
available resources can support.12 (2009, March 18, p. 6)  
The EEoA approach proposed in this study represents an important step in 
integrating the DoD’s requirements generation and Defense Acquisition Systems with 
PPBE. For instance, in considering alternative budget scenarios that rely on the FYDP, it 
injects an explicit constrained-optimization approach into the Defense Acquisition System 
(DAS) that parallels the one already embedded in the PPBE process.13  
                                                
11 “The lack of early systems engineering, acceptance of unreliable cost estimates based on overly 
optimistic assumptions, failure to commit full funding, and the addition of new requirements well into 
the acquisition cycle all contribute to poor outcomes” (GAO, 2009, March 18). Whereas this study 
focuses on funding risks, Melese, Franck, Angelis and Dillard (2007, January) introduce an economic 
approach called “Transaction Cost Analysis” that addresses the other GAO concerns. 
12 The cost of many programs reviewed by the GAO exceeded planned funding/budget levels (GAO, 
2008, July 2). 
13 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 titled Preparation and Submission of 
Budget Estimates is the official guidance on the preparation and submission of budget estimates to 
Congress. The Army’s Acquisition guidance emphasizes “the requirement for presenting the full 
funding for an acquisition program—that is the total cost [for] a given system as reflected in the most 
recent FYDP […] pertains to all acquisition programs” (DoA, 1999, July 15, p. 41). 
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In generating alternatives under optimistic, pessimistic and most likely budget 
scenarios, the EEoA requires explicit interaction with the PPBE process. In sharp contrast 
with the MCDM approach that underlies most AoAs, the EEoA approaches explicitly identify 
and emphasize budgets, funding, and affordability. Ultimately, widespread adoption of the 
EEoA would contribute to the goal of:  
greater consultation between requirements, budget, and acquisition processes [that] 
could help improve the department’s […] portfolio of weapon programs […]. This 
means that decision makers responsible for weapon system requirements, funding, 
and acquisition execution must establish an investment strategy in concert […], 
assuring requirements for specific weapon systems are clearly defined and 
achievable given available resources [funding/budgets]. (GAO, 2008, July 2, p.10, 
14) 
The next section offers a brief description and critical evaluation of the status quo. 
We review two common decision criteria used in cost-effectiveness analyses. The first is the 
popular “bang-for-the-buck” or Benefit/Cost ratio. The second criterion is essentially a 
weighted average of cost and effectiveness, a decision rule generated by the standard 
static, deterministic MCDM approach to cost-effectiveness analysis that underpins most 
contemporary AoAs. 
Section 3 offers a set of alternate approaches to resolve the decision-criterion 
problem. Six intuitive approaches are described to structure an Economic Evaluation of 
Alternatives (EEoA).14 Section 4 concludes with a Decision Map to guide analysts and 
decision-makers in selecting which of the six approaches is best suited for them to structure 
an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA). 
A Critical Evaluation of the Status Quo: Two Popular Decision 
Criteria 
Today, most modern military investment (and disinvestment) decisions are supported 
by some form of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The US Department of Defense (DoD) applies 
CBA to anything from milestone decisions for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs 
and MAISs), to outsourcing (OMB Circular A-76; Eger & Wilsker, 2007), to public-private 
partnerships, to privatization, to Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions (see OMB 
Circular A-94; FAR; DFARS; DoD 5000 series, etc.). 
When benefits cannot be expressed in monetary terms, analysts develop so-called 
“measures of effectiveness” (MOEs), in which case CBA is generally referred to as “cost-
effectiveness” analysis (OMB, 1992, October 29).15  The most common methodology and 
                                                
14 Appendix 3 (in the Mathematical Appendix—available upon request) reveals the static, 
deterministic, multi-stage, constrained-optimization, micro-economic production (procurement 
auction) model that underpins the central EEoA approach. 
15 Fisher (1965) argues that “numerous terms […] convey the same general meaning […] ‘cost-benefit 
analysis,’ ‘cost-effectiveness analysis,’ ‘systems analysis,’ ‘operations analysis,’ etc. Because of such 
terminological confusion, […] all of these terms are rejected and ‘cost-utility analysis’ is employed 
instead” (p. 185). Although this study uses the terms “cost-benefit” and “cost-effectiveness” 
interchangeably, the assumption throughout is that neither “benefits” nor “effectiveness” can be 
measured in monetary terms. 
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approach for building MOEs and structuring cost-effectiveness analyses is alternately 
referred to as Multiple-criteria Decision-making (MCDM), Multi-attribute Utility Theory 
(MAUT), or Multiple-objective Decision-making (MODM) (see French, 1986; Keeney & 
Raiffa, 1976; Clemen, 1996; Kirkwood, 1997; Parnell, 2006; Ramesh & Zionts, 1997; etc.). 
This study describes some limitations of the current decision criteria methodology 
and proposes an alternate methodology derived explicitly from a constrained-optimization 
approach, closer in spirit to the economic origins of cost-effectiveness analysis in Gorman 
(1980); Hitch and McKean (1967); Michael and Becker (1973); Stigler (1945); Theil (1952); 
etc.—although often attributed to Lancaster (1969a; 1969b; 1971; 1979). The six 
approaches we offer to structure an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) resolves 
the decision-criterion problem. A key difference between the MCDM approach to an AoA 
and the Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) is that instead of modeling decision 
alternatives from competing vendors as points in cost-effectiveness space, the EEoA 
models the alternatives as functions of optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely funding 
(resource/budget) scenarios.  
The EEoA approach directly responds to the GAO’s observation that affordability 
needs to be an integral part of any business case analysis of alternatives: “[o]ur work in 
[uncovering] best practices has found that an executable business case [requires] 
demonstrated evidence that […] the chosen concept can be developed and produced within 
existing resources [funding/budgets]” (GAO, 2008, p. 6). Benchmarking against the private 
sector, the GAO emphasizes that “successful commercial enterprises […] follow a 
disciplined integrated process during which the pros and cons of competing proposals are 
assessed based on strategic objectives […] and available resources [budgets/funding]” 
(GAO, 2009, March 18, p. 5, emphasis added).  
A distinctive feature of defense investment decisions is that multiple criteria such as 
cost and effectiveness cannot easily be combined into a single, overall objective such as 
“government profitability.” The problem of ranking public investments when benefits cannot 
be expressed in dollars has spawned an extensive literature in management science, 
operations research and the decision sciences. 
This literature models investment alternatives as bundles of measurable 
characteristics (attributes or criteria). Techniques that mostly fall under the umbrella of 
MCDM are routinely used by analysts and decision-makers (for example, through AoAs) to 
guide public investment decisions. The development of “Measures of Effectiveness” 
(MOE’s)16 and lifecycle cost calculations are used to help rank alternatives. An ongoing 
concern is how to integrate costs and effectiveness in the final selection process (see Henry 
& Hogan, 1993; Melese & Bonsper, 1996, December; Melese, Stroup, & Lowe, 1997; etc.). 
In their pioneering work applying economic analysis to defense, Hitch and McKean 
(1967) define a “criterion” as the “test by which we choose one alternative […] rather than 
                                                
16 The Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Section 3.3.1: AoA Plan, states that “measures of 
effectiveness […] provide the details that allow the proficiency of each alternative in performing the 
mission tasks to be quantified […]. A measure of performance typically is a quantitative measure of a 
system characteristic (e.g., range, […] logistics footprint, etc.) chosen to enable calculation of one or 
more measures of effectiveness” (DoD, 2006, July 7). 
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another” (p. 160). They stress that “[t]he choice of an appropriate economic criterion is […] 
the central problem in designing a [cost-effectiveness] analysis” (p. 160). 
The two most popular decision criteria used to integrate cost and effectiveness in 
AoAs are: 1) to construct Benefit/Cost (or MOE/Cost) ratios, and 2) to assign a weight on 
cost relative to effectiveness and construct a weighted average of cost and effectiveness 
(often using a linear, separable, additive “value” function). The latter decision criterion is a 
common prescription for AoAs that emerges from MCDM. Both approaches, however, are 
problematic.  
We first focus on what is arguably the most commonly applied criterion—
Benefit/Cost ratios. Then, we move to the most common MCDM decision criterion—to 
assign a relative weight to the cost (price) of alternatives in an overall value function. At first 
glance, the Benefit/Cost (MOE/Cost) ratio or “bang-for-the-buck” criterion is appealing. 
However, it turns out to be largely meaningless unless alternatives are constructed for a 
specific budget scenario or to achieve a specific level of effectiveness. Meanwhile, the 
second decision criterion can also be misleading in the absence of a specific budget 
scenario (and a good understanding of “opportunity costs”).17  
“Bang-for-the-Buck” (Benefit/Cost or MOE/Cost) Ratios 
It is relatively well known that a Benefit/Cost ratio (or “bang-for-the-buck”) decision 
criterion is largely meaningless unless alternatives are constructed for a specific budget 
scenario or to achieve a specific level of effectiveness. Yet, the next four examples illustrate 
that this remains a popular decision criterion, even when alternatives differ in both costs and 
effectiveness.  
1. In a military text entitled Executive Decision Making, the author offers that 
“[w]hen we cannot fix cost or effectiveness, we might combine them to help us 
choose between alternatives […]. If neither can be fixed […] we can establish a 
cost/effectiveness ratio” (Murray, 2002, pp. 6-3, 6-10). 
2. The Department of the Army’s Economic Analysis Manual, in a section entitled 
Comparing Costs and Benefits, states: “When the results yield unequal cost and 
unequal benefits […] in this situation all alternatives […] may be ranked in 
decreasing order of their benefit/cost ratios” (DoA, 2001, February, p. 32).  
3. Finally, in a recent landmark RAND study on Capabilities-based Planning, the 
author falls into the same trap. In a section entitled Choosing Among Options in a 
Portfolio, Paul Davis (2002) develops “A Notional Scorecard for Assessing 
Alternatives in a Portfolio Framework,” where alternatives differ in both their costs 
and effectiveness. Nevertheless, the decision criterion recommended by the 
author to select among alternative options in “[t]he last column is the ratio of 
effectiveness over cost” (pp. 45-46). 
 
                                                
17 Ironically, given a budget scenario, there is no need to take the MCDM approach that underpins 
most AoAs since it is possible to adopt the EEoA approach—which constructs alternatives to fit within 
a budget envelope, converting the problem into a straightforward MOE maximization. 
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Each of these diverse examples recommends using a Benefit/Cost ratio as the 
decision criterion. However, another RAND analyst, Gene Fisher (1971), clearly points out in 
his classic text Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis:  
The use of ratios usually poses no problem as long as the analysis is conducted in 
[a] framework […] with the level of effectiveness or cost fixed. However, it is common 
to encounter studies where this has not been done, with the result that the 





















Benefit/Cost (A1)  > Benefit/Cost (A2)
Is A1 really superior to A2 ?
LESSON: DANGER in using Benefit/Cost (Bang/Buck) or 
Cost/Benefit (Buck/Bang) ratios without anchoring Budget or MOE
Marginal Benefit/Marginal Cost
“The perceived benefits of the 
higher priced proposal shall 
merit the additional cost…”  
www.arnet.gov FAR 15.101-1(2)c
 
Figure 1. Inappropriate Application of Benefit/Cost Ratios 
A simple, extreme example helps illustrate the danger in using Benefit/Cost ratios 
without anchoring the Budget, or a specified Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). Suppose 
Alternative A1 in Figure 1 costs $10 million and yields an MOE of 10 utils, while Alternative 
A2 costs $1 billion and yields an MOE of 900 utils.18 Applying the Benefit/Cost ratio criterion 
indicates that A1 has a bigger “bang-for-the-buck” since it returns 1 util per million dollars, 
while A2 only offers 0.9 utils per million dollars. Strictly using Benefit/Cost ratios to rank 
alternatives is dangerous in this case since it ignores the absolute magnitude of the costs 
involved. Suppose the situation was reversed and A2 offered a higher Benefit/Cost ratio 
than A1. Anyone that chooses A2 strictly on the basis of “bang-for-the-buck” would be in for 
an unpleasant surprise (a 1-billion vs. 10-million-dollar decision). 
Since affordability and opportunity costs are always a concern in public investment 
decisions (especially those made through the PPBE process, requirements generation 
system, and Defense Acquisition System), it is imperative that analysts and decision-makers 
explore the budget and opportunity cost implications of going with the high-cost alternative 
                                                
18 In Figure 1, the slope of any ray from the origin represents a constant Benefit/Cost ratio anywhere 
along that ray. The steeper the slope, the greater the Benefit/Cost ratio. 
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(for example, the extra expenditure of $990 million for an additional 890 utils of MOE) or, 
equivalently, of the savings in going with the low-cost alternative.  
In applying economic analysis to defense, Hitch and McKean (1967) warn: 
One common “compromise criteria” is to pick that [alternative] which has the highest 
ratio of effectiveness to cost. [M]aximizing this ration is the [decision] criterion. 
[While] it may be a plausible criterion at first glance […] it allows the absolute 
magnitude of [effectiveness] or cost to roam at will. In fact, the only way to know 
what such a ratio really means is to tighten the constraint until either a single budget 
(or particular degree of effectiveness) is specified. And at that juncture, the ratio 
reduces itself to the test of maximum effectiveness for a given budget (or a specified 
effectiveness at minimum cost), and might better have been put that way at the 
outset […]. The test of maximum effectiveness for a given budget (or alternatively, 
minimum cost of achieving a specified level of effectiveness) […] seems much less 
likely to mislead the unwary.19 (pp. 165-167) 
Our Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) approach follows this and another 
of Hitch and McKean’s (1967) recommendations. “As a starter […] several budget sizes can 
be assumed. If the same [alternative] is preferred for all […] budgets, that system is 
dominant […]. If the same [alternative] is not dominant the use of several […] budgets is 
nevertheless an essential step, because it provides vital information to the decision maker” 
(p. 176). 
We conclude that the use of Benefit/Cost ratios as a decision criterion poses no 
problem as long as the analysis is structured with the level of either utility (MOE) or 
budget/funding fixed.20 Since Benefit/Cost ratios are “misleading”21 in any context in which 
alternatives differ in both costs (price) and benefits (MOE), decision scientists have 
developed another decision criterion to rank investment options in AoAs. This second 
popular decision criterion is examined below. 
Weighted Averages of Cost and Effectiveness: Assigning a Weight to Cost 
MCDM is often used as an umbrella term, and we will do so here. “In the literature 
the terms multi-attribute decision making (MADM), multi-criteria decision making (MCDM), 
and multi-objective decision making (MODM) are used almost interchangeably” (French, 
1986, p. 105). In a typical MCDM evaluation, a decision-maker (DM) is asked to identify 
desired attributes (criteria/characteristics) of a project, program or system to fill some critical 
capability gap, given a specific threat scenario. Next, the DM is asked to reveal agreeable 
                                                
19 The authors continue: “Of course, if the ratios did not alter with changes in the scale of 
achievement (or cost, the higher ratio would indicate the preferred system, no matter what the scale 
[…]. But to assume that such ratios are constant is inadmissible some of the time and hazardous the 
rest” (Hitch & McKean, 1967, p. 167). 
20 An additional (necessary and sufficient) condition is a linear, separable, additive objective function. 
21 “Usually, ratios are regarded as potentially misleading because they mask important information” 
(DoD, 2006, July 7, Section 3.3.1). 
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trade-offs among those attributes. An exercise of this sort helps analysts uncover the DM’s 
underlying trade-offs or “utility” function, used to generate a Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) 
for each alternative.22  
In attempting to understand a DM’s utility function, decision scientists beginning with 
Saaty (1977) bridged an important implementation gap. Objectives (analytic) hierarchy 
approaches were developed that help reveal underlying utility functions. For example, an 
objectives hierarchy can help a DM work down from a high-level objective (provide national 
security) to a relevant set of sub-objectives (an effective airlift capability), to specific 
attributes (mobility, transportability, etc.), and, finally, to measurable characteristics 
(mobility=speed (S), range (R); transportability=payload (P), weight (W), etc.).  
The outcome in this example is a utility function for airlift capability: U=U(M(S,R); 
T(P,W)), where the characteristics might be measured respectively in mph, miles, cubic feet, 
and pounds. The standard assumption in the literature is to define a linear, separable 
additive utility function that generates an MOE for each alternative that is roughly analogous 
to a weighted average of its attributes (provided certain assumptions are satisfied such as 
“additive independence,” etc. (see French, 1986; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; Keeney, 1994). 
There is a vast literature concerned with eliciting preference weights and the normalization 
of characteristics data that involves several important issues discussed in the Mathematical 
Appendix (available upon request).  
Temporarily overlooking these issues, it is interesting to note in passing that 
maximizing a linear multi-attribute utility function subject to a budget constraint yields a 
decision rule analogous to the Benefit/Cost ratio criterion discussed above. Under the 
assumption of a fixed budget and linear additive separable utility function, the Benefit/Cost 
decision rule can be used to evaluate alternatives. In this case, the winning alternative is the 
one that generates the highest MOE per dollar or the biggest “bang-for-the-buck.” With a 
more general (non-linear) utility function, the equivalent optimization generates a more 
complex Marginal Benefit/Marginal Cost decision rule. 
In reality, the MCDM techniques that underpin most AoAs often do not rely on an 
explicit discussion of the budget (affordability/funding/resources) to structure the decision 
problem. As a consequence, the problem is generally not structured as a constrained 
optimization, as described above. 
 
 
                                                
22 “Measures of Effectiveness […] provide the details that allow the proficiency of each alternative in 
performing the mission tasks to be quantified […]. A measure of performance typically is a 
quantitative measure of a system characteristic (e.g., range, etc.) chosen to enable calculation of one 
or more measures of effectiveness […]. The cost analysis normally is performed in parallel with the 
operational effectiveness analysis. It is equal in importance in the overall AoA process […]. [I]ts 
results are later combined with the operational effectiveness analysis to portray cost-effectiveness 
comparisons” (DoD, 2006, July 7, Section 3.3.1). 
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Instead, a popular decision-analysis approach is to simply attach a weight to cost 
and introduce it directly into the utility function.23 This common practice generates an overall 
“value” function that is essentially a weighted average of cost and effectiveness. The 
solution is found through an unconstrained optimization by selecting the alternative that 
maximizes the “overall effectiveness” or “value” function V=V(MOE; COST). “Deterministic 
decision analysis is concerned with finding the most preferred alternative in decision space 
by constructing a value function representing a decision maker’s preference structure, and 
then using the value function to identify the most preferred solution” (Ramesh & Zionts, 
1997, p. 421). 
The linear, additive separable version of this value function is often used to calculate 
a positively weighted MOE and negatively weighted cost for each alternative. For example, 
see Beil & Wein (2003), Che (1993), Clemen (1996), Kirkwood (1997), French (1986), 
Keeney & Raiffa (1976), Keeney (1994), Hwang and Yoon (1981), Liberatore (1987), Pinker, 
Samuel, and Batcher (1995), Varzsonyi (1995), etc. According to the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook: “An AoA is an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, suitability, 
and life-cycle cost of alternatives that satisfy established capability needs.” (DoD, 2006, July 
7, Chapter 3.3) 
The typical decision sciences’ approach to an AoA can be described as: 
Given several Alternatives, select the preferred alternative that provides the Best 
Value, or Maximizes: V(MOE,COST) = w1*MOE - w2*COST 
This requires two important modeling efforts: 1) MOE—Building an Effectiveness 
model (non-cost factors; performance=quality, schedule, etc.); and 2) COST—Building a 
Cost model (costs/prices; estimate total system lifecycle costs, total ownership costs). Once 
the independent modeling efforts are completed, the overwhelming challenge is to assign a 
relative weight to cost (w2 in the example above). A typical response in the applied literature 
is to ask the DM: “How important is cost relative to effectiveness?” 
A key proponent of this decision methodology offers an example of administrators 
and regulators asking questions such as: “Which is more important, costs or pollutant 
concentrations?” (Keeney, 1994, p. 797). As the author is quick to point out, the problem 
with this approach is that without some estimate of the total budget available or any 
knowledge of opportunity costs of funds, one cannot expect the DM to provide a sensible 
answer. In fact, the author warns: “I personally do not want some administrator to give two 
minutes of thought to the matter and state that pollutant concentrations are three times as 
                                                
23 “In the European Union, a legislative package intended to simplify and modernize existing public 
procurement laws was recently adopted. As before, the new law allows for two different award 
criteria: lowest cost and best economic value. The new provisions require that the procurement 
authority publishes ex-ante the relative weighting of each criteria used  when best economic value is 
the basis for the award” (see European Commission, 2004a; 2004b).  
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important as cost” 24 (Keeney, 1994, p. 797). The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) both promote similar approaches:25  
 “The solicitation shall state whether all evaluation factors other than cost/price, 
when combined [i.e., MOE], are significantly more important than, approximately 
equal to, or significantly less important than cost/price” (General Services 
Administration, 2005, March, Section 15.101-1(2)). 
  “The specific weight given to cost or price shall be at least equal to all other 
evaluation factors combined unless quantifiable performance measures can be 
used to assess value and can be independently evaluated” (OMB, 2003, p. B-8). 
Consider an extreme case. If we suppose that affordability is not an issue, then 
funding is not an issue and the budget is not binding, making costs irrelevant. In this case, a 
zero weight should be assigned to costs and the analysis of alternatives can be made 
exclusively on the basis of MOEs.  
Thus, any weight applied to costs must reflect an implicit concern about affordability 
(budgets/funding levels). Figures 2 and 3 offer an illustration. Figure 2 reflects a situation in 
which the decision-maker believes costs to be important enough (and thus assigns a 
sufficiently large relative weight, w2, to cost) that the preferred alternative is A1 (the low-cost 
option). The opposite case is illustrated in Figure 3.26 How does a decision-maker (DM) 
decide on appropriate weights to assign to MOE and costs? A key hypothesis in the EEoA is 
that if a DM pays any attention to costs (i.e., places any weight on cost) it is because there 
is a (implicit) budget constraint or opportunity cost of funds for the program. This is directly 
related to our higher-level affordability discussions in Section 1 that involved requirements 
generation (JCIDS), the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and PPBE.27  
The irony, as Keeney (1994) rightly observed, is that to assign any weight to costs 
requires the DM to have some understanding of the budget (funding/resources) available 
and an appreciation of relevant opportunity costs. But if this information is known, then the 
DM has no reason to take the MCDM approach and assign a weight on costs since the 
more robust, constrained-optimization (mathematical programming) EEoA approach 
becomes available. 
                                                
24 Surprisingly, the author has continued to write prolifically in this field and continued to promote this 
decision criterion, apparently never taking the time to reflect back on these key observations. 
25 According to the FAR, “source selection” is the decision process used in competitive, negotiated 
contracting to select the proposal that offers the “Best Value” to the government. “In different types of 
acquisition, the relative importance of cost or price may vary” (General Services Administration, 2005, 
Section 15.101). In describing some lessons learned, Gansler (2003) recommend: Use performance-
based contracting; Do not list tasks [mix of inputs], instead state results sought or problems to be 
solved [desired attributes/characteristics of outputs/outcomes]; Choose contractors according to “Best 
Value”; in the source selection, trade-off performance and price instead of simply awarding to the 
lowest bidder (p. 15). 
26 Note that the slope of the straight-line indifference curves that reflect the DM’s relative preference 
(or trade-offs) between MOE and Cost are given by –w2/w1. 
27 In fact, the Army’s Economic Analysis (EA) Manual states that “[a] good EA should go beyond the 
decision-making process and become an integral part of developing requirements in the PPBE 
process” (DoA, 2001, February, p. 12). 
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In fact, it is relatively straightforward to demonstrate that even if the DM had perfect 
information about the budget (funding/affordability) and attempted to interpret that 
information through a weight assigned to the cost (price) of alternatives (as illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3), the rankings that result would only coincidentally correspond to rankings 
obtained under the full information, constrained-optimization EEoA (in which an MOE utility 
function is maximized subject to the budget constraint).28 
This is a damning result that clearly undermines the way MCDM is typically applied 
to support AoAs. If there is no guarantee this MCDM approach will yield consistent results 
under full information, then using this criterion with less than perfect information (i.e., without 
explicit assumptions about affordability/budgets/funding), is clearly problematic. In fact GAO 
emphasizes “[w]ith high levels of uncertainty […] funding needs are often understated” 

















So Which Alternative is “Best”?
Decision Sciences Approach
Max V = V(MOE,Cost) = w1*MOE - w2*Cost
Ask Decision Maker What is More Important: MOE or Cost?
(dMOE/dCost = w2/w1)
MOE(Utils)
If Cost has a sufficiently 
greater weight (w2>>w1), 




Figure 2. When Cost is Relatively More Important than Effectiveness 
                                                
28 The weight on cost in the unconstrained-optimization (MCDM) approach roughly corresponds to the 
Lagrangian multiplier (shadow price) of the budget constraint in the constrained-optimization (the 
EEoA approach). 
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Which Alternative is “Best”?
Decision Sciences Approach
Max V = V(MOE,Cost) = w1*MOE - w2*Cost
(dMOE/dCost = w2/w1)
MOE(Utils)
If Performance has a 
sufficiently greater weight




Figure 3. When Effectiveness is Relatively More Important than Cost 
 
In conclusion, the popular MCDM, Decision Sciences approach that underpins many 
AoAs implicitly attempts to capture affordability through a relative weight assigned to cost in 
a value function such as, Maximize V = V(MOE,Cost) = w1*MOE - w2*Cost. 29 Again, to 
quote Hitch and McKean (1967):  
One ubiquitous source of confusion is the attempt to maximize gain [w1*MOE] while 
minimizing cost [w2*Cost] […] If a person approaches a problem with the intention of 
using such a [decision] criterion, he is confused to begin with […] [A] criterion in 
which the budget […] is specified has the virtue of being aboveboard. (pp.165-167)  
A very real risk in this MCDM approach is that if AoAs “fail to balance needs with 
resources [funding/budgets], […] un-executable programs [are allowed] to move forward, 
[and] program managers […] are handed […] a low probability of success” (GAO, 2009, p. 
10). Rather than attempt to get a DM to reveal their affordability concerns through a weight 
assigned to costs (or prices) of alternatives, the EEoA recommends a more transparent and 
accountable approach—to treat “cost as an independent variable” (CAIV).  
The CAIV concept adopted here follows a definition posted on the OUSD (A&T) 
website in early 1999 that CAIV is the “DoD’s acquisition methodology of making technical 
and schedule performance a function of available budgeted resources” (see Lorell & Graser, 
                                                
29 In a section describing “Building a Model,” Fisher (1965) comments: “Since by definition a model is 
an abstraction from reality, the model must be built on a set of assumptions. These assumptions must 
be made explicit. If they are not, this is to be regarded as a defect of the model design” (p. 190). It is 
easy to conceal the importance of affordability (budget/funding) issues in the MCDM, Decision 
Sciences approach that underpins many AoAs. In sharp contrast, the Economic Evaluation of 
Alternatives approach encourages explicit affordability (budget/funding) assumptions.  
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2001, p. 33). OMB Circular A-109 for Major Systems Acquisition mentions the goal of 
“design-to-cost”: “Under the CAIV philosophy, performance and schedule are considered 
dependent on the funds available for a specific program” (OMB, 1976). According to the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook, “all participants […] are expected to recognize the reality of 
fiscal constraints” (DoD, 2006, July 7, Section 3.2.4). 
Six Ways to Structure an “Economic Evaluation of 
Alternatives” (EEoA) 
We have identified (what we believe are the only) six ways that analysts and 
decision-makers can structure a deterministic Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) 
that avoid the issues (decision-criteria problems) discussed in the last section. These involve 
two main categories of approaches: 1) Intra-program analysis and 2) Inter-program analysis. 
The first, third, and fourth approaches are very much in the spirit of “cost as an independent 
variable” (CAIV). By recalling the earlier quote from Hitch and McKean (1967), we are 
reminded of the first two EEoA approaches: “[A] criterion in which the budget or level of 
effectiveness specified has the virtue of being aboveboard” (p. 167). The six EEoA 
approaches appear in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Six Approaches to Structure an EEoA 
 
 
In the case of Intra-program analysis, the decision-maker (DM) associated with the 
program is assumed to have sufficient information to be able to select an alternative without 
reference to competing programs. That is not the case in Inter-program analysis, which 
requires an explicit “opportunity cost approach.”  
There are two possibilities highlighted within the Intra-program analysis approach. 
The first possibility is when DMs (analysts) are able to construct/define/build alternatives 
(“endogenous alternatives”). The second possibility is when the alternatives are already 
constructed/defined/built and must simply be evaluated (“exogenous alternatives”).  
I) INTRA-PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
A) Build Alternatives 
1. Fixed Budget Approach 
2. Fixed Effectiveness Approach  
3. Expansion Path Approach (Construct alternatives as Cost-
output/Effectiveness Relations or “Response Functions”: Multi-stage 
Micro-economic Production Model) 
B) Modify Existing Alternatives: “Level the Playing Field”  
4. Modified Budget Approach: GOTO 1.  
5. Modified Effectiveness Approach: GOTO 2.  
II) INTER-PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
6. Opportunity Cost/Benefit Approach 
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This section describes each of the six Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) 
approaches in some detail. The Mathematical Appendix describes the static, deterministic, 
multi-stage, constrained-optimization, micro-economic production (procurement auction) 
model that underpins the third, and most general, approach to the EEoA, the Expansion 
Path Approach. We begin with the Fixed Budget Approach, based on the earlier quote from 
Hitch and McKean (1967): “The test of maximum effectiveness for a given budget seems 
much less likely to mislead the unwary” (p. 167, emphasis added).  
1. Fixed Budget Approach 
In his groundbreaking book Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis, Fisher (1971) 
states: “In the fixed budget case, the alternatives being considered are compared on the 
basis of effectiveness likely to be attainable for the specified budget level” (p. 12). In other 
words, Fisher also explains that, “The analysis attempts to determine that alternative (or 
feasible combination […]) which is likely to produce the highest effectiveness” (p. 10). 
In a footnote, Fisher (1971) adds: “the fixed budget situation is somewhat analogous 
to the economic theory of consumer [optimization…]. For a given level of income [budget] 
the consumer is assumed to behave in such a way that he maximizes his utility” (p. 10). 
Drawing on this comparison, the Fixed Budget Approach to the EEoA leverages Lancaster’s 
“characteristics approach to demand theory” (Lancaster, 1969a; 1969b; 1971; 1979). 
Originating in the works of Gorman (1980), Stigler (1945), Theil (1952), and others (that also 
provided an early foundation for some of the MCDM literature), Lancaster offers economists 
(and defense analysts) a familiar way to analyze the consumer (or defense DM’s) choice 
problem (such as choosing among defense investment alternatives).  
In Lancaster’s model, different vendors generate different bundles of characteristics 
evaluated by decision-makers (“consumers”). Lancaster’s model proposes that to choose 
among alternative bundles of commodities (say computers), defense decision-makers 
maximize their utility function, defined over a desired set of criteria, attributes, or 
characteristics—hence the term adopted by decision scientists, Multiple-criteria Decision-
making (MCDM)—subject to a budget [funding/affordability] constraint, which is mostly not 
adopted by decision scientists.30 In this approach, the cost-effective alternative is the one 
that, for a given budget or expenditure, generates the best mix of characteristics, evaluated 
using the decision-maker’s utility function.  
                                                
30 Note that we refer to the usual deterministic “utility function” that is conventional in the economics 
literature. This is in contrast to the way a utility function is typically defined in the decision sciences 
and operations management literature as a stochastic function. The “value function” described in the 
latter literature is similar to our “utility function,” except that costs can enter into a value function and 
are excluded from our utility function since they appear as part of the budget constraint. 
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1. Fixed Budget Approach
Maximize Effectiveness subject to Budget Constraint















Outsourcing Opportunity:    




Figure 4. Fixed Budget Approach  
 
This Fixed Budget Approach is the first of six ways proposed to structure an 
Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) and is illustrated in Figure 4.31 The Budget 
estimate for the program in Figure 4 is set at level B*. The three alternatives constructed 
given this budget are A1, A2, and A3. Given its superior performance in terms of its MOE, 
A3 wins the competition, which, in this case, can also be determined from its Benefit/Cost 
ratio.  
2. Fixed Effectiveness Approach 
The second way to structure an EEoA is the dual of the first: minimize the cost of 
achieving a given MOE. RAND Corporation’s AoA for the KC-135 Recapitalization adopts 
this approach, stating: “in this AoA, the most ‘cost-effective’ alternative [fleet] means 
precisely the alternative whose effectiveness meets the aerial refueling requirement at the 
lowest cost” (Kennedy et al., 2006, p. 7, emphasis added). Figure 5 offers an illustration. 
Another example is the section on cost-effectiveness analysis in OMB Circular A-94 
that states: “A program is cost-effective if, on the basis of life cycle cost analysis of 
competing alternatives, it is determined to have the lowest costs […] for a given amount of 
benefits […]. Cost-effectiveness analysis can also be used to compare programs with 
identical costs [budgets/funding] but differing benefits” (OMB, 1992, October 29, p. 4). The 
latter part of the quote refers to the first approach to structuring an EEoA, and the former 
refers to the second approach.  
                                                
31 Note that in the first and second EEoA approaches, since either the budget (funding level) or MOE 
(level of effectiveness) is anchored in the constrained optimization, the Benefit/Cost ratio decision 
criterion can be used as a decision rule in the selection process. The steeper the slope from the origin 
through an alternative (A1, A2, A3), the bigger the “bang-for-the-buck.” 
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2. Fixed Effectiveness Approach
Dual: Minimize Costs subject to Effectiveness Constraint












= MOE*/$B1 Outsourcing Opportunity:   
Can we spend less bucks for 
the same bang?              OMB 
Circular A-76: Statement of 
Work(SOW); Invitation for Bid(IFB) 
If A1 is the In-house MEO, then 
“Outsourcing’s Out & Insourcing’s In” 
(DoD FY 2005 : 71% A-76 won by in-house MEO)
 
 
Figure 5. Fixed Effectiveness Approach 
 
Another example of the Fixed Effectiveness Approach to structuring an EEoA is 
given by public-private (competitive sourcing) competitions conducted under OMB Circular 
A-76, which “requires […] a structured process for [evaluating] the most efficient and cost-
effective method of performance for commercial activities” (2003, May 29). This involves 
four steps: 1) develop a Statement of Work (SOW) or Performance Work Statement (PWS) 
to define desired performance/effectiveness, 2) construct the Most Efficient Organization 
(MEO) for the in-house competitor, 3) issue an Invitation for Bid (IFB) for well-defined, 
routine commercial activities (SOW or PWS), and 4) compare bids or proposals (source 
selection) and select the “least cost” for IFB.  
Finally, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 146, Section 2462 of the US Code 
reads: “A function of the Department of Defense […] may not be converted […] to 
performance by a contractor unless the conversion is based on the results of a public-
private competition that […] examines the cost of performance of the function by 
Department of Defense civilian employees and the cost of performance of the function by 
one or more contractors to demonstrate whether converting to performance by a contractor 
will result in savings to the Government over the life of the contract” (2007, January 3). This 
offers another example of the Fixed Effectiveness Approach to structuring an EEoA. 
3. Expansion Path (Response Function) Approach 
Hitch and McKean (1967) strongly hint at the third way to structure an EEoA: “The 
test of maximum effectiveness for a given budget seems much less likely to mislead the 
unwary” (p. 167). They explain, “As a starter, […] several budget sizes can be assumed. If 
the same [alternative] is preferred for all […] budgets, that system is dominant. If the same 
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[alternative] is not dominant, the use of several […] budgets is nevertheless an essential 
step, because it provides vital information to the decision maker” (p.176, emphasis added). 
This third way to structure an EEoA is the foundation for all the others and is 
described mathematically in the Mathematical Appendix (available upon request). It 
is modeled as a three-step process that involves multiple players.  
For ease of exposition, we assume three players: the military buyer and two 
private vendors. The first step is for the military buyer to publish a synopsis of the 
solicitation. This synopsis (solicitation) states all significant non-price factors 
(criteria/attributes/characteristics) that the agency expects to consider in evaluating 











ECONOMIC APPROACH: Endogenous Alternatives (“Engel Curves”)
A1
A2
3. Expansion Path (Response Function) Approach
(Alternatives are Cost-Effectiveness Relations, not Points)
Explore impact of budget cuts (Identify vendor responses)
Alternative 2
Alternative 1




Source Selection Decision: A2 for pessimistic budget; A1 for optimistic budget  
Figure 6. Expansion Path Optimization Approach 
 
Assuming the award will be made without discussions (pursuant to FAR 52.212-1 
and 52.215-1 (General Services Administration, 2005)), the military buyer has a secret 
scoring rule32 used to rank vendors that is only revealed after the award of the contract. 
                                                
32 The buyer can request a single offer from each supplier and choose the one he prefers among the 
submitted offers. “We call this procedure a ‘single-bid auction with secret scoring rule’” (Asker & 
Cantillon, 2004, p. 1). 
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Once a solicitation is issued in the form of an RFP or IFB, interested vendors submit their 
offers and the selection process begins.33 
Each vendor is assumed to have different production and cost functions (to generate 
the attributes). The vendors constrained optimizations define distinct expansion paths, one 
for each vendor. From the Envelope Theorem, the Lagrangian multiplier in each vendor’s 
optimization reveals the marginal product (the extra output or attribute mix possible for them 
to produce) from relaxing the funding constraint, i.e., using a more optimistic budget.  
Economic Evaluation of Alternatives Approach:  
Military Buyer Goal: Select an alternative that Maximizes  
MOE = utility function = U(non-cost factors/attributes),  
Subject to BUDGET constraint = TC 
Vendor Goal: Select a mix of non-cost factors that 
Maximizes Q = Production Function = Q(non-cost factors/attributes)   
Subject to TC = Sum of Costs of Attributes = c1 x a1 + c2 x a2 +… <= 
Budget 
Military Buyer: 
(MOE) build-effectiveness model (non-cost factors: Performance = quality, schedule, 
etc.)  
(COST) build-cost model (costs/prices: Estimate total system lifecycle costs, total 
ownership costs) 
(BUDGET) Estimate budget (funding level for the program) 
Private Vendor: 
(Q) Understand Production Function Generates Attributes  
(TC) Identify cost of producing each attribute 
Construct Alternatives as a function of the Military Buyer’s Budget constraint 
 
This EEoA approach illustrated in Figure 6 follows Hitch and McKean’s (1967) 
recommendations: “As a starter […] several budget sizes can be assumed. If the same 
[alternative] is preferred for all […] budgets, that system is dominant […]. If the same 
[alternative] is not dominant the use of several […] budgets is nevertheless an essential 
step, because it provides vital information to the decision maker” (p. 176). 
The expansion path for each vendor (see Mathematical Appendix) reveals what that 
vendor can offer at different budget levels (e.g., pessimistic, most likely and optimistic). The 
set of each vendor’s proposals under the different budget scenarios is an “alternative.” 
When the set of expansion path proposals of each vendor are transformed (through the 
government’s utility function) into a cost-utility or cost-effectiveness (MOE) function for that 
particular vendor, then, given a range of likely budgets for the program, the most effective 
vendor over that range of budgets can be selected (see Figure 6).  
This approach explicitly addresses a key concern of the GAO that “A cost estimate is 
[…] usually presented to decision makers as a […] point estimate that is expected to 
represent the most likely cost of the program but provides no information about the range of 
                                                
33 The budget announcements are analogous to an agency exploring in order to uncover its true 
“reservation price” for the acquisition (given the competing demands for scarce budgets). The 
adoption of this approach of evaluating vendor proposals under different reservation prices could 
eventually lead to greater use of fixed-price contracts.  
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risk and uncertainty or level of confidence associated with the estimate” (GAO, 2009, p. 9). 
The three-stage procurement auction process is summarized in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2. Three Stage Multi-attribute Procurement Auction (Expansion Path 
























Whereas the first three ways to structure an EEoA assume that alternatives can be 
generated by the decision-maker, the last three assume that alternatives are exogenously 
determined and that the decision-maker must choose among pre-specified alternatives. The 
interesting cases are those in which an alternative costs more but offers greater utility, while 
others cost less and offer less utility. 
4. Modified Budget Approach 
Suppose that the overall budget or desired level of effectiveness for a program is not 
available and that the alternatives are derived exogenously—for example, on the basis of a 
manpower or squadron constraint (e.g., one computer per person or a certain number of 
aircraft per squadron). Then, it is likely that the pre-specified alternatives solicited from 
different vendors have different costs and yield different measures of effectiveness (MOE). 
The first step might be to create a scatter plot of effectiveness versus cost (see Figure 7). In 
the absence of any other information, the highest cost alternative a DM is willing to consider 
can be used as a notional budget estimate for the program.  
1) First Stage: (CAIV)  
– The DoD provides notional budget guidance (B) to alternative vendors for the 
program. The DoD searches for the optimum product (Procurement) and/or 
service (R&D; O&M) package that it can obtain at that price, B. The DoD also 
reveals optimistic and pessimistic budget guidance. 
– The DoD defines the set of characteristics/attributes that it values, and this is 
known to vendors. However, the DoD’s precise utility function over those 
characteristics is unknown to vendors (secret scoring rule). 
2) Second Stage: (Target Costing) 
– Vendors have different costs and production functions for generating 
products or services (defined as bundles of characteristics).  
– Each vendor maximizes its output offer (an optimal mix of the desired 
characteristics) subject to its particular budget constraint (which includes the 
DoD’s budget guidance and the vendor’s individual costs to produce a unit of 
each characteristic).  
– This is the product and/or service package (output) a particular vendor is 
able to propose for each possible budget (B), given its production function 
(technical production possibilities) and its costs of generating those 
characteristics. 
3) Third Stage: (Selection) 
With the latest budget forecast, the DoD selects among the optimized 
characteristic bundles proposed by each vendor the bundle/alternative (total 
product/service package) that maximizes the DoD’s utility function. 
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EEOA: “LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD”
4. Modified Budget Approach (GOTO 1 & 3)
Modify alternatives to equalize budget 






Figure 7. Modified Budget Approach 
 
The fourth way to structure an EEoA recognizes that the highest-cost (highest-utility) 
alternative under consideration (for example, A2 in Figure 7) reveals a possible budget 
constraint. By “leveling the playing field,” the decision-maker asks how the extra money 
might be used by the lower-cost (lower-utility) vendor (A1) to increase the utility of that 
alternative (from A1 to A1*).34 Note that this effectively returns the problem to the first (and 
third) way of structuring an EEoA. 
5. Modified Effectiveness Approach 
Similarly, the fifth way to structure an EEoA levels the playing field for a threshold 
choice of utility (or effectiveness), returning the problem to the second (and third) way of 
structuring an EEoA. For example, in Figure 8, anchoring the desired MOE at a target level 
such as that offered by vendor 2, the government would return to vendor 1 and ask, how 
much would it cost to achieve the same target level of MOE? In Figure 8, vendor 1 is 
preferred since the response (A1=>A1*) minimizes the budget required. 
                                                
34 Alternatively, different valuable uses for the money saved by choosing the lower-cost alternative 
could be brought into the effectiveness calculation. Some will recognize this search for the “next best 
alternative use of funds” as the standard economic definition of opportunity costs. This sets the stage 
for the sixth way to structure an EEoA. 
 =






















5. Modified Effectiveness Approach (GOTO 2 & 3)
Modify alternatives to equalize MOE 




Figure 8. Modified Effectiveness Approach 
 
6. Opportunity Cost (or Effectiveness) Approach 
Finally, what if 1) we cannot modify alternatives to obtain response functions, and 2) 
we don’t know, or cannot assume, a given budget or desired level of MOE? In this case, 
some alternatives (bundles) cost more but offer more effectiveness, while others cost less 
and offer less effectiveness (“efficient set”). The sixth and final way to structure an EEoA 
involves an inter-program comparison we call the Opportunity Cost Approach. 
Rather than modify the alternatives to level the playing field, the Opportunity Cost 
Approach accepts both lower-cost, lower-effectiveness alternatives (A1 in Figure 9) and 
higher-cost, higher-effectiveness alternatives (A2) but requires a more challenging inter-
program analysis.  
The main challenge in selecting an alternative in this context is that the DM must 
reach beyond the immediate program, A, into higher-level inter-program considerations 
(perhaps entering the requirements generation system or the PPBE process).  
If the alternatives are exogenously determined, and it is not possible to level the 
playing field, then to find the most cost-effective solution requires information about other 
competing programs (e.g., program B in Figure 9). “[T]he assessment should provide details 
as to how excess funding […] demands will be accommodated by reductions in other 
mission areas, or in other […] accounts” (DoD, 2006, July 7, Section 3.2.2). 
This involves an inter-program analysis similar to that illustrated in Figure 9. What is 
the loss in utility in other programs that might be sacrificed (B2=>B1) for the funds to be 
made available to purchase greater utility in the program under review (A1=>A2)? 
Alternatively, how much more utility might the extra money generate somewhere else if we 
went with the low-cost alternative (A1)? These are tough but useful questions that break 
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through the sub-optimization of most traditional AoAs. In this way, the EEoA approach 
encourages critical communication to take place between different layers of the 
organization.35  
6. Opportunity Cost Approach         
(INTER-PROGRAM Marginal Analysis)
A) Question: Where is the extra money coming from if I 
buy the high cost alternative? 










Program A Program B
 
Figure 9. Opportunity Cost Approach  
 
The bottom line is that it is often more transparent, efficient, and effective to develop 
MOEs that are independent of costs and to treat costs as an independent variable (CAIV). 
Equally important are the roles of budget (funding) forecasts and opportunity costs in 
helping structure defense investment decisions. Structuring an Economic Evaluation of 
Alternatives (EEoA) using one of the six approaches summarized in Table 1 could help 
achieve the primary goal of defense acquisition reform—to help coordinate the requirements 
generation system (JCIDS), Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and PPBE to lower the 
costs of defense investments and improve performance and schedules. 
                                                
35 Fisher (1965) quotes Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: “Suppose we have two tactical 
aircraft which are identical in every important measure of performance [MOE] except one—aircraft A 
can fly ten miles per hour faster than Aircraft B. Thus, if we need about 1,000 aircraft, the total 
additional cost would be $10million. If we approach this problem from the viewpoint of a given amount 
of resources, the additional combat effectiveness […] of Aircraft A would have to be weighed against 
the additional combat effectiveness which the same $10million could produce if applied to other 
defense purposes—more Aircraft B, more or better aircraft munitions, or more ships, or even more 
military family housing […] This kind of determination is the heart of the planning-programming-
budgeting […] problem with the Defense Department.” (p.182) 
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Conclusion: A Decision Map for Decision-makers 
This study identified several major challenges that face current military cost-
effectiveness analyses. It also critically examined key assumptions of the decision sciences’ 
literature, which are frequently used by the military to structure acquisition decisions. An 
alternative micro-economic set of approaches to structure acquisition decisions was 
proposed, called the Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA). 
This study points to a significant weakness in the multiple-criteria, decision-making 
(MCDM) approach that underpins many contemporary AoAs. The weakness is that while 
MCDM techniques, and therefore most AoAs, correctly focus on lifecycle costs and the 
operational effectiveness of individual alternatives, affordability is often only implicitly 
addressed through a weight assigned to costs.  
In contrast, the EEoA approach recommended in this study encourages analysts and 
decision-makers to include affordability explicitly in the AoA. This requires working with 
vendors to build alternatives based on different funding (budget/affordability) scenarios. 
Supported by a static, deterministic, multi-stage, constrained-optimization, micro-economic 
production (procurement auction) model described in Section 3, this EEoA approach 
explicitly addresses affordability up-front. The key difference between the MCDM approach 
to AoA, and the EEoA approach, is that instead of modeling decision alternatives from 
competing vendors as points in cost-effectiveness space, the EEoA models alternatives as 
functions of optimistic, pessimistic and most likely funding (resource/budget) scenarios.  
The primary goal of this study was to help improve public investment decisions by 
providing a set of six approaches practitioners (acquisition officials and others) can employ 
to structure an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA). An important secondary goal of 
the study was to develop a Decision Map to guide practitioners and acquisition officials in 
structuring cost-effectiveness analyses to improve defense acquisition outcomes. The 
Decision Map to structure an EEoA appears below.  
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Decision Map to Structure an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA)
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Figure 10. Decision Map to Structure EEoAs  
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to my colleagues in the Defense Resources Management Institute 
(DRMI) and Graduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, to defense economics colleagues at the RAND-organized sessions of 
the Western Economic Association, and to Jacques Gansler and many other current and 
former Pentagon officials for ideas and inspiration that led to this study. Given the often 
lively debates surrounding this topic, I am not only solely responsible for any errors, but also 
for the views expressed. I also gratefully acknowledge Admiral Greene and his colleagues at 
GSBPP’s Acquisition Program for funding this research. The usual disclaimers apply. 
References 
Asker, J., & Cantillon, E. (2004). Properties of scoring auctions. Unpublished Working Paper. 
Beil, D., & Wein, L. (2003). An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a 
multiattribute rfq process. Management Science, 49(11). 
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 34 - 
=
=
CJCS. (2007, May). Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (CJCSI 
3170.01F). Washington, DC: Author. 
Che, Y. (1993). Design competition through multidimensional auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 
24. 
Clemen, R. (1996). Making hard decisions: An introduction to decision analysis (2nd ed.). Belmont, 
CA: Duxbury Press. 
Corner, J., & Kirkwood, C. (1991). Decision analysis applications in the operations research literature. 
Operations Research, 39(2). 
Davis, P. (2002). Analytic architecture for capabilities-based planning, mission-system analysis, and 
transformation. Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, RAND. 
DoA. (1999, July 15). Pamphlet 70-3. Washington, DC: US Army Headquarters. 
DoA. (2001, February). Economic analysis manual. Arlington, VA: US Army Cost and Economic 
Analysis Center. 
DoD. (1984, May 22). The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) (DoD Directive 
7045.14). Washington, DC: Author. 
DoD. (1987, April 9). Implementation of The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) 
(DoD Directive 7045.07). Washington, DC: Author. 
DoD. (1995, November 7). Economic analysis for decisionmmaking (DoD Directive 7041.3). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
DoD. (1998). DoD Guide to cost as an independent variable (DA PAM 70-3). Washington, DC: 
Author. 
DoD. (2006, July 7). Department of Defense (DoD) defense acquisition guidebook. Chapter 1.1 
(Integration of the DoD Decision Support System); Chapter 1.2 (Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution Process; Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the PPBE 
Process). Retrieved March 16, 2009, from https://acc.dau.mil  
Dyer, S., & Sarin, R. (1979). Measurable multiattribute value functions. Operations Research, 27.  
Dyer, S., Fishburn, P., Steuer, R., Wallenius, J., & Zionts, S. (1992). Multiple criteria decision making, 
multi-attribute utility theory. Management Science, 38(5). 
Edwards, W., von Winterfeldt, D., & Moody, D. (1988). Simplicity in decision analysis. In D. Bell, H. 
Raiffa, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Decision making: Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive 
interactions (pp. 443l-4464). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.  
Eger, R., & Wilsker, A. (2007). Cost effectiveness analysis and transportation: Practices, problems 
and proposals. Public Budgeting and Finance, 27(1). 
European Commission. (2004a, March 31). Coordinating the procurement procedures of entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (Directive 2004/17/EC of 
The European Parliament and of The Council), EC 2004a, Article 55. 
European Commission. (2004b, March 31). On the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contract (Directive 2004/18/EC of 
The European Parliament and of The Council), EC 2004b, Articles 53, 54. 
Ewing, P., Tarantino, W., & Parnell, G. (2006). Use of decision analysis in the Army base realignment 
and closure (BRAC) 2005 military value analysis. Decision Analysis, 3(1). 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. (Public Law 103-355) 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1995. (Public Law 104-106) 
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998. (Public Law 105-270) 
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 35 - 
=
=
Fisher, G. (1965). The role of cost-utility analysis in program budgeting. In D. Novick (Ed.), Program 
budgeting. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Fisher, G. (1971). Cost considerations in systems analysis. New York: American Elsevier Publishing. 
Fowler, B., & Cason, P. (1998). The cost exchange ratio: A new aggregate measure of cost and 
operational effectiveness. JMORS, 3(4). 
French, S. (1986). Decision theory: An introduction to the mathematics of rationality. Cambridge: Ellis 
Horwood. 
Gansler, J. (2003, June). Moving toward market-based government. New Ways to Manage Series. 
IBM Endowment for the Business of Government. 
GAO. (2008, July 2). Defense acquisitions: A knowledge-based funding approach could improve 
major weapon system program outcomes (GAO-08-619). Washington, DC: Author.  
GAO. (2008, September 25). Defense acquisitions: Fundamental changes are needed to improve 
weapon program outcomes (GAO-08-1159T). Testimony of M. Sullivan, Director of 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial 
Management, US Senate. Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2008, December). Defense logistics: Improved analysis and cost data needed to evaluate the 
cost-effectiveness of performance-based logistics (GAO-09-41). Washington, DC: Author.  
GAO. (2009, March 18). Defense acquisitions: DoD must prioritize its weapon system acquisition and 
balance them with available resources (GAO-09-501T). Testimony of M. Sullivan, Director of 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management before the Committee on the Budget, House of 
Representatives. Washington, DC: Author. 
General Services Administration, Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. (2005, March). Federal acquisition regulation (FAR). Washington, DC: Author. 
Golabi, K., Kirkwood, C., & Sicherman, A. (1988). Selecting a portfolio of solar energy projects using 
multiattribute preference theory. Management Science, 34. 
Gorman, W. (1980). The demand for related goods: A possible procedure for analysing quality 
differentials in the egg market. Review of Economic Studies, 47. 
Henry, M., & Hogan, W. (1993, September). Cost and effectiveness integration. Retrieved April 20, 
2009, from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA275710&Location 
=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf 
Hitch, C., & McKean, R. (1967). The economics of defense in the nuclear age. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Howard, R. (1988). Decision analysis: Practice and promise. Management Science, 34. 
Hwang, C., & Yoon, K. (1981). Multiple-attribute decision making: Methods and applications. New 
York: Springer-Verlag. Keeney, R. (1982). Decision analysis: An overview. Operations 
Research, 30(5). 
Keeney, R. (1992). Value-focused thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Keeney, R. (1994). Using values in operations research. Operations Research, 42(5). 
Keeney, R., & Raiffa, H. (1976). Decisions with multiple objectives: Preferences and value tradeoffs. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons.  
Kennedy, M., et al. (2006). Analysis of alternatives (AoA) for KC-135 recapitalization. Santa Monica, 
CA: Project Air Force, RAND.  
Kirkwood, C. (1997). Strategic decision making. New York: Duxbury Press.  
Lancaster, K. (1966a). A new approach to consumer theory. Journal of Political Economy, 74. 
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 36 - 
=
=
Lancaster, K. (1966b). Change and innovation in the technology of consumption. American Economic 
Review, 61. 
Lancaster, K. (1971). Consumer demand: A new approach. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Lancaster, K. (1979). Variety, equity, and efficiency. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Larsen, R., & Buede, D. (2002). Theoretical framework for the continuous early validation method. 
Systems Engineering, 5(3). 
Liberatore, M. (1987). An extension of the analytic hierarchy process for industrial R&D project 
selection and resource allocation. IEEE Transaction on Engineering Management, 34(1). 
Lorell, M., & Graser, J. (2001). An overview of acquisition reform cost saving estimates. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force. 
Melese, F. (2007, May 17). Outsourcing for optimal results: Six ways to structure an analysis of 
alternatives. In Proceedings of the 4th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium: Creating 
synergy for informed change. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Melese, F., & Bonsper, D. (1996, December). Cost integration and normalization issues. PHALANX, 
29(4). 
Melese, F., Franck, R., Angelis, D., & Dillard, J. (2007, January). Applying insights from transaction 
cost economics to improve cost estimates for public sector purchases: The case of U.S. 
military acquisition. International Public Management Journal,10(4). 
Melese, F., Stroup, M., & Lowe, J. (1997). Integrating cost and effectiveness: An economic 
perspective. PHALANX, 30(3). 
Michael, R., & Becker, G. (1973). On the new theory of consumer behavior. Swedish Journal of 
Economics, 75(4). 
Murray, C. (2002). Executive decision making (6th ed.). Newport, RI: National Security Decision 
Making Department, US Naval War College.  
OSD. (2009, January 15). Defense federal acquisition regulation supplement (DFARS). Washington, 
DC: Author. Retrieved April 20, 2009, from http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ 
dars/dfars/html/current/tochtml.htm 
OMB. (1976, April 5). Major systems acquisitions (OMB Circular A-109). Washington, DC: Author. 
OMB. (1992, October 29). Guidelines and discount rates for benefit-cost analysis of federal programs 
(OMB Circular A-94). Washington, DC: Author. 
OMB. (2003, May 29). Performance of commercial activities (Public-private competitions) (OMB 
Circular A-76 (Revised)). Washington, DC: Author. 
Parkes, D., & Kalagnanam, J. (2005). Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions. 
Management Science, 51(3). 
Parnell, G. (2006). Value-focused thinking using multiple objective decision analysis. In Methods for 
conducting military operational analysis (Chap. 19). Alexandria, VA: Military Operations 
Research Society. 
Pinker, A., Samuel, A.H., & Batcher, R. (1995, December) On measures of effectiveness. PHALANX.  
Quade, E. (1989). Analysis for public decisions (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Ramesh, R., & Zionts, S. (1997). Multiple criteria decision making. In S. Gass & C. Harris (Eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science. Boston, MA: Kluwer. 
Retchless, T., Golden, B., & Wasil, E. (2007). Ranking US Army Generals of the 20th century: A 
group decision-making application of the analytic hierarchy process. Interfaces, 37(2). 
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 37 - 
=
=
Ruefli, T. (1974). Analytic models of resource allocation in hierachical multi-level systems. Socio-
Economics Planning Science, 8. 
Ruefli, T. (1971). PPBS—An analytical approach. In R. Byrne et al. (Eds.), Studies in budgeting. 
Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Saaty. T. (1977). A scaling method for priorities in hierarchical structures. Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology, 15. 
Saaty, T. (1980). The analytic hierarchy process. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Smith, J., & von Winterfeldt, D. (2004). Decision analysis in management science. Management 
Science, 50(5). 
Stigler, G. (1945). The cost of subsistence. Journal of Farm Economics, 27. 
Theil, H. (1952). Qualities, prices and budget enquiries. Review of Economic Studies, 19. 
Thomas, C., & Sheldon, R. (1999). The knee of the curve. Military Operations Research, 4(2). 
US Code. (2007, January 3). Title 10—Armed Forces, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 146, Section 2462. 
US Congress. (1997). Clinger-Cohen Act—Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 
(Public Law 104-106). 104th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, DC: Chief Information 
Officers Council. 
USD (AT&L). (2007, November 20). The defense acquisition system (DoD Directive 5000.01). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
USD (AT&L). (2008, December 8). Operation of the defense acquisition system (DoD Instruction 
5000.02). Washington, DC: Author. 
Vazsonyi, A. (1995, December/January). Multicriteria decision making. Decision Line, 26(1). 
Willard, D. (1998). Cost-effectiveness, CAIV, and the knee of the curve. Phalanx, 31(3). 
Winterfeldt, D., & Edwards, W. (1986). Decision analysis and behavioral research. Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press. 
Zahedi, F. (1986). The analytic hierarchy process—A survey of the method and its applications. 
Interfaces, 16. 
Zionts, S. (1980). Methods for solving management problems involving multiple objectives. In G. 
Fandal & T. Gaul (eds.), MCDM: Theory and applications. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
 
 =















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 39 - 
=
=




May 13, 2009 
Panel 3 - Acquisition Management of Systems-of-systems 




Chair: Reuben Pitts, III, President, Lyceum Consulting, LLC 
Discussant: Colonel Raymond D. Jones, US Army, Program Manager, 
Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station, Joint Tactical Radio System 
Acquisition Management for Systems-of-systems: Exploratory Model 
Development and Experimentation 
Daniel DeLaurentis and Muharrem Mane, Purdue University 
Acquisition of Capabilities through Systems-of-systems: Case Studies 
and Lessons from Naval Aviation 




Chair: Reuben S. Pitts, III, has a BS in Mechanical Engineering from Mississippi State 
University and has completed graduate studies in Engineering Mechanics from VPI&SU and 
the University of Oklahoma. He has also completed graduate studies in Public Administration 
from the University of Northern Colorado and has attended the Federal Executive Institute. 
Early successes in ordnance test and design at NSWCDD earned Pitts a promotion as the 
Navy’s Gun Ammunition Design Agent Principal Engineer for gun ammunition design.  Then, as 
Design Manager for the 8-inch Guided Projectile project team, he achieved the first successful 
firing of guided munitions from shipboard guns.  As Head, Intelligence Systems Processing 
Branch, he directed the development of the first mobile, field-deployable, computer-based 
Intelligence Analysis Center (IAC) for the Marine Corps.  He subsequently served on the 
planning team to reintroduce the Navy to Wallops Island, VA, currently a multiple ship combat, 
over-the-water weapons testing lab for Surface Ship Combat Systems, Fighter Aircraft and live 
missile firings.  His outstanding service as the deployed Science Advisor to Commander, US 
Sixth Fleet was recognized with the Navy’s Superior Civilian Service (NSCS) Award and the 
Navy Science Assistance Program Science Advisor of the Year Award.   
Pitts was selected to lead the technical analysis team in support of the formal JAG investigation 
of the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by USS Vincennes, and participated in subsequent 
briefings to CENTCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Secretary of Defense.  As 
Head, Surface Ship Program Office and Aegis Program Manager, Pitts was awarded a second 
NSCS, the James Colvard Award, and the John Adolphus Dahlgren Award (Dahlgren’s highest 
honor) for his achievements in the fields of science, engineering, and management.  
Anticipating the future course of combatant surface ships, Pitts co-founded the NSWCDD 
Advanced Computing Technology effort, which eventually became the Aegis/DARPA-
sponsored High Performance Distributed Computing Program: the world’s most advanced 
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distributed real-time computing technology effort.  That effort was the foundation for the Navy’s 
current Open Architecture Initiative.  Pitts led the applications of total ship system engineering 
to surface ship combat system developments at the platform level, integrating combat systems 
and Hull, Mechanical & Electrical functions and achieving commonality of technologies, 
equipment, and computer programs across ship classes.  While in this position, he was 
promoted to the rank of Senior Science and Technology Manager (SSTM).  In 2003, Pitts 
accepted responsibility as Technical Director for PEO Integrated Warfare Systems (IWS), the 
overall technical authority for the PEO.  In September of that year, he was reassigned as the 
Major Program Manager for Integrated Combat Systems in the PEO.  In this position, he was 
the Program Manager for the Combat Systems and Training Systems for all US Navy Surface 
Combatants—including Aircraft Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates, Amphibious Ships, and 
auxiliaries—with total obligation authority that approached $6 billion.  In this position, he began 
the Navy’s Warfare System Way Ahead effort that formed the Navy’s basis for future budget 
strategies; he began the Enterprise Test and Evaluation effort which demonstrated savings of 
hundreds of millions of dollars, and he established the Navy strategy for acquisition of Warfare 
Systems based on Open Architecture principles.  For this work, he was awarded a Navy 
Meritorious Civilian Service Award.   
In July, 2006, Mr. Pitts returned to NSWCDD to form and head the Warfare Systems 
Department, a hands-on research and development organization with 700 employees and an 
active budget of over $400 million.  Under his leadership, the department became the leading 
Navy field activity voice for the future of Navy Surface Warfare Systems and Warfare System 
architectures and technologies.  While in this position, he maintained his personal technical 
involvement as the certification official for Surface Navy Combat Systems.  He also served as 
Chair of the Combat System Configuration Control Board and Chair of the Mission Readiness 
Panel for Operation Burnt Frost, the killing of inoperative satellite USA 193.  Pitts has been a 
guest speaker/lecturer and symposium panelist at a many NAVSEA-level and DoD 
symposiums, conferences and at the Naval Postgraduate School, the Defense Systems 
Management College, the Applied Physics Lab of the Johns Hopkins University, and the 
National Defense University.  For 19 years, Pitts was the sole certification authority of all Aegis 
Combat System computer programs for fleet use.  He retired from the US Civil Service in 
September 2008, with over 40 years of service to the Navy, and now heads his own consulting 
company, Lyceum Consulting, LLC. 
Discussant: Colonel Raymond D. Jones, US Army, recently assumed the responsibilities as 
the Program Manager for the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Domain, Joint Tactical Radio 
System (PM AMF JTRS) in San Diego, CA. This is a Joint Service Acquisition Defense 
Category I D (ACAT ID) program reporting to the Joint Program Executive Officer JTRS and the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition Technology and Logistics. 
He is a 1983 graduate of the United States Military Academy, with a Bachelor of Science 
Degree in Aerospace Engineering. He also earned a Master of Science Degree in Aeronautical 
Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, holds a Master of Business 
Administration from Regis University in Denver, CO, and attended the Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces, where he graduated as a distinguished Academic Honor Graduate with a 
Master’s in National Resource Strategy.  
Jones is a graduate of the US Naval Test Pilot School with over ten years and 3000 hours of 
flight test experience in 43 different types of aircraft, including both fixed and rotary wing. Some 
of his other military education includes: the Infantry Officers Basic Course, the Army Command 
and General Staff College, and the Advanced and Executive Program Manager’s Courses at 
the Defense Systems Management College. 
His previous military assignments include Project Manager for Modular Brigade Enhancements 
(MBE), an ACATI D program, reporting to the Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat 
Systems. Prior to serving as PM MBE, he served as the Military Deputy to the Director for 
Acquisition Resources and Analysis in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
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Acquisition Technology and Logistics.   Jones also served as the Commander for the Kwajalein 
Missile Range in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, had multiple experimental and 
developmental flight test tours at Fort Monmouth, NJ, and Fort Rucker, AL, and served multiple 
operational tours—including three and a half years with the First Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, 
TX, and over two years in the Republic of Korea with the 17th Aviation Brigade.  
His military decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, 
Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters, Army Commendation Medal with one oak 
leaf cluster, the Master Aviator’s Badge, Office of the Secretary of Defense Service badge, 
Army Staff badge, and the Airborne and Air Assault Badges.  
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In recent years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has placed a growing 
emphasis on the pursuit of agile capabilities via net-enabled operations. In this setting, 
systems are increasingly required to interoperate along several dimensions. Yet, the 
manner in which components of these “system-of-systems” (SoS) are acquired 
(designed, developed, tested and fielded) has not kept pace with the shifts in operational 
doctrine. Acquisition programs have struggled with complexities in both program 
management and engineering design. We have developed a conceptual model for pre-
acquisition and acquisition strategy in an SoS environment and have implemented it in 
an exploratory, dynamic model. The model allows acquisition professionals to develop 
intuition for procuring and deploying system-of-systems by providing a venue for 
experimentation through which they can develop insights that will underpin successful 
acquisition of SoS-oriented defense capabilities. This paper presents example studies 
that demonstrate the capabilities of the dynamic model and highlight the importance of 
project characteristics. Specifically, we investigate the impact of SoS attributes—
requirement interdependency, project risk, and span-of-control of SoS managers and 
engineers—on the completion time of SoS projects. 
Introduction 
A system-of-systems (SoS) consists of multiple, heterogeneous, distributed 
systems that can (and do) operate independently but can also assemble in networks and 
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collaborate to achieve a goal. According to Maier (1998), the SoS typically demonstrate 
traits of operational and managerial independence, emergent behavior, evolutionary 
development and geographic distribution. Networks of component systems often form 
among a hierarchy of levels and evolve over time as systems are added to or removed 
from the SoS. However, these component systems are often developed outside of the 
context of their interactions with the future SoS. As a result, the systems may be unable 
to fully interact with the future SoS, adapt to any emergent behavior, or be robust in the 
face of external disturbances.  
The Future Combat System (FCS) program exemplifies a Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition process for an SoS. FCS seeks to modernize the US Army and 
provide soldiers with leading-edge technologies and capabilities—allowing them to 
dominate in asymmetric ground warfare and to sustain themselves in remote places (US 
Army, 2009). The FCS has faced technical and management challenges that have come 
to typify acquisitions in SoS environments. 
In 2003, the FCS program was comprised of an information network and 18 
primary systems (categorized as manned ground systems, unmanned ground systems, 
and unmanned air vehicles). The Army’s initial schedule allotted a 56-month system 
development and demonstration (SDD) phase (2003-2008), with the goal of achieving 
full operational capability by 2013. The Army’s initial cost estimate was $108 billion 
(GAO, 2003). Over the past four years, the FCS has been restructured twice in an effort 
to reduce the high risk attributed to both the presence of immature technologies in 
critical paths as well as the challenges of concurrently developing these technologies 
with product development. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) criticized the 
Army’s acquisition strategy and concluded that the total cost for the FCS program had 
increased by 76% ($160.7 billion) from the Army’s first estimate of $108 billion. However, 
independent estimates predicted an increase to $234 billion (116%).  
In addition to the technical challenges, the FCS program also faced managerial 
challenges stemming from the Army’s partnership with an industry Lead System 
Integrator (LSI). The role of the LSI is to reach across Army organizations to manage 
development of the SoS (GAO, 2007, June). Given the high risk involved in 
implementing a complex SoS, the GAO specifically underlined the importance of 
oversight challenges faced by the LSI in this area (GAO, 2007, March). The challenges 
of the FCS Program have pushed the Army to decrease the scope of the program to 14 
systems and to extend the time estimate for achieving full capability to 2030 instead of 
2013.  
Other non-DoD organizations are also struggling with systems integration of a 
collection of complex systems. The US Coast Guard’s (USCG) Integrated Deepwater 
System (IDS) is an example of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acquisition 
process for an SoS that has also faced challenges. These challenges have stemmed 
from the lack of collaboration between contractors and the marginal influence wielded by 
system integrators to compel decisions between them (GAO, 2006). The NextGen Air 
Transportation System and the NASA Constellation program are also facing similar 
challenges as they attempt to apply generic system engineering processes for 
acquisition in an SoS environment. Integration challenges faced by the Constellation 
Program are documented in a recent NRC report (Committee on System Integration for 
Project Constellation, 2004). These examples possess the key drivers motivating the 
research described in this paper. 
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The overarching goal of our research is to understand the types of complexities 
present in acquisition management for SoS, and then to develop approaches that can 
increase the success of an acquisition process in the SoS setting. The three research 
questions derived from this goal are: 
1. Is there a taxonomy by which one can detect classes of complexities in 
particular SoS applications? 
2. What are the underlying systems engineering (SE) and program 
management functions that are affected? 
3. How can exploratory modeling generate SE and acquisition management 
modifications to improve the probability of success?  
In order to answer some of the questions posed, we aim to: 
1. Identify the complexities in the acquisition of SoS based on historical trends 
of “failures,” especially in the context of the DoD  
2. Develop a conceptual model of a generic acquisition process that is 
customizable to different SoS applications. 
3. Develop a computational model based on the conceptual model and, through 
simulation, provide insight on and answer questions about process 
modifications.  
Complexities 
Simon (1996) and Bar-Yam (2003) define complexity as the amount of 
information necessary to describe a system effectively. In the context of a system-of-
systems, the necessary information encompasses both the systems that comprise the 
SoS and their time-varying interactions with each other and the “externalities.” Rouse 
(2007) summarized that the complexity of a system (or model of a system) is related to: 
the intentions with which one addresses the systems, the characteristics of the 
representation that appropriately accounts for the system’s boundaries, architecture, 
interconnections and information flows, and the multiple representations of a system—all 
of which are simplifications. Hence, complexity is inevitably underestimated and context-
dependent. Polzer, DeLaurentis, and Fry (2007) explored the issue of multiplicity of 
perspectives, in which perspective is a system’s version of operational context. 
Historical data from previous unsuccessful defense acquisition programs show a 
distinct correlation with the causes for complexity identified by Fowler (1994). Such data 
suggest some of the causes for the failure of the Defense Acquisition Process to be 
“over specification and an overly rigid approach on development,” unreasonably detailed 
cost estimates of development and production, impractical schedules, and extremely 
large bureaucratic overhead. Dr. Pedro Rustan, Director of Advanced Systems and 
Technology at the National Reconnaissance Office, identified four specific shortcomings 
in the acquisition process for defense space systems: initial weapons performance 
requirements that are too detailed and lacking flexibility, insufficient flexibility in the 
budget process, a propensity to increase performance requirements in the middle of the 
acquisition cycle, and demands to field entirely new spacecraft to meet new requirement 
(Spring, 2005).  
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Using the above examples, we summarize the common causes of failure (Rouse, 
2007) within SoS acquisition processes as: a) misalignment of objectives among the 
systems, b) limited span-of-control of the SoS engineer on the component systems of 
the SoS, c) evolution of the SoS, d) inflexibility of the component system designs, e) 
emergent behavior revealing hidden dependencies within systems, f) perceived 
complexity of systems and g) the challenges in system representation.  
To provide context, in Ghose and DeLaurentis (2008), we mapped these 
complexities to a System-of-systems Engineering (SoSE) Process Model designed 
specifically for SoS applications by Sage and Biemer (2007). This mapping represents 
points at which complexities might arise and how they may affect the acquisition 
process.  
Development of a Conceptual Model 
Pre-acquisition Model 
We developed a pre-acquisition model to understand the impact of external 
stakeholders on the acquisition process. The model is based loosely on the Sage and 
Biemer (2007) SoSE Process Model and categorizes the external inputs to the SoS 
acquisition strategy model into “Capabilities & Possibilities” (CAP), “Technology 
Assessment, Development, Investment and Affordability Plan” (ADIA) and the funding 
received (Ghose & DeLaurentis, 2008). The CAP and the Technology ADIA Plan 
translate into technical requirements for the SoS. Provision of a computational model of 
the pre-acquisition activities is outside the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus on 
realizing a model for the acquisition strategy, described next. 
Acquisition Strategy Model 
Development of a “brand new” SoS has been and will remain a rare occurrence. 
In their 2005 study on SoS, the United States Air Force (USAF) Scientific Advisory 
Board (Saunders et al., 2005) stated that one of the challenges in building an SoS is 
accounting for contributions and constraints of legacy systems. These legacy systems 
may be used “as-is” or may need re-engineering to fulfill the needs of the new SoS. New 
systems are also incorporated to develop the capabilities of the SoS. Again, the new 
systems may range from off-the-shelf, plug-and-play products to custom-built systems 
dependent of the working of a legacy system. Sub-categories arise when the two or 
more categories overlap (Figure 2). 
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outlined in the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook 
(DoD, 2003), often 
referred to as the 5000-
series guide. However, 
an SoS environment 
changes the way these 
processes are applied. 
The Systems 
Engineering Guide for 
System-of-Systems 
(SoS-SE) (DoD, 2008) addresses these considerations by modifying (in some cases 
revamping) some of the 16 processes in accord with an SoS environment. These new 
processes and their functions are described in Table 1. Our conceptual model for 
acquisition in an SoS environment (illustrated in Figure 3) is centered on these revised 
processes, depicted in a hierarchy to show the flow of control between the processes 














Figure 1. Heterogeneity of Component Systems  
in an SoS 
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Table 1. Modified Technical Management and Technical Processes  




Takes all inputs from relevant stakeholders and translates the inputs 
into technical requirements. 
Logical Analysis Obtains sets of logical solutions to improve the understanding of the 
defined requirements and the relationships among the requirements 
(e.g., functional, behavioral, temporal). 
Design Solution Translates the outputs of the Requirements Development and Logical 
Analysis processes into alternative design solutions and selects a 
final design solution. 
Decision Analysis Provides the basis for evaluating and selecting alternatives when 
decisions need to be made. 
Implementation Yields the lowest-level system elements in the system hierarchy. The 
system element is made, bought or reused. 
Integration Incorporates the lower-level system elements into a high-level system 
element in the physical architecture. 
Verification Confirms that the system element meets the design-to or build-to 
specifications. It answers the question “Did you build it right?” 
Validation Answers the question of “Did you build the right thing?” 
Transition Applies the process required to move the end-item system to the 
user. 
Technical Planning Ensures that the systems engineering processes are applied properly 
throughout a system’s lifecycle. 




Provides traceability back to user-defined capabilities 
Risk Management Helps ensure program cost, schedule and performance objectives are 
achieved at every stage in the lifecycle and communicates to all 
stakeholders the process for uncovering, determining the scope of, 
and managing program uncertainties. 
Configuration 
Management 
Ensures the application of sound business practices to establish and 
maintain consistency of a product’s attributes with its requirements 
and product configuration information. 
Data Management Addresses the handling of information necessary for or associated 
with product development and sustainment. 
Interface Management Ensures interface definition and compliance among the elements that 
compose the system, as well as with other systems with which the 
system or systems elements must interoperate.  
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A detailed description of the conceptual model and the acquisition stages it 
models (Figure 2) is presented in Ghose and DeLaurentis (2008).    
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Model of Acquisition Strategy Based on SoSE Process 
Described in Table 1 
The purpose of the exploratory computational model is to help acquisition 
professionals develop intuition for procuring and deploying systems in a system-of-
systems context, not to provide a tool validated for use in managing real acquisition 
programs. A model that captures all the complexity of the acquisition process for SoS in 
a modest span of time and effort is impossible. The exercise of the model described in 
this paper specifically targets complexities stemming from the interdependencies among 
systems, the evolutionary development of the SoS and the span-of-control of the SoS 
managers and engineers. An abstraction of the model is presented in Figure 3. 
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At the requirement 
level, each node 
represents a 
requirement, while each 
link represents the 
interdependency 
between requirements. 
Similarly, at the system 
level, each node 
represents a system and 





are needed to fulfill a 
requirement. In our 
computational model, 
the user can specify the 
number of requirements 
and their 
interdependencies as 
well as the number of 
systems and their interdependencies for each requirement, or the user can randomly 
generate the requirement and system interdependencies. It is with this layered network 
concept/representation that the computational model progresses through the acquisition 
stages described in Figure 2. 
Developing the Exploratory Computational Model 
Overview 
Several challenges arise in transforming the acquisition model to a computational 
one for the purposes of simulation and learning. One challenge lies in converting all the 
qualitative concepts into quantitative measures to support the computational model for 
SoS acquisition. Disruptions occur at various stages in the model and are governed by 
the risk associated with the project. A high-risk project, for example, will be more 
vulnerable to disruptions than a low-risk project. A second challenge is building a model 
that can accommodate the dynamic addition and removal of components in the SoS. In 
addition, these component systems need to reflect the heterogeneity of the systems in a 
real acquisition process. We included parameters such as level of completeness to 
demonstrate the difference between legacy systems, new systems and partially 
implemented/integrated systems. A third challenge arises from the numerous 
methodologies that can be applied to reflect the integration and implementation 
processes. In a simplified model, it is much easier to begin integration once all the 
systems have been implemented. However, this method is neither cost- nor time-
efficient, especially in multi-year projects involving numerous systems. On the other 
hand, dynamically implementing and integrating systems is time-efficient but often not 





Figure 3. Node/link Picture of Acquisition Model 
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As stated previously, a model that captures all the complexity of the acquisition 
process for SoS in a modest span of time is impossible. Therefore, our coarse-scale 
engineering model will specifically target challenges related to the evolution of the SoS 
and the span-of-control of the SoS engineer(s).  
Simple SoS Example 
A simple SoS acquisition strategy with two requirements and five component 
systems (Figure 4) is first presented to illustrate the model workings. Figure 4(a) shows 
the physical composition of the SoS, while Figure 4(b) presents the layered network of 













Figure 4. Simple Example of SoS 
 
Requirement 1 is to improve rescue operations performed by a certain fleet, 
while Requirement 2 is to improve communication and coordination between air and 
ground units. The three types of component systems fulfilling Requirement 1 are 
helicopter (A), ship (B) and communication system (C). Similarly, the three component 
systems fulfilling Requirement 2 are ground units (A*), airborne units (B*) and a 
communication system (C*). 
a) Example of SoS b) Model Structure for Example SoS
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Since Requirement 2 needs to use the 
communication system (C) built by Requirement 1, 
Requirement 2 is dependent on Requirement 1. The 
directional dependencies within the component systems 
fulfilling each requirement are shown in Figure 4(a) using 
dashed yellow (bidirectional) and red (unidirectional) 
lines. The requirement level dependency matrix and the 
system-level dependency matrices for each requirement 
are shown in Table 2.  
Model Inputs 
Three levels of inputs are used in the model: 
project-level, requirement-level and system-level. The 
three user-defined project-level inputs are project-risk, 
span-of-control of SoS managers and engineers, and 
estimated amount of time needed to complete the 
project. A project can have low, medium or high project-
risk profile. This profile determines: a) the probability of the project being affected by 
disruptions at Design Solution (Level t3(0), Figure 2) and Implementation & Integration 
(Level t5(0), Figure 2) stage, and b) the probability of a new requirement being added 
during the project lifecycle. The span-of-control of an SoS engineer or manager indicates 
whether component systems are directly or indirectly accountable to the SoS manager 
or engineer. A project’s span-of-control is either “0” or “1,” where “0” represents low 
span-of-control. A project with low span-of-control implements dependent systems 
sequentially instead of in parallel. The requirement-level inputs to the exploratory 
computational model are initial number of requirements, dependencies between 
requirements, component systems fulfilling each requirement, and the dependencies 
between the component systems. 
The dependencies between the requirements determine the schedule by which 
the requirements will be implemented. For the simple example problem, as shown in 
Table 2, there are two requirements (1, 2), and each has a dependency vector 
associated with it. The vectors are concatenated to form the dependency matrix for 
requirements (“0” is placed for all diagonal elements since a requirement cannot be 
dependent on itself). The vector for Requirement 1 ([0 1]) shows that Requirement “1” is 
dependent on Requirement “2,” and “1” cannot  be realized until “2” is implemented. In 
real-world applications, communication upgrade to the North-Atlantic fleet may be 
independent of the weaponry upgrade for the same group of systems. In such a case, 
both the requirements on the same group of systems may be implemented 
simultaneously. Each requirement affects a subset of the systems present in the SoS, 
and the systems in each subset share a unique dependency matrix with other systems in 
that subset. 
All component systems of the SoS have user-defined and calculated system-
level parameters that expose their heterogeneity and help track their progress through 
the acquisition process. Some of the parameters used to describe each system in the 
SoS are described in Table 3.  
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Table 3. System-level Parameters Used to Describe Component System of the SoS 
Parameter Description 
ID Unique ID assigned to the system 
Imp.completeness[] An array that tracks the progress of the system in the implementation 
phaseImp.dependencies[] Dependency vector that shows if system implementation is dependent 
on information from any other system 
Imp.time Maximum time needed to complete implementation 
Int.completeness[] An array that tracks the progress of the system in the integration phase  
Int.dependencies[] Dependency vector that shows if system integration is dependent on 
information from any other system 
Int.time Maximum time needed to complete integration 
 
While most of the parameters are user-defined, Imp.completeness and 
Int.completeness are only initialized by the user, and ID is assigned by the model. 
Implementation or Integration of a system[A] is either dependent on information from 
other systems satisfying the requirement or independent of any such information. Thus, 
all the tasks necessary to successfully implement or integrate system[A] can be divided 
into smaller subsets depending upon which systems they need information from. At a 
given time-step, the level of completeness of system[A] with regard to system[X] is 
defined as the percent of tasks needed to successfully implement/integrate system[A] 
that are dependent on information from system[X] and have been completed. Level of 
completeness for both integration and implementation processes can vary between 0 
and 100%. The level of completeness of system[A] with regard to N individual systems is 
summed to calculate the total level of completeness of system[A]. Note that although the 
tasks are dependent on information from system[A], the level of completeness says 
nothing about the status of system[A]. Note also that the model works in discrete time.  
Similar to requirements, each system has a pre-defined dependency vector for 
implementation and integration processes. These vectors are concatenated to form a 
dependency matrix for the systems fulfilling each requirement.  
Model Dynamics 
The model begins at the Requirement Development (Level t0(0), Figure 3) stage, 
which initializes requirements to be implemented, project span-of-control and project 
risk. Disruptors at the requirement level can take the form of change in existing 
requirements or addition of new requirements. The user-defined inputs from 
Requirement Development are passed to Logical Analysis (Level t2(0), Figure 2), which 
generates a schedule to realize the given requirements either in series or in parallel (per 
the dependencies). Each requirement then enters its own Design Solution and Decision 
Analysis (Level t3(0), Figure 2) process. The Design Solution and Decision Analysis 
processes feed into each other, and any disruptions at this stage imply that the design 
solution provided is not feasible. If the solution fails in multiple consecutive time-steps, 
then the requirement is sent back to the Requirement Development stage; otherwise, the 
set of component systems and their user-defined parameters are sent to the Technology 
Planning and Technology Assessment (Level t4(0), Figure  2) processes.  
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Implementation (Level t5(0), Figure 2) of systems occur in series or parallel, 
depending on the system dependencies and the span-of-control of the project. The level 
of completeness for implementation increases by the iteration rate at every time-step 
until it reaches a completeness value of 1. The incremental increase in the level of 
completeness of two dependent systems in a project with high span-of-control (“1”) 
occurs simultaneously, as shown in Figure 5(a). In a case of low span-of-control (“0”), 
dependent systems are implemented sequentially, as shown in Figure 5(b).  
When a system achieves the implementation completeness = 1, it enters the 
Integration stage. 
























































Figure 5. Incremental Increase in Implementation Completeness 
 
Similar to Implementation, systems can be integrated in series or in parallel 
depending on the span-of-control. When both the Implementation and Integration 
processes for the given requirement are complete, the Validation and Verification phase 
(Level t6(0), Figure 2) checks for a completeness level of “1” for all component systems. 
If the requirement successfully passes Validation and Verification, it is said to be ready 
for Testing. A more detailed description of these stages is presented by Ghose and 
DeLaurentis (2008). 
To present an example of output generated by the computational model, we 
simulate the acquisition process of the simple SoS presented in Figure 4. We assume 
that this project has a high span-of-control and a low risk level. All systems have random 
initial completeness levels as well as implementation and integration times. Results for 
this simple example from the computational model are presented in Figure 6.  Results 
similar to the ones presented on the left plot are available for all systems that comprise 
the acquisition project in this example.  
a) Independent b) Dependent Systems 
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Figure 6. Sample Results of Computational Model for Example Problem 
In Figure 6(a), each bar represents a system that is part of requirement 1. 
Because we are observing system “a,” its integration with itself has a value of “1.”  The 
integration completeness of system “a” with systems “b” and “c” fluctuates (due to 
disruptions—occurring here with a uniformly random probability) until after 22 time-steps, 
at which point integration is complete. The numerous set-backs in integrating systems 
“b” and “c” indicate key dynamic features of this model. Though modeled as uniformly 
random here, we envision more meaningful probability functions for the occurrence of 
disruptions that relate to physical or actual observed patterns. When the system histories 
are compiled, the result is the acquisition process history shown in Figure 6(b). Evidence 
of the impact of disruptions on completeness is noticeable. The completion time of this 
acquisition project is 138 time units. Note, however, that requirement 2 shows no activity 
after the Design Solutions phase from 10 to 81 time units; requirement 2 is dependent 
on requirement 1, which is completed after 81 time units. 
Case Studies 
Management organization and the complexity of requirements vary from SoS 
project to project. Further, component systems that comprise the SoS have different risk 
levels that add to the complexity and uncertainty of a given SoS. In these case studies, 
we utilize the exploratory model to test the dynamics underlining the acquisition 
management in an SoS environment. We explore the impact of span-of-control, 
requirement dependency, and system risk on the completion-time of an SoS. First, we 
study the impact of span-of-control by simulating the acquisition process for low and high 
span-of-control. Then, we simulate twelve scenarios—which result from the combination 
of low and high span-of-control, dependent and independent requirements, and low, 
medium, and high risk profile—and study the impact of these project and system 
characteristics on the project’s completion time.  
The effect of span-of-control is studied by simulating the acquisition process of 
the example problem described in Figure 4 for low and high span-of-control. All the 
values of the input parameters are the same (same probability of occurrence of 
a) Integration completeness of system “a” b) Completeness history of entire project 
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disruptions and low risk level) for each scenario, while the span-of-control is varied from 
low to high. Figure 7 present the results for these two scenarios.  








































Figure 7. Impact of Span-of-control 
Because the example presented in Figure 6 already considered the high span-of-
control scenario, the same result is presented here in Figure 7(a). Figure 7(b), on the 
other hand, presents the results of the scenario when the SoS has low span-of-control. 
The comparison of these two scenarios makes obvious the impact of the span-of-control 
parameter. For low span-of-control, the project completion time is about 4500 time units, 
while high span-of-control permits the completion of the same project in 138 time units. 
Since the probability of disruptions is never zero, disruptions inevitably occur that 
impact the system completeness level and, ultimately, the project completion time. 
Because the model is probabilistic in nature, 100 different runs are performed for each 
scenario, and the mean completion time is recorded. To isolate the effect of the random 
disruptions, we enforce all systems to have the same initial completeness level for all 
100 runs; furthermore, we assume that when a disruption occurs, it will not reduce the 
completeness level below the initial value.   
Figure 8 presents a distribution of the completion time for each of these 
scenarios. As expected, the mean completion time when span-of-control is high (70 time 
units) is lower than when span-of-control is low (2,474 time units, a 35-fold increase).  
a) High Span-of-control Result b) Low Span-of-control Result 
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Figure 8. Distribution for Completion Time for Low and High Span-of-control 
This behavior seems reasonable when we consider that when the span-of-control 
is low, systems are integrated and implemented sequentially, which increases the 
probability of disruptions. The variance is also lower in the high span-of-control case.  
As previously mentioned, the acquisition model also uses risk level to describe 
the probability of disruptions during the design of component systems. Its impact on the 
completion time when coupled with span-of-control and requirement interdependency is, 
thus, also investigated. Figure 9 displays the results for combinations of low and high 
span-of-control with low, medium, and high risk levels—all for cases of both dependent 











































Figure 9. Comparison of Project and System Characteristics 
 
a) High Span-of-control Result b) Low Span-of-control Result 
a) High Span-of-control Results b) Low Span-of-control Results 
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Each data point in Figure 9 represents the mean completion time after 100 runs. 
As expected, these mean total time results show that span-of-control has the largest 
impact on completion time. Additionally, the impact of dependent requirements is much 
greater in the low span-of-control case. A dependent requirement must wait for the 
completion of the requirement on which it depends, and when both requirements must 
sequentially implement and integrate component systems (low span-of-control), the 
result is a substantial increase in completion time.  
The results from these twelve test cases are used next in a sensitivity analysis to 
quantify the relative importance of each of the three parameters on the total time needed 
to complete the project.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis further investigates the impact of the three parameters 
(requirement dependency, span-of-control, and risk profile) studied in the twelve test 
cases.  
Requirement Dependency: Compare completion time in cases of dependent 
versus independent requirements while keeping span-of-control and risk profile constant. 
Table 5 presents the ratio of the mean completion time of the scenarios with dependent 
requirements to the mean completion time of the scenarios with independent 
requirements. Risk profiles are labeled “1” for Low, “2” for Medium and “3” for High. 
These results show that scenarios with dependent requirements take marginally longer 
when compared to projects with independent requirements. Note, however, that as 
Figure 9 showed, for low span-of-control, the absolute increase in the mean completion 
time is still relatively large. 
Table 5. Effect of Requirement Dependency 
Span‐of‐control Risk Ratio Span‐of‐control Risk Ratio
1 1 1.008 0 1 1.008
1 2 1.017 0 2 1.008
1 3 1.013 0 3 1.030  
Span-of-Control: Compared cases of low versus high span-of-control while 
keeping requirement-dependency and risk profile constant. Table 6 presents the ratio of 
the mean completion time of the scenarios with low span-of-control to the mean 
completion time of the scenarios with high span-of-control. The six results indicate the 
level of risk of each scenario (labeled “1” for Low, “2” for Medium and “3” for High) and 
whether requirements are dependent or independent (labeled “I” for independent and “D” 
for dependent). These results show that low span-of-control increases the mean 
completion time by a factor of 32.70 to 35.08. Also of note is that the largest increases in 
completion time occur when requirements are dependent. This is an expected result 
because dependent requirements are completed sequentially instead of in parallel.  
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Table 6. Effect of Span-of-control 
I/D Risk Ratio I/D Risk Ratio
I 1 32.77 D 1 32.77
I 2 32.98 D 2 32.70
I 3 34.51 D 3 35.08  
Risk Profile: Compared cases of three risk profiles, while keeping requirement 
dependency and span-of-control constant. Table 7 presents the ratio in mean completion 
time between scenarios with risk “2” and “3” and risk “1.”  These ratios indicate that as 
risk increases, so does the mean completion time. As expected, the highest increase is 
observed for high risk levels (risk with value “3”) for both low and high span-of-control 
scenarios. For example: for a project with independent requirements and high span-of-
control, the ratio of the mean completion time for a high risk (“3”) profile versus a low risk 
(“1”) profile is 1.042.  
Table 7. Effect of Increasing Project Risk  
I/D Span‐of‐control Risk Ratio I/D Span‐of‐control Risk Ratio
I 1 1 ‐ I 0 1 ‐
I 1 2 1.036 I 0 2 1.043
I 1 3 1.042 I 0 3 1.098
D 1 1 ‐ D 0 1 ‐
D 1 2 1.045 D 0 2 1.043
D 1 3 1.047 D 0 3 1.121  
Results 
Some insights gained from testing the exploratory model via the sensitivity 
analysis are: 
1. As expected, time to implement dependent requirements is always greater 
than the independent case; completion time strongly depends on the span-of-
control of the SoS managers and engineers, as well as on the project risk.  
2. Time needed to implement projects with higher risk profiles is always greater 
than the time needed to implement the project with lower risk profiles. 
3. The sensitivity analysis shows that the time needed to complete a project is 
much more sensitive to the span-of-control of the SoS engineers and 
managers than to the project risk or the dependencies between the 
requirements. 
4. A project with high span-of-control is better equipped to recover from the 
debilitating disruptions associated with a high risk, thus making the 
acquisition process more resilient.  
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We have developed a conceptual model for pre-acquisition and acquisition 
strategy activities by mapping the sources of complexity to a section of the SoSE 
Process Model by Sage and Biemer (2007) in conjunction with the 16 technical and 
technical-management SE processes identified by the SoS-SE Guide (DoD, 2008). This 
mapping and conceptual model provide a basis for a computational exploratory model 
for acquisition strategy in an SoS environment. The purpose of the model is to explore 
the complexities that arise in SoS acquisition programs due to evolutionary development 
of the SoS, heterogeneity of the component systems, as well as the effect of 
management parameters on the acquisition programs. Based on user-defined inputs for 
the requirements and their interdependencies, the model uses series and parallel 
processing to implement and integrate the component systems that comprise the SoS 
while allowing the impact of disruptors to propagate through the various processes in the 
acquisition hierarchy.  
In this study, we use the dynamic exploratory model to investigate the impact of 
requirement interdependency, project risk, and span-of-control on the completion time of 
SoS projects.  Results from test scenarios and sensitivity analysis underline the 
importance of span-of-control of SoS managers and engineers on the timely completion 
of projects. Projects with a low span-of-control always require more time to complete 
than projects with high span-of-control. Furthermore, the effects of requirement 
interdependency and project risk are always overshadowed by the impact of span-of-
control. A high span-of-control positively affects completion time by making the 
acquisition process more resilient and agile in the face of disruptions. While some of 
these observations confirm intuition, the computational model provides a means to test 
acquisition and/or management strategies and explore new approaches for the SoS 
acquisition process.  
The uniqueness of the models (both conceptual and computational) lies in their 
ability to provide decision-makers with a better understanding of the acquisition process 
in an SoS environment. The models also offer computational tools to aid decision-
making for the higher levels of SoS management. We hope that the insights gained from 
this research will improve the probability of success of future acquisition programs of 
complex SoS.  
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Abstract 
The acquisition community in many nations faces novel challenges with the 
transition to systems-of-systems, capabilities-based solutions to meet military 
requirements. Much of the “tribal knowledge” and experience of those in acquisition, 
both in industry and government, has stemmed from platform-centred development 
strategies. It is questionable to what extent lessons from these can be applied to 
systems-of-systems acquisition. How does the acquisition expert trade off platform 
capabilities against the capabilities of a network of systems that might be composed of 
new and existing platforms used in new or old ways?  
This paper presents case studies from past and present, illustrating such issues, 
and seeks to draw out lessons from experience that may be useful. It draws on many 
years of empirical research, undertaken with those involved in addressing such issues in 
the acquisition community. 
Introduction 
Much work in the acquisition community, in many nations, has been undertaken 
in recent years toward achieving enhanced military capabilities through the use of 
systems-of-systems, network-centric or -enabled capabilities and through life 
management of these. This work has been motivated by many different factors—
evolving threats and military doctrines, changes in technology, force re-structuring, etc. 
Central to these efforts has been a desire to achieve interoperability of forces, allowing 
the deployment of capabilities that, hopefully, are more than the sum of their parts. 
While much of this work has rightly focussed on the opportunities offered by new, 
notably digital, technologies, more prosaic (perhaps what could be seen as “old-
fashioned”) issues also have a significant impact. Capability depends on the interaction 
of all system components and their differing characteristics. In this paper, the effects of 
capabilities of such prosaic issues will be explored, with the focus on one of the oldest 
“systems-of-systems,” the aircraft carrier and its aircraft. In a near century of evolution, 
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the aircraft carrier and military aircraft have evolved both independently and together in 
the face of, and in response to, changing military needs. The success of their 
evolutionary ability means that they are still seen as providing important capabilities for 
the long term.  
Aircraft and aircraft carriers form symbiotic system for the delivery of capability. A 
view of aircraft carriers as mere infrastructure, a floating runway and hangar for the 
aircraft it carries, misses much of its importance. In order to understand how to acquire 
such capabilities, we need to understand the interactions between the aircraft carrier and 
its aircraft. In this paper, the prosaic issues that matter in operating aircraft from ships 
will be illustrated. This is not to diminish the modern need for digital interoperability, etc., 
but rather to illustrate how matters such as simply being able to move aircraft around the 
deck and hangar of a ship in an effective manner can have significant effects on 
capability. 
This paper examines the issue from the perspective of the United Kingdom’s 
Royal Navy and its experiences of deploying Short Take Off and Vertical Landing 
(STOVL) aircraft onboard its carrier fleet over several decades. Current acquisition 
policy in the UK is concerned with delivering capability using Through Life Capability 
Management (TLCM). This is defined as, “translating the requirements of Defence policy 
into an approved programme that delivers the required capabilities, through-life, across 
all Defence Lines of Development” (MoD, 2009). 
The Defence Lines of Development (DLODs) allow for the co-ordination of the 
development of the different aspects of capability that are needed to create a real 
military capability. These aspects are: 
 Training  
 Equipment  
 Personnel  
 Information  
 Concepts & Doctrine  
 Organisation  
 Infrastructure  
 Logistics 
It is only by addressing all the lines of development that the acquisition (and 
sustainment) community can effectively deliver capability to the UK armed forces, 
through the various force elements (ships, aircraft, army units, etc.), which are then used 
to create Joint Capability Packages. These are tailored by a force commander to 
undertake particular missions or tasks, taking into account coalition forces, threats and 
the overall operating environment. This is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The Role of the UK Defence Lines of Development  
in the Creation of Capability 
The DLODS can therefore be seen as being the primary constituents of capability 
and forms a useful analytical tool to understand the impact of differing ways of delivering 
capability. In this paper, we are concerned with the UK Royal Navy’s use of STOVL 
aircraft from its carriers. An illustration of how the choice of STOVL aircraft can impact 
on the DLODs is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of UK and US Naval Strike Fighter Costs across the 
UK Defence Lines of Development  
(Stanford, 2008) 
This figure illustrates how, for the achievement of a given capability, the costs are 
allocated for the two examples across the DLODs, due both to the innate differences 
between two different types of aircraft and also to the differing operational employment 
of STOVL and CTOL aircraft. The UK STOVL aircraft training costs are lower than for 
the US aircraft, attributable to the needs of “cat and trap” landings at 140 knots on the 
US Navy supercarrier. However, the lower warload of the UK STOVL aircraft may 
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account for the higher overall equipment costs while the difference in costs attributable 
to doctrine is perhaps the most marked, reflecting the greater flexibility of the STOVL 
aircraft carrier and its aircraft. 
While STOVL aircraft may be “easier” to integrate at one level with a ship (with 
no catapult or arrestor wires and the ability for STOVL aircraft to operate from smaller 
ships), what this example really illustrates is that the costs are distributed differently for a 
given capability depending on the nature of the systems used to deliver it. In the case of 
aircraft carriers and their aircraft, it is important to note that both are complex systems in 
their own right, with differing design, testing, manufacturing and support approaches. As 
Andrews (2003) has rightly pointed out, a ship does not have a prototype, unlike aircraft, 
and therefore, there is a need for the designer to ensure that it is “right first time.” 
However, in the case of an aircraft carrier, it is only once it is operating aircraft, or when 
a new generation of aircraft are introduced, that it can be determined if the design was 
indeed right—and that while it may be right first time, it may not be right second time, 
with new aircraft onboard.  
For the acquisition community, the issues attendant on developing and 
sustaining capability using ships and aircraft in combination present formidable 
challenges. While traditional approaches to designing them separately may be seen as 
less than ideal, the rest of this paper will explore how the acquisition process of the past 
has managed to achieve a large measure of success in doing this, despite being 
focussed largely around projects rather than overall capability. 
Harrier and Invincible Class Experience and Design 
One of the main “transformational” military technologies of the twentieth century 
was the development of aircraft to provide a new dimension to warfare. The impact of 
aircraft on naval warfare became apparent during World War II, notably in the great 
battles of the Pacific War, with Japan and the United States relying on aircraft and 
aircraft carriers as the centrepiece of their fleets. Post-1945, the aircraft carrier continued 
in this central role in major navies, and helicopters allowed the provision of air power to 
be extended to smaller vessels and lesser navies. 
In the United Kingdom, attempts to sustain a viable force of major aircraft carriers 
foundered due to budgetary restrictions. Nevertheless, in order to retain a viable naval 
force, it was recognised (despite considerable inter-service debate) that some form of 
organic air power was still required to deliver the Royal Navy’s key NATO role of anti-
submarine warfare in the Eastern Atlantic. This was a highly complex environment with 
threats from Soviet submarines, surface combatants and aircraft (both land- and ship-
based) requiring a mix of capabilities to be able to respond to them. 
In order to meet these threats, the Royal Navy was largely forced to adapt the 
land-based Harrier STOVL strike aircraft to meet their needs. The ability of the Harrier to 
land on many types of ship had been demonstrated since 1963, from full-size aircraft 
carriers to the helicopter decks of cruisers. The adoption of the Harrier by the US Marine 
Corps during the 1970s had led to the regular use of the aircraft from the assault ships of 
the US Navy, although only those (LPH and LPD) with full flight decks and hangars had 
Harriers based on them. 
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The Royal Navy was already planning a fore of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
cruisers during the early 1970s, to operate helicopters only. However, the need for the 
ships to carry more than six helicopters to meet the submarine threat from the Soviet 
Union led to the adoption of a “through deck” layout for the ships, essentially a miniature 
aircraft carrier, and in many ways the same basic layout as the US Navy’s assault ships 
from which the Harrier was already operating. The recognition of the inability of surface-
to-air missiles to fully meet the threat of “shadowing” reconnaissance aircraft of the 
Soviet Navy (providing targeting data for submarine launched anti-ship missiles) led the 
Royal Navy to push for the adoption of the Harrier to operate from the new class of ASW 
cruisers, with a small number of the aircraft operating alongside the helicopters.  This led 
to the development of the British Aerospace (BAe) Sea Harrier, which first flew in 1978 
(Brown & Moore, 2003). 
However, the design of the ships, which became known as the Invincible class, 
was largely fixed before the decision to develop the Sea Harrier—HMS Invincible was 
laid down in 1973, while the Sea Harrier was not funded for development until 1978. This 
meant that, with the Sea Harrier being an adaptation of the land-based Harrier, neither 
the ship nor the aircraft was designed specifically for the other. For the ship, the hangar, 
flight deck, maintenance and stores (fuel, weapons, spares) facilities were all designed 
around the Sea King ASW helicopter. They were also designed “to have the ability to 
take future VSTOL” (i.e., STOVL) aircraft, with provision made for STOVL aircraft (in 
terms of some additional space being allocated and with the aircraft lifts) sized for 
STOVL aircraft. This latter assumed a generation of aircraft in advance of the Harrier, 
although it led to the assumption that such an aircraft would have similar dimensions to 
an earlier STOVL project, which had been cancelled while still under development in 
1965: the Hawker Siddeley P.1154. The latter had been essentially a larger, faster, more 
powerful version of the Harrier concept (Andrews, 2009, February 12). 
Adapting the Harrier for use in a maritime environment proved relatively 
straightforward, with new avionics and minor systems improvements in addition to a 
more noticeable new front fuselage. As the aircraft was relatively small, major 
modifications such as wing folding were not required, although the radome folded for 
maintenance access and to reduce the spotting factor. Tie-down lugs were added to the 
aircraft’s undercarriage to secure it to the deck, but, all told, “navalisation” added only an 
extra 100 pounds of weight. This low figure was largely attributable to the ability of the 
Sea Harrier to land vertically, so eliminating the need for strengthening to cope with 
arrested landings, as well as the aircraft’s ability to take-off without the need for 
catapulting, with similar structural “beefing up” obviated (Fozard, 1978). 
In place of the catapult, one innovation allowed the Sea Harrier to operate at 
higher weights from aircraft carriers. This was the “ski jump” ramp, an upwardly curved 
addition to the end of the flight deck runway that enabled the Sea Harrier to take-off at 
either lower airspeeds or at higher weights for a given deck run than a “flat deck” take-
off. The ramp also offered safety benefits, as it meant that the Sea Harrier should almost 
always be launched on an upwards trajectory even if the bows of the ship were pointing 
down, as often happened in heavy seas. Trials on land during the latter half of the 1970s 
proved the concept of the ramp, and showed that only relatively trivial modifications to 
the Sea Harrier’s undercarriage were required to allow it to use the new “ski jump” 
technique (Fozard, 1978; Davies & Thornborough, 1996). 
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The first installation of the “ski jump” on a ship was on the old light fleet carrier 
HMS Hermes, which was given a 12-degree ramp during a refit and took Sea Harriers 
onboard for trials in 1979. These trials showed that the concept would work at sea, 
although it had already been decided to add ramps to the Invincible class during build—
although on the first two ships of the class, the ramp was at the lower angle of 7 
degrees. This was due to the ships being fitted with a substantial anti-aircraft missile 
launcher in the bows, the firing arc of which required the lower-angle ramp. This reduced 
the benefits of the ramp, but still allowed a useful addition in payload or reduction in 
take-off run for the Sea Harrier (Brown & Moore, 2003). 
Once HMS Invincible had been commissioned and began operating Sea 
Harriers, it became clear that the two systems had not been designed for each other. 
The dimensions of the ships’ hangar had been defined by two main constraints—the 
need to change the rotor head of the Sea King helicopter and by the need for the ship’s 
own gas turbine propulsion system uptakes to pass next to the hangar. This produced a 
“dumbbell” shaped hangar that was wider at its ends than in the middle section. While 
this was adequate for the Sea King, the absence of wing folding on the Sea Harrier did 
mean that they were already approaching the limits of the hangar width in this area. 
Even greater strains were caused by the Sea Harrier’s support onboard the ship, with 
perhaps three times as much fuel, spares, etc., required for each Sea Harrier than for 
each Sea King helicopter. In addition, the need to remove the wing of the Sea Harrier in 
order to change its engine meant that a specialised hoist was installed in the hangar, 
with an engine change requiring the aircraft to be trestled and secured to the hangar 
floor. The entire engine change evolution could take several days, monopolising a major 
part of the hangar and reducing the scope for aircraft movements in the hangar 
(Andrews, 2009, February 12; Davies & Thornborough, 1996). 
While these limitations were coming to light, there were benefits to using the Sea 
Harrier onboard the Invincible class. It quickly became apparent that the vectored thrust 
engine of the Sea Harrier allowed it to “back taxi” under its own power, reducing the 
requirement for tractors and towing gear and considerably speeding up the process of 
moving aircraft to and from parking areas on deck. This meant that landing and take-off 
cycles could be increased, adding to the other benefits of operating STOVL aircraft such 
as the ability to dispense with “go around” fuel margins, reduced weather minima and 
high sortie generation rates. 
All these aspects were proven of value during the Falklands conflict in 1982, in 
which the Sea Harrier and Invincible class both proved their worth in a real conflict 
(Davies & Thornborough, 1996). Subsequently, both were updated, with the Sea Harrier 
receiving a new weapons system, and the Invincible class adapted with additional 
weapons and the ablity to operate a larger number of Sea Harriers (and later land-based 
Harriers). The anti-aircraft missile system was removed from the ships, allowing an 
increase in deck area and larger weapons magazines for the aircraft, and further 
operational experience has proven that these adaptations have been valuable. 
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Figure 3. Royal Navy Sea Harriers Operating from an Aircraft Carrier  
during the Falklands War  
*Note the proximity of the deck crews, a problem in later studies for a Sea Harrier successor. 
(Harrier.org.uk, 2009) 
However, it can be seen from this brief and incomplete history that designing the 
ships and the aircraft as separate projects—only loosely associated during 
development—came at a considerable price in terms of reduced efficiency and 
difficulties in operation. These were offset by the personnel of the Royal Navy and Fleet 
Air Arm who proved adept at coping with these difficulties. However, the costs of the 
equipment line of development were considerable, and adding costs in terms of 
personnel, training and additions to the equipment to overcome deficiencies identified 
during use was undesirable, as was the in-built high logistics cost of the difficult nature of 
some Sea Harrier maintenance operations and the confined spaces of the Invincible 
class hangar. 
Sea Harrier Replacement Design and Invincible Class 
With the experience of the Falklands War and the emergence of new threats for 
the Soviet Union (notably the deployment of Soviet aircraft carriers, fighters and long-
range maritime strike aircraft), meant that by the early 1980s, the Royal Navy was 
actively pursuing a Sea Harrier replacement programme, in addition to updating the 
earlier aircraft. One basic assumption was that such an aircraft would be in service 
during the lifetime of the Invincible class, so it had to be compatible with those ships. 
This allowed the opportunity to design new aircraft with the issues of operating from the 
Invincible class in mind, rather than evolving the aircraft design separately from the ship. 
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As part of the threat analysis and operational research into how to meet such a 
threat, work in the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) into the characteristics of a Sea Harrier 
replacement showed that supersonic speed would be a valuable asset. In meeting a 
notional attack from Soviet forces, it was seen that a smaller number of supersonic 
aircraft could cover the threat than was the case with subsonic aircraft using similar 
sensors and weapons. For some threats, only supersonic speed in the aircraft could 
provide an adequate response. This issue of aircraft numbers was important as the 
relatively small size of the Invincible class (plus the ships’ need to also accommodate 
anti-submarine helicopters) meant that the total number of aircraft carried was unlikely to 
exceed the number of Sea Harriers the ships could accommodate, about 8 STOVL 
aircraft (Pryce, 2008). 
In industrial studies to develop a Sea Harrier successor aircraft (involving British 
Aerospace and Rolls Royce), the need to provide supersonic speed led to a number of 
design issues becoming the focus of much work. The most significant of these was that 
a much more powerful and energetic engine would be needed than that used in the Sea 
Harrier. This provided a number of environmental difficulties when operating aircraft 
onboard ships—as the noise, jet temperatures and velocities could adversely impact the 
deck environment of the ship as well as the aircraft itself to a significant extent (Pryce, 
2008). One result of the work was that it was seen that it may be possible that when 
supersonic STOVL aircraft were hovering in advance of landing, the deck crew might 
need to use some form of refuge or shelter as the noise level could induce nausea and 
possible unconsciousness, and the high velocity jets of the aircraft could readily blow 
crew members overboard (Brooklands Museum Archive File HSA/SHR/047). Clearly, 
this would be unacceptable, as the role of the deck crew was to enable aircraft 
operations (see Figure 3). 
The effort to obviate such potential risks in the design stage led to a number of 
propulsion systems and operating techniques that sought to reduce such adverse effects 
(Pryce, 2008). However, these brought with them a range of operational drawbacks as 
well—such as the loss of the ability to “back taxi” and the introduction of engines that 
were too large for the engine maintenance and storage spaces of the Invincible class. A 
visit by the aircraft design team from BAe to an Invincible class ship revealed further 
complications that had not been assumed in their design studies, such as ruts in the 
hangar deck that could mean that if the nose undercarriage of some designs went into 
such a rut, the tail of the aircraft could “scrape” the hangar roof—despite the ruts only 
being an inch or so deep. In addition, it was realised that the highly integrated avionics 
proposed for some of the new aircraft would require a complete re-arrangement of both 
the maintenance spaces of the ship and the trade structure of the maintenance 
personnel (Brooklands Museum Archive File HSA/SHR/047). 
While these issues were not faced by all the new aircraft designs proposed (and 
many of them managed to successfully address the existing problems with the Sea 
Harrier, such as the difficult engine change evolution), it was apparent that the need for 
supersonic speed and the innate limitations of the Invincible class would cause 
problems. In the aircraft design studies, it was to be assumed that the ships were not to 
be modified with special devices such as deck blast deflectors to accommodate the new 
aircraft. It was discovered that a key limitation was the strength of the ski jump ramp of 
the ships, as the new aircraft were much heavier, and that strength limitations of the 
ramp, as well as in the undercarriage of the aircraft, meant that in some cases the 
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aircraft could not take-off with a full load of fuel or weapons (National Archive File AVIA 
6/25876). 
While the aircraft designers were wrestling with these difficulties, additional 
analytical studies in the MoD and in BAe showed that further ship/aircraft interaction-
dependent characteristics also provided limitations. With only a relatively small number 
of aircraft carried by the Invincible class, high levels of availability were essential to meet 
the threats assumed. While the aircraft could possibly be more reliable than the Sea 
Harrier, it became clear from assessment work of the deck and hangar movements of 
the aircraft onboard the ship that critical limitations on availability were imposed on all 
aircraft designs, with reductions in the number of aircraft actually available for operations 
disproportionately affected by these limitations (Pryce, 2008; Brooklands Museum 
Archive File HSA/SHR/047). 
For example, the ability of the Sea Harrier to “back taxi” under its own power 
meant that it was able to move quickly into deck parking spaces. However, the 
configuration of the propulsion systems of the some of the proposed successor aircraft 
meant that this was not possible, so they would need to be towed around on deck. While 
a slower process in itself, the realisation that the turning circle of an aircraft plus tow bar 
and tractor may be much larger than a Sea Harrier meant that not only were 
manoeuvres slower, but also required greater free deck area to be carried out. Such free 
area may not be available as the deck was already congested—with many areas used 
for more than one purpose (see Figure 4), and a “traffic jam” situation would result. 
Similar problems arose when the size of the aircraft designs reached a point at which the 
size limits of the lifts or hangar were approached—narrow margins meant much more 
careful positioning was required, which the crew were likely to have to do much more 
slowly. It was realised that while crew training and possibly increase personnel numbers 
may make it possible ways to ameliorate such matters, it was difficult to accommodate 
additional crew onboard the ship and impossible to show the extent of training required 
to ensure high levels of availability (Pryce, 2008; Brooklands Museum Archive File 
HSA/SHR/047). 
 
Figure 4. Invincible Class Deck Layout and Uses 
(The colours show the different uses of the deck, and how these uses could overlap. An 
aircraft landing on the deck could slow down take-off operations if it was unable to clear the 
landing area or to park quickly (Brooklands Museum Archive File HSA/SHR/047).) 
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Once these ship-dependent aspects of replacing the Sea Harrier were looked 
into, it became clear that being able to design a new aircraft “around” the Invincible class 
as it already existed was extremely difficult—as the change in the threat that the new 
aircraft were intended to meet meant that the aircraft had features that the Invincible 
class found difficult to accommodate. Attempting to trade-off aircraft performance levels 
against the deck environment and “traffic” issues on deck also proved extremely difficult, 
and once wider issues such as the higher fuel/weapon loads of the new aircraft (leading 
to more frequent replenishment operations) were considered, the work led to the 
somewhat startling realisation that a new, “better” aircraft could lead to a reduction in 
capability compared to the Sea Harrier if it had to operate from an Invincible class ship 
(Brooklands Museum Archive File BAe/PRJ/065—NST.6464). 
Harrier/Invincible Experience and CVF/JSF 
Although the attempts at developing a replacement for the Sea Harrier foundered 
during the 1980s, the Royal Navy eventually transitioned to a force of Harrier aircraft 
operated in conjunction with the Royal Air Force in what is known as Joint Force Harrier. 
With heavy commitments to operations in Afghanistan, there has been only limited 
opportunity in recent years to deploy these aircraft aboard the two Invincible class ships 
still in service, but it is the intention of the Royal Navy to replace these vessels in the 
next decade with two much larger ships, under the CVF programme. 
These vessels are intended to employ the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), in particular 
the STOVL F-35B Lightning II version of the JSF. They will, therefore, be able to build 
upon the experience of STOVL operations at sea built up over many years by the Royal 
Navy, while at the same time benefitting from being able to design both systems in 
parallel in order to maximise the capabilities they can provide. 
One clear lesson that has been adopted on the CVF programme is that a large 
ship is helpful in operating even STOVL aircraft, as it gives much more space for moving 
aircraft around, which has been a problem in past operations and studies. Based on the 
idea that “air is free and steel is cheap,” this appears to be a welcome move, albeit one 
that may seem to reduce the need for using STOVL aircraft at all. Indeed, the CVF 
design has been developed so that it can be adapted for the later adoption of CTOL 
aircraft, including the CTOL version of the JSF. However, this would require not only a 
significant shift in UK procurement policy but also a re-assessment of all the lines of 
development for the CVF and JSF. As Figure 2 showed, the costs are distributed 
differently for the different types of aircraft, although basing them on versions of the JSF 
should reduce such differences. 
Nevertheless, the current plan to deploy STOVL aircraft on the CVF means that 
the experience built up on the Harrier will be of use. This does not just depend on the 
service use of the Harrier, but also on research programmes that have used the aircraft. 
Most notable among these is the VAAC Harrier programme, which has been used to 
develop the flight control aspects of the STOVL JSF. In the Harrier family, the control of 
the aircraft was difficult because the pilot had a high work load when hovering the 
aircraft. For the JSF, the intention is that this can be reduced significantly, requiring 
much less training and greater flight safety, at the cost of a more complex flight control 
system. 
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Tests with the VAAC Harrier have revealed that the control system that came to 
be preferred from land-based trials needed some modifications when applied at sea 
(Denham, Krumenacker, D’Mello & Lewis, 2002). In addition, the VAAC Harrier has been 
used to develop the proposed Shipboard Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL) technique that 
will allow the JSF to land at low speeds on the CVF, significantly increasing the “bring 
back” payload while reducing engine “wear and tear” (Rosa, 2008). While this should 
allow savings in terms of reduced maintenance as well as operations of the aircraft at 
higher weights and the deliverance of greater capability, there may be issues to address 
that may offset these savings in other lines of development, such as training for pilots 
and deck crew, and the development of additional deck lighting patterns and deck 
parking arrangements (Hodge & Wilson, 2008). 
Further benefits from previous experience with the Harrier, and studies into 
replacing it, are shown by the adoption of a “ski jump” ramp for take-off. Despite the fact 
that the CVF is much larger than the Invincible class and that the JSF has a completely 
different propulsion system, the ramp still gives the same benefits as it did on earlier 
ships: boosting capability by increasing payloads and enhancing safety, as well as 
freeing up more deck area for aircraft parking and recovery (Fry, 2008; Rolfe, 2008). 
This is also assisted by the use of a jet blast deflector, the value of which was first 
indicated in the Sea Harrier replacement studies. Again, despite the larger size of CVF, 
the area of deck that it frees up for other uses is of great value, as is the enhancement of 
the safety of deck crew by reducing the chances of them being blown overboard 
(Morrison, Dockton & Underhill, 2008). 
It is possible that the first aircraft to operate from the CVF will be those of Joint 
Force Harrier, as the ships may undertake trials (or be in operation) before the UK’s JSF 
fleet is ready to come aboard. If so, the experience of decades of Harrier operation will 
be able to be directly applied to the new ships, while new lessons about the greater 
capability of the larger ship could be directly related to the experience of using the 
Harrier onboard the Invincible class. In addition, such an opportunity could allow 
validation of some of the Harrier-based research work that has helped to underpin the 
JSF development. Although the equipment line of development subsumes many aspects 
of such research and technology programmes, there is little doubt that this work has 
provided a significant contribution to reducing costs across the lines of development. 
Overview, Conclusions and Further Work  
This paper has provided a limited view of the vast subject of operating STOVL 
aircraft from ships. Its aim has been to illustrate how the experiences of the “prosaic” 
issues covered matter in delivering capability, and how this capability is a product of the 
effect of these issues across the Defence Lines of Development.  
In summary, it is hoped that this paper has shown that aircraft and aircraft 
carriers may benefit from being designed with each other in mind, but that they need to 
adapt to changing operational, technical and other circumstances (budgetary!). The 
timescale for designing, building and operating aircraft and ships extends over many 
decades, so it is simply not possible to design to a single “point.” Flexibility is an 
important attribute of both STOVL aircraft and aircraft carriers, with both able to 
contribute to capabilities independently of each other, but the flexibility of the combined 
system-of-systems that they deliver when brought together depends on an 
understanding of how the system functions over time. A key aspect of this is that it is 
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extremely difficult, and probably undesirable, to tailor aircraft and ship designs to each 
other. This is because the lifecycles of each differ, and it may mean that they are then 
unable to contribute effectively to capability delivery when operated apart. 
It is this difficult issue of optimising platforms as part of a flexible system that 
confronts acquisition managers. While it may be possible to use standards and protocols 
to ensure interoperability of digital systems or of weapon pylon attachments and other 
“lesser” mechanically based systems, at the level of complex, independent systems such 
as STOVL aircraft and aircraft carriers, it becomes a matter of having (at some point) to 
abandon the quest for an analytical “optimum” solution and instead to use judgement to 
decide on the best mix of platform characteristics and interactions to deliver capability. It 
is then up to the skills and bravery of service personnel to adapt the platforms, and to 
adapt to using them, in order to deliver a truly flexible range of capabilities using the 
systems they are given. 
In order to support those involved in acquisition that need to use such judgement, 
as well to reduce the burden on service personnel later on, we will end with an outline 
suggestion for further research that may prove fruitful. Based on the researcher’s own 
past efforts, and on discussions with practitioners in the field of aircraft and ship design, 
the researcher would suggest that attempts at understanding the real processes of 
designing ships and aircraft, understanding how design is done and not just assuming 
that it is done “by the book,” offers a route to providing a basis for sound judgement. 
Design is a multi-faceted activity: but from an acquisition perspective, it would appear 
that understanding the early conceptual, or project design, stage matters most. This is 
because many of the irrevocable decisions about a platform or system are made at this 
stage, while trade-offs can be made against other platforms and systems—in an attempt 
to achieve desired capabilities—relatively cheaply in terms of actual expenditures. 
However, doing this in isolation would miss important lessons, and it would 
appear that learning how to link current use of existing systems to the design of future 
ones would be useful too. If we can see how the assumptions and decisions of 
yesterday’s acquisition experts have come to be used by today’s service personnel, 
perhaps we can learn how to anticipate a little better the needs of the future. Hopefully 
this paper has made some small contribution to just such an endeavour. 
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Chair: Mr. Carl R. Siel, Jr., currently serves as the Chief Engineer for the Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. He provides senior leadership for the 
integration and interoperability of combat, weapon, and command, control, communications and 
computers and intelligence systems across Navy and Marine Corps programs, and supports the 
Assistant Secretary in his responsibility for establishing policy and procedures to manage these 
activities consistent with Department of Defense directives. Siel was appointed to the Senior 
Executive Service in May 2004.  
Upon receiving his undergraduate degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Dayton, Siel 
began his civil service career in 1980 as a structural project engineer employed with the David 
Taylor Naval Research Center in Rockville, MD. In 1985, Siel transferred to the SEAWOLF Class 
Submarine Program Management Office, Naval Sea Systems Command in Arlington, VA. Under 
this program, he worked in engineering and acquisition management positions and became 
responsible for the systems engineering, integration and evaluation of the SEAWOLF Hull, 
Mechanical, and Electrical Systems. After nearly nine years with the SEAWOLF acquisition 
program, he was selected as the Director of Advanced Submarine Concepts in 1994 and spent 
several years developing plans and leading research initiatives to advance the mission capabilities 
of existing and future submarine classes.  
In 1997, Siel joined the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in San Diego, CA, where he 
spent over six years in a variety of engineering and acquisition management positions. In 1998, he 
was selected as the Deputy Program Manager for the Submarine Communications Program Office 
and led a multi-faceted communications program focused on enabling the submarine force to fully 
participate in network-centric warfare operations. He was selected as the Program Manager for 
Navy Information Security Systems in 2000, where he directed the development, evaluation and 
fielding of information security systems across Navy ships and shore command sites worldwide. 
Post September 11, 2001, he was appointed by Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
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Command to serve as the Command's Homeland Security Director and was given an Emergency 
Limited appointment to the Senior Executive Service. In this capacity, he engaged in extensive 
assessments, evaluations and forums aimed at identifying opportunities to effectively deploy 
SPAWAR products and capabilities that addressed Homeland Security defense requirements for 
the Navy, as well as Federal, State and Local law enforcement, emergency service and intelligence 
agencies.  
Siel is a graduate of the DoD Senior Executive Service APEX Orientation Program, Advanced 
Program Manager’s Course, Defense Systems Management College, and a member of the 
Department of Defense Acquisition Professional Community. He has earned certifications in 
Program Management and in Systems Planning, Research and Development and Engineering. Siel 
is also a recipient of the Department of the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Medal. 
Discussant: Mr. Nickolas Guertin’s duties as the Deputy Director for OA center on enabling the 
Navy to buy and build systems as a coordinated enterprise effort. Over the past year, the Naval 
Open Architecture (NOA) initiative has garnered the attention of both the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) as well as members of Congress.  
Guertin’s past duties included Chief Engineer for submarine combat control, which incorporated the 
business and technical processes of the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment in the 
Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) program. He also served as a systems engineer for 
submarine sonar—including Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion sonar system, as a heavyweight 
torpedo depot engineer, and as a naval shipyard nuclear test engineer. He is also a retired Naval 
Reserve officer with submarine service and various engineering-duty ship repair and construction 
assignments, leading up to command of a ship repair team. 
Guertin has also sat down with CHIPS to discuss the NOA initiative, its past accomplishments and 
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Ontology-based Solutions for Software Reuse 
Presenter: Ms. Jean M. Johnson is a Lecturer in the Systems Engineering Department at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. After serving on active duty in the US Navy, 
she supported the NAVSEA Warfare Systems Engineering Directorate (NAVSEA06) before 
coming to Naval Postgraduate School. Her current research focus areas are software repositories 
to enable reuse and the use of modeling and simulation in DoD acquisition. She holds an ME in 
Operations Research and Systems Analysis and a BS in Applied Mathematics from Old Dominion 
University and is currently a PhD candidate in Software Engineering. 
Jean M. Johnson 
Systems Engineering Department 
Naval Postgraduate School 
2669 Alamance Circle 
Virginia Beach, VA  23456 
Tel: 757-689-4492 
E-mail: jmjohnso@nps.edu  
Author: Curtis Blais is a Research Associate Professor with the Naval Postgraduate School 
Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation (MOVES) Institute. His primary areas of research 
and development include application of semantic web technologies to improve interoperability and 
for identifying and delivering valued information in network-centric environments such as the 
Global Information Grid. Blais earned Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in 
Mathematics from the University of Notre Dame. 
Curtis Blais 
Modeling, Virtual Environments and Simulation Institute 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
Tel: 831-656-3215 
Fax: 831-656-7599  
E-mail: clblais@nps.edu  
Abstract 
The commonly recognized benefits of software reuse are increased productivity, 
higher quality, shorter time-to-market, and reduced development and maintenance costs. 
Software reuse is a key thrust of DoD acquisition improvement initiatives including the Naval 
Open Architecture program. Successful reuse depends on many aspects of a reuse 
program, ranging from organizational climate to technical solutions. As technical solutions, 
current software repositories do not provide robust search and discovery capabilities due to 
limitations of current information organization practices.  
This research explores potential solutions that are enabled when ontologies are used 
as the framework for information contained in the software repository. In this paper, we will 
briefly summarize previous work on an ontology-based repository framework. We will then 
present current efforts to specify a software repository tool that exploits the framework to 
enable more sophisticated search and discovery.  
The suggested tool will emphasize human interaction and allow users to bring their 
context to the search process. New navigation techniques will be employed that guide 
human users, offering suggestions based on projected needs. The improved search 
capability will encourage developers to consider reuse and aid in its success. 
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In August 2006, Program Executive Officer of Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO-
IWS) established the Software Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository to 
enable the reuse of combat system software and related assets. In July 2007, the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) was tasked to develop a component specification and ontology 
for the SHARE repository.  
A description of SHARE and the requirements for a component specification and 
ontology supporting this repository are available in Johnson (2008). A vision of the 
component specification and ontology for the repository framework, a brief survey of 
initiatives and technologies relevant to desired repository capabilities, a development 
approach, and initial design are described in Johnson and Blais (2008, March). In Johnson 
and Blais (2008, September) we provided the initial component specification and ontology 
for the repository framework, as well as initial information models supporting future 
implementation of stronger semantic representations of assets and artifacts in the 
repository.  
This paper and presentation summarize the previous work and discuss the current 
research being conducted, which will result in a requirements specification for improved 
software repository tools.  
Repository Framework 
In Johnson and Blais (2008, March), we proposed a repository framework for 
SHARE, consisting of two major aspects: a component specification and ontology. The 
component specification is a description or model of the items in the repository and consists 
of two parts: metadata and software behavior representation. The ontology describes 
concepts and relationships to create various perspectives or contexts for examining the 
contents of the repository. These aspects of the framework are discussed below. 
1. Component Specification: Metadata 
The metadata for each artifact should incorporate all necessary data for discovery 
and implementation. The metadata will aid repository users in determining if the item is 
suited for their use and will provide information about how to use the asset when it is 
retrieved. We refer to this as “standard” or “typical” metadata since there are many existing 
examples of metadata we can use to develop the metadata for SHARE.  
We developed a metadata schema for the SHARE repository and presented its 
details in Johnson and Blais (2008, September). An initial list of required asset information 
developed by the SHARE Program Office at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, 
was used as a starting point. We began by creating an Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
Schema for this metadata set and then enhanced the schema based on a more current 
“wizard” that leads a user through the SHARE asset information entry process.  
After careful analysis of this initial schema, as well as known metadata examples 
found in existing software repositories, we began to modify the schema by reorganizing the 
data and complementing the fields with information that should be included. We also 
incorporated the necessary information to place each artifact in the appropriate context 
based on the ontology development. Finally, we evaluated the schema against the minimum 
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requirements of the DoD Discovery Metadata Specification (Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, 2007) to promote future exposure of SHARE contents across the DoD Enterprise.  
The most significant recommended change to the current SHARE approach to 
handling metadata is the level of application. It is our assertion that to enable the satisfaction 
of repository user needs, metadata must be applied at the artifact level rather than at the 
asset level, which is the current methodology for SHARE.  
To be clear, we must provide our definition of these two concepts. The Navy Open 
Architecture (OA) program has adopted similar definitions for asset and artifact as those 
used in the Object Management Group (OMG) Reusable Asset Specification (RAS). In the 
RAS, artifacts are defined as “any work products from the software development lifecycle,” 
and assets are a grouping of artifacts that “provide a solution to a problem for a given 
context” (Object Management Group, 2005, p. 7). Accordingly, the RAS describes an 
approach for packaging artifacts into an asset.  
This is consistent with the current SHARE approach and remains consistent in the 
proposed metadata schema. However, the current SHARE approach is to package artifacts 
into assets at the convenience of the submitter and to enable the current retrieval process. 
We believe it is more useful to enable packaging of artifacts into assets based on users’ 
needs. This means that the grouping of artifacts into an asset should have the capability of 
being user-defined. In order to enable this approach, the users must be able to discover the 
artifacts of potential value to their particular context in order to solve a particular problem 
and then package those artifacts into an asset for retrieval.    
Therefore, the proposed metadata schema includes separate definitions of structures 
for artifacts and assets. This does not preclude the pre-packaging of artifacts into assets for 
submission to the repository or for extraction to solve common problems. We envision the 
capability for users to discover a problem solution by either locating a prepackaged 
(reusable) asset or by building an asset from artifacts they believe will help solve their 
particular problem. 
Splitting the metadata into two schemas, one for assets and another for artifacts, 
also enables a clearer distinction about the data that needs to be collected for each. For 
example, the current SHARE metadata collects data on the type of artifacts included in the 
asset, such as whether they are documents or code. Then, it separately asks for thousands 
of lines of code (KSLOC) for the asset. This would more likely be tied to particular artifacts 
that are of the type “code” in the asset. By separating the asset and artifact schemas, we 
can better distinguish the necessary data for an asset from the necessary data for an 
artifact, and we will be able to manipulate the data more appropriately with tools that 
implement the search.  
Collecting metadata information for each artifact may seem like a daunting task when 
compared to the current method. However, it is highly likely that a good portion of the 
metadata that applies to one artifact also applies to the remaining artifacts in a group of 
submitted artifacts. The submission tool can be constructed to minimize duplicative entries 
of data by prompting users to verify that the information being entered applies to all the 
artifacts in a group. This construction would minimize the individual entries required in the 
submission and metadata collection process. It is also possible to create tools that automate 
much of the metadata collection from the artifacts themselves. Other organizations are 
conducting research and development to auto-generate metadata from the source products. 
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This is a critical capability in making legacy content available for search and discovery. 
Adoption of structured metadata makes autogeneration feasible, although certainly 
nontrivial. This is a recommended area for future research and development in the SHARE 
program. 
Artifact Schema 
The artifacts schema is designed to be flexible in its implementation. All the 
elements, types and attributes in the schema are defined globally so they can be reused in 
other schemas that developers may create for working with artifact information. The root 
element, Artifacts, is simply a container for any number of artifacts contained in a single 
instance of the schema, as shown in Figure 1. Repository managers and tool designers can 
decide if they wish to keep a separate XML file describing each artifact or if they prefer to 
group multiple artifact descriptions into a single XML file.  
 
Figure 1. Artifacts Element 
 
The individual descriptions of each artifact are also designed to be flexible. A specific 
artifact can be incorporated into the file in one of three ways. The first is by providing the full 
artifact description. This full description represents the heart of the metadata development 
effort and should be considered the preferred method for representing an artifact. However, 
if the full description is not available, or if the information required is provided in some other 
location, the schema allows the inclusion of the artifact representation by reference—either 
to a physical location or by URL. This is shown in Figure 2.  
The full description of each artifact, contained in the element ArtifactFullDescription, 
is composed of eight sub-elements as depicted in Figure 3. Each sub-element is discussed 
in detail in Johnson and Blais (2008, September). 
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Figure 2. Artifact Element 
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Figure 3. Artifact Full Description Element 
Asset Schema 
In the preceding description of artifacts, we see that much of the detail about a 
submission has been moved to the artifact level. The information needed to describe an 
asset is thus simplified to be primarily an identification of the artifacts contained in the asset. 
The root element of the assets XML structure is a container for one or more asset records, 
as shown in Figure 4. The proposed top-level XML structure for an asset is shown in Figure 
5.  
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Figure 4. Assets Root Element 
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Figure 5. Asset Element 
The remaining sub-elements of the asset schema are described in Johnson and 
Blais (2008, September). 
2. Component Specification: Software Behavior 
The metadata for many current repositories fail to capture a searchable 
representation of the behavior of the items outside general categories of functionality (e.g., 
Archiving Compression Conversion, Control Flow Utilities, Graphics, and Security) and text-
based search of code descriptions. Unlike current practice, the SHARE component 
specification will consist of both typical metadata and a behavioral model of the component. 
Since this piece of the component specification is not commonly incorporated into 
repositories in a standardized manner, we feel it is a specific focus area to identify the 
appropriate representation mechanisms for software behavior in the repository context.  
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One of the loftier goals of a software repository is to support automatic composition 
of systems from reusable components. This is a difficult problem, which many have tried to 
solve.1  It is especially difficult if the components were not originally designed for reuse. As a 
necessary first step towards more sophisticated uses of a repository, behavioral descriptions 
must be machine-readable in order to support automated search and discovery. 
Furthermore, the behavior descriptions must be formalized and consistently applied to each 
item in the repository if the intent is to automatically compose them into a larger functioning 
system. 
In our efforts towards standardized specification of software behavior for the SHARE 
repository, we have sought a balance between method robustness and ease of 
implementation. Each type of presented representation offers advantages for certain 
purposes. However, it is recognized that the array of contributors to SHARE requires caution 
in dictating standards that will impact the development processes of the asset developers.    
We explored characterization of software interfaces based on current and emerging 
Web Services (e.g., WSDL) and Semantic Web Services (e.g., WS-BPEL, OWL-S) 
approaches. However, the work is preliminary, since the current approach to describing 
code artifacts making up an asset is extremely limited. It will be necessary to adopt a more 
precise description of code artifacts to introduce these techniques. As a start, we included 
the option of inserting a WSDL description of software services in the 
SoftwareBehaviorDescription element. 
We also proposed a near-term solution that uses domain information to standardize 
descriptions of software functionality; namely, the well-established Common System 
Function List (CSFL).2  We developed a taxonomy based on the CSFL and incorporated 
fields into the metadata (XML schema) that will assign functions to repository items. If we 
require asset submitters to state the functionality of the components in these terms, we can 
then build the tools to guide users in selecting desired behavior in the same terms. 
The CSFL was captured in an OWL structure to use as an initial characterization of 
software behavior. The process by which the taxonomy was generated is a good example of 
methods for creating a practical set of structured data from initial raw formats. The taxonomy 
was constructed from a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (CSFL version 3.0). The spreadsheet 
provided definitions of the domains and functions, identified what the domain or function is 
derived from and identified sources of the definitions. Microsoft Excel provides the capability 
to export the content of the spreadsheet to XML format. A simple Extensible Stylesheet 
Language for Transformations (XSLT) was written to transform the source XML format 
(spreadsheet data) to a target XML format (OWL). The transformation created a simple 
class/subclass hierarchy expressed in OWL. A portion of the resulting OWL structure is 
shown in the Protégé ontology editing tool in Figure 6. 
                                                
1 The proceedings from the International Symposium on Software Composition, an annual event, 
provide examples of research into the breadth of research topics currently being pursued in the area 
of software composition. The website for the 2008 conference is located at http://www.2008.software-
composition.org/   
2 DoD Warfighter Service Components in the DoD Enterprise Architecture Service Component 
Reference Model are derived from the DoN CSFL. 
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Figure 6. Portion of the CSFL Taxonomy Displayed in Protégé  
under the Jambalaya Graphics Tab 
Other similar lists have been developed for operational activities (i.e., the Common 
Operational Activities List (COAL)) and for information elements (Common Information 
Element List (CIEL)). It may be valuable to also capture these in OWL classes and then 
create interrelationships across the classes (e.g., what information elements are generally 
employed in performing certain system functions and what information elements are 
generally produced by performing certain system functions, etc.). Further exploration with 
subject-matter experts is needed to determine potential benefit from such approaches.  
Although we cannot solve the software composition problem in the near-term, initial 
descriptions of software behavior through identification of functionality and specification of 
interfaces are necessary steps toward that capability. These intermediate steps toward 
formalized behavior descriptions will prove useful in the near-term and helpful in advancing 
long-term goals.  
3. Ontology of Framework Relationships 
The framework ontology includes descriptions of the component relationships to form 
a contextual model of the repository items.3  These relationships may include the 
component’s use/role in existing systems, its mapping to reference or domain architectures, 
and its utility in various software development lifecycle phases. Contextual information about 
                                                
3 Throughout the document, ontology is used as a general term for describing concepts and 
relationships among concepts, with taxonomy as a special case in which the classes in the ontology 
are related by a single property, such as “is-a” or “has-a.”  
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 87 - 
=
=
the artifact can be exploited to enable sophisticated search and discovery methods that 
more closely match recommended retrieval items to a user’s problem context.  
Assets and artifacts in the SHARE repository can be examined from a number of 
perspectives, reflecting a variety of associations. We chose to create initial classification 
schemes that can provide benefit in the near-term. The resulting taxonomies and ontologies 
are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. The taxonomies/ontologies we developed for 
SHARE are based on several types of relationships between the items in the repository, as 
well as with relevant domain architectural descriptions and other information. They capture 
an artifact’s place in the software engineering lifecycle (see Figure 7), its architectural fit in 
its original system (see Figure 8), its architectural fit in any system in which it was 
subsequently used, identification of the component’s fit in the Surface Navy Objective 
Architecture (see Figure 9), and the semantic relationships of various documents in the 
repository. Each of these ontologies is discussed in detail in Johnson and Blais (2008, 
September). 
This enriched semantic specification of the assets in the SHARE repository will 
enable users to more readily find resources that meet their needs in their context. Extensive 
work in the Web community is providing tools and techniques that can be applied to the 
framework when it is based on these ontologies. We have created an initial semantic 
foundation on which enhanced capabilities can be implemented. 
 
Figure 7. Software Artifact Taxonomy 
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Figure 8. System Ontology Example (AEGIS) 
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Figure 9. Surface Combat System Top-level Objective Architecture Described as a 
Taxonomy in OWL (Jambalaya Graphic Tab in Protégé) 
 
Current Research 
Current research efforts focus on designing repository tools that allow for guided 
navigation of artifacts in software repositories. These tools will take advantage of the 
improved repository framework developed during the previous effort. The value of the 
repository tools will be demonstrated through use case demonstrations, sponsor 
evaluations, and a focus group study. 
The results will be detailed requirements specifications for user tools associated with 
the new repository framework, including specifications for both the repository user interface 
tool as well as the asset-submission tool. The repository user interface tool will enable 
multiple views of repository contents for improved search efficiency. The tool will be open-
ended to allow extension based on the domain knowledge of the repository manager and 
users. The asset-submission tool will aid software developers in properly describing and 
characterizing items as they are submitted into a repository. When implemented as a 
repository system, these products will enable sophisticated search and discovery of 
reusable artifacts and maintenance of the repository, which will improve the current state-of-
the-art. 
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Each piece of the repository framework enhances the search capabilities in different 
ways. The basic metadata in the XML schemas provides search criteria for finding 
components of interest in the repository as well as specific information about the artifacts in 
order to determine if they are appropriate for retrieval. OWL taxonomies and ontologies 
enable identification of functionality and associated resources that may be beneficial to 
users. In short: 
 The metadata is evaluated to enable retrieval decisions. 
 The software behavior representations enable searches based on functionality. 
 The ontologies point users to helpful artifacts they may not have initially 
considered. 
The current efforts will result in designs for repository tools that will take full 
advantage of the repository framework to enable guided search and discover as well as 
asset submission.  
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Abstract 
This research addresses three closely related problems: (1) Most current search 
technology is based on a popularity metric (e.g., PageRank or ExpertRand) but not on the 
semantic content of the document. (2) When building components in a service-oriented 
architecture (SOA), developers must investigate whether components that meet certain 
requirements already exist. (3) There is no easy way for writers of requirements documents 
to formally specify the meaning and domain of their requirements. Our goal in the research 
presented here is to address these concerns by designing a search engine that searches 
over the “meanings” of requirements documents. In this paper, we present the current state 
of the ReSEARCH project. 
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The readiness of a system under development cannot be adequately measured by 
using traditional project management tools that focus predominantly on cost and schedule. 
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An alternative principally utilized by NASA, the DoD and the DoE to address this has been 
the prescriptive metric known as Technology Readiness Level (TRL). However, TRL is only 
meant to measure the readiness of technology elements and does not address their 
integration or some other challenges of systems development. 
To address integration, the Systems Development & Maturity Laboratory (SD&ML) at 
Stevens Institute of Technology introduced another prescriptive metric called Integration 
Readiness Level (IRL). Combining TRL and IRL scales, SD&ML has formulated a System 
Readiness Level (SRL). SRL is an aggregate measure that characterizes the progress that 
has been accomplished by a system under development based on the observable readiness 
characteristics of the technology and integration elements, not the cost and schedule 
values. 
This paper describes the application of SRL to a constrained resource optimization 
model to determine an optimal development plan that identifies which technologies and 
integration elements should be matured to which levels such that a specific level of system 
readiness is achieved by a certain time. This optimal plan can be used to monitor and 
evaluate the actual progress of the system—it can be the basis of a systems lifecycle 
maturity management approach called System Earned Readiness Management (SERM). A 
simple example is used to illustrate SERM. 
1. Introduction 
“How much progress have I accomplished against my original plan?”  Program 
managers ask this is the fundamental question in order to keep track of the development of 
their systems. To answer this, they have relied on assessment and evaluation tools. Abba 
(1997) describes the evolution of these techniques from the “Spend Plan” approach to 
Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT), which was then modified by the Navy 
into PERT COST in an attempt to improve cost management in 1960. Combining its own 
experiences with those of the Navy’s, the Air Force in 1963 formulated the earliest version of 
an Earned Value Management (EVM) approach by developing Cost/Schedule Planning and 
Specification (C/SPEC) to manage the Minuteman program. This initiative evolved into the 
1967 Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction called Cost/Schedule Control Systems 
Criteria or C/SCSC (DoD, 1967). Initially developed by financial managers, C/SCSC was 
primarily concerned with cost and was generally ignored by project managers who were 
more concerned with technical and performance considerations (Abba, 1997). In 1989, the 
organization within the DoD tasked with C/SCSC was transferred from the Controller’s office 
to Acquisition. By 1995, EVM was designated as the preferred tool for managing risky, cost-
based contracts (Kaminski, 1995). Along with these developments, the DoD also developed 
the pioneering EVM software Performance Analyzer. The DoD encouraged the private 
sector to enhance and eventually replace this software with tools that are commercially 
available today. 
EVM as a primary tool has been credited with reducing total cost overrun on the 
largest, most risky DoD contracts to 5.5% by 1999, (Abba 2001). Currently, however, there 
is growing concern that EVM, which evaluates cost and schedule performances, does not 
adequately report the proper maturation of complex systems under development. In 
particular, while EVM is quite effective in capturing and representing the accomplishment of 
work packages, it is unable to state whether these completions are actually leading to the 
maturity of the system’s critical components. Thus, it is unable to estimate the maturity or 
readiness of the entire system at a given time during its development. This is especially true 
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 97 - 
=
=
when there is a high degree of uncertainty due to the novelty and high technological content 
of the system. Such systems require numerous iterations before requirements and design 
can be frozen. Once they are, then EVM becomes a most effective tool. However, until that 
point in a system’s development is reached, a different kind of assessment method is 
needed. 
This new assessment method will require the following elements: metrics that can 
measure maturity of technologies—their integration links and the system itself; the 
identification of optimal development plans (based on these metrics) that can meet the 
development strategy of the system; and a mechanism for reporting the periodic status of 
the system against the optimal development plan so variances can be measured, explained 
and corrective measures may be formulated. 
To begin to address these elements of an alternative or modified EVM approach, we 
will describe the application of a system maturity metric (i.e., System Readiness Level) and 
its application to a constrained resource optimization model to determine an optimal 
development plan that identifies which technologies and integration elements should be 
matured to which levels, such that a specific level of readiness is achieved by a certain time. 
We will then use the optimal plan to demonstrate how this technology can be used to 
monitor and evaluate the actual progress of a system. Thus, it can become the basis of a 
system’s lifecycle maturity management approach, which we have defined as System 
Earned Readiness Management (SERM). We conclude with a simple example to illustrate 
SERM. 
2. System Readiness Metrics 
In order to measure the maturity of a complex system, Sauser, Verma, Ramirez-
Marquez, and Gove (2006) proposed the System Readiness Level scale or SRL. This was 
eventually refined into its latest form, which was presented to this Symposium last year 
(Sauser, Magnaye, Ramirez-Marquez & Tan, 2008b) and later published in length in the 
International Journal of Defense Acquisition Management (Sauser, Magnaye, Ramirez-
Marquez & Tan, 2008a). It combines the widely accepted Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL) scale (Mankins, 1995; 2002; DoD, 2005), which is used to evaluate critical technology 
elements and an Integration Readiness Level  (IRL) scale developed by Sauser et al. (2006) 
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Table 1. Technology Readiness Levels 
TRL Definition Description (DoD, 2005) 
Actual System Proven Through 
Successful Mission Operations 
Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission 
conditions, such as those encountered in operational test and 
evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug fixing" 
aspects of true system development. Examples include using the 
system under operational mission conditions. 
8 
Actual System Completed and 
Qualified Through Test and 
Demonstration 
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under 
expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the end of 
true system development. Examples include developmental test and 
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if 
it meets design specifications. 
7 
System Prototype 
Demonstration in Operational 
Environment 
Prototype near or at planned operational system. Represents a major 
step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of an actual system 
prototype in an operational environment, such as in an aircraft, vehicle 
or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft 
6 
System/Subsystem Model or 
Prototype Demonstration in 
Relevant Environment 
Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond the 
breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. 
Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated readiness. 
Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity laboratory 
environment or in simulated operational environment. 
5 
Component and/or Breadboard 
Validation in Relevant 
Environment 
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic 
technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a 
simulated environment. Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory 
integration of components. 
4 
Component and/or Breadboard 
Validation in Laboratory 
Environment 
Basic technological components are integrated to establish that the 
pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" compared to the 
eventual system. Examples include integration of “ad hoc” hardware in 
a laboratory. 
3 
Analytical and Experimental 
Critical Function and/or 
Characteristic Proof-of-Concept 
Active research and development is initiated. This includes analytical 
studies and laboratory studies to physically validate analytical 
predictions of separate elements of the technology. Examples include 
components that are not yet integrated or representative. 
2 Technology Concept and/or Application Formulated 
Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical 
applications can be invented. The application is speculative and there is 
no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. Examples are 
still limited to paper studies. 
1 Basic Principles Observed and Reported 
Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to be 
translated into applied research and development. Examples might 
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Table 2. Integration Readiness Levels  
(Gove, 2007) 
IRL Definition Description 
9 Integration is Mission Proven through successful mission operations. 
IRL 9 represents the integrated technologies being used in the 
system environment successfully. In order for a technology to 
move to TRL 9 it must first be integrated into the system and 
then proven in the relevant environment, so attempting to move 
to IRL 9 also implies maturing the component technology to 
TRL 9. 
8 
Actual integration completed and 
Mission Qualified through test and 
demonstration, in the system 
environment. 
IRL 8 represents not only the integration meeting requirements, 
but also a system-level demonstration in the relevant 
environment. This will reveal any unknown bugs/defects that 
could not be discovered until the interaction of the two 
integrating technologies was observed in the system 
environment. 
7 
The integration of technologies has 
been Verified and Validated with 
sufficient detail to be actionable. 
IRL 7 represents a significant step beyond IRL 6; the integration 
has to work from a technical perspective, but also from a 
requirements perspective. IRL 7 represents the integration 
meeting requirements such as performance, throughput, and 
reliability.  
6 
The integrating technologies can 
Accept, Translate, and Structure 
Information for its intended 
application. 
IRL 6 is the highest technical level to be achieved, it includes 
the ability to not only control integration, but to specify what 
information to exchange, unit labels to specify what the 
information is, and the ability to translate from a foreign data 
structure to a local one. 
5 
There is sufficient Control between 
technologies necessary to establish, 
manage, and terminate the 
integration. 
IRL 5 simply denotes the ability of one or more of the 
integrating technologies to control the integration itself; this 
includes establishing, maintaining, and terminating. 
4 
There is sufficient detail in the Quality 
and Assurance of the integration 
between technologies. 
Many technology integration failures never progress past IRL 3, 
due to the assumption that if two technologies can exchange 
information successfully, then they are fully integrated. IRL 4 
goes beyond simple data exchange and requires that the data 
sent is the data received and there exists a mechanism for 
checking it. 
3 
There is Compatibility (i.e., common 
language) between technologies to 
orderly and efficiently integrate and 
interact. 
IRL 3 represents the minimum required level to provide 
successful integration. This means that the two technologies 
are able to not only influence each other, but also communicate 
interpretable data. IRL 3 represents the first tangible step in the 
maturity process. 
2 
There is some level of specificity to 
characterize the Interaction (i.e., 
ability to influence) between 
technologies through their interface. 
Once a medium has been defined, a “signaling” method must 
be selected such that two integrating technologies are able to 
influence each other over that medium. Since IRL 2 represents 
the ability of two technologies to influence each other over a 
given medium, this represents integration proof-of-concept. 
1 
An Interface between technologies 
has been identified with sufficient 
detail to allow characterization of the 
relationship. 
This is the lowest level of integration readiness and describes 
the selection of a medium for integration. 
 
The SRL scale is calculated by using a normalized matrix of pair-wise comparisons 
of TRLs and IRLs that reflects the actual architecture of the system. Briefly stated, the IRL 
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 100 - 
=
=
matrix is obtained as a symmetric square matrix (of size n×n) of all possible integrations 
between any two technologies in the system. For technology integration to itself, perfect 
integration is assumed (IRL= 9) while an IRL of zero is used when there is no integration 
between two technologies. Likewise, the vector TRL defines the readiness level of each of 





















































⎛ ⎞+ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=  
where ni is the number of integrations with technology i plus its integration to 
itself. 
The resulting SRL metric can be used to determine the maturity of a system and its 
status within the developmental lifecycle.  Table 3, for example, is a representation of how 
the SRL scale correlates to a systems engineering lifecycle. These notional values of the 
SRL scale shown in Table 3 are meant to be organization-generic examples of how the 
calculated SRL values can be set as a guide by a systems engineer or program manager. 
That is, in practice the systems engineer or program manager at the outset must determine 
what values of the SRL correlate to that point where one phase begins and where it ends for 
that particular system. A calibration of these relevant ranges for each phase of system 
development will have to be program-specific or, at best, pertinent only to a particular class 
of systems that share a large degree of similarity. Therefore, the SRL value of a system can 
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Table 3. System Readiness Levels 
SRL Name Definitions 
0.90 to 1.00 Operations & Support 
Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness 
and operational support performance requirements and 
sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over 
its total lifecycle. 
0.80 to 0.89 Production & Deployment Achieve operational capability that satisfies mission needs. 




Develop system capability or (increments thereof); reduce 
integration and manufacturing risk; ensure operational 
supportability; minimize logistics footprint; implement human 
systems integration; design for production; ensure 
affordability and protection of critical program information; 
and demonstrate system integration, interoperability, safety 
and utility. 
0.40 to 0.59 Technology Development 
Reduce technology risks and determine and mature 
appropriate set of technologies to integrate into a full system 
and demonstrate CTEs on prototypes. 
0.10 to 0.39 Materiel Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solution options 
NOTE: These ranges have been derived conceptually and are undergoing field verification 
and validation under Naval Postgraduate School Contract # N00244-08-0005. 
While the TRL has been widely accepted by many government and industry 
organizations, the IRL and SRL need continued verification and validation; efforts are 
currently under way. Early results indicate that SRL can institute a robust and repeatable 
method for assessment and reporting the status of a system’s development. It enables 
program managers to evaluate system development in real time and take corrective actions. 
It can also be applied as a predictive tool for technology insertion (Michaud, Forbes, Sauser 
& Gentile, 2008). In order to firmly establish the validity of SRL, it must be applied to a 
sufficient number of real complex systems under development. 
Nevertheless, a rudimentary SRL calculator has been developed by the Systems 
Development & Maturity Laboratory (SD&ML) at Stevens Institute of Technology (see 
http://www.SystemReadinessLevel.com; Tools) and is undergoing refinement. In addition, 
the SD&ML is in ongoing partnerships to develop tools for system maturity assessment that 
leverage their continued research in systems maturity. 
3. Formulating Optimal Development Plans 
System development is pursued based on two generic strategies: minimizing costs 
or being the first to market/deployment (Laugen, Acur, Boer & Fick, 2005). In order to meet 
these strategic imperatives, the program manager must have the capability to instruct the 
project managers about which technologies and integration links must be matured to 
sufficient levels and when. Leveraging the SRL method previously described, such a 
development plan can be formulated by relying on constrained optimization techniques. The 
methodology for cost minimization has been formulated by Magnaye, Sauser, and Ramirez-
Marquez (2009) while the first to market/deployment was developed by Sauser and 
Ramirez-Marquez (2009). These are summarized below. 
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3.1. Cost-driven Strategy 
The cost-driven strategy is becoming more common as political pressure (in 
government programs) and competitive intensity (in industry) becomes more pronounced in 
the current and future economic environment characterized by more constrained resources 
and more demanding customers. In this case, the development strategy is to optimize the 
allocation of limited resources while attaining a certain level of system maturity or readiness 
within a specified time. In order to execute the development required to reach a SRL value 
by a certain time, it is necessary to know how to reach this level at a minimum cost. To 
address these concerns, Magnaye et al., (2009) proposed an optimization model whose 
objective is to minimize development cost (a function of TRL and IRL development) under 
constraints associated with the required SRL value and schedule. This model recognizes 
that technologies compete for resources and that the optimal allocation of the least amount 
of resources to reach a certain SRL value is desirable. The general mathematical form of 
this model called SCODmin follows: 
Minimize: SCOD (TRL,IRL) = SCODfixed + SCODvariable (TRL,IRL) 
Subject to: SRL(TRL,IRL) ≥ λ 
   R1 (TRL,IRL) ≤  r1 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   Rh (TRL,IRL) ≤  rh 
In addition to the SRL and time or schedule constraints, other possible constraints 
could be technical performance parameters such as equivalent mass for space systems, 
peak load capacities for transportation and so on. 
The matrices IRL and TRL in Model SCODmin contain the decision variables. Each 
variable is integer-valued and bounded by (IRLi,9) and (TRLi,9), respectively. That is, the 
TRL/IRL for the ith component cannot be below its current level or above perfect technology 
or integration development (IRL or TRL = 9).  
To completely characterize the decision variables in Model SCODmin, it is necessary 
to introduce the following transformation:  
yi
k = 1 If TRLi = k
0 otherwise
⎧ ⎨ ⎩   and  xij
k = 1 If IRLij = k
0 otherwise
⎧ ⎨ ⎩   for k=1,…9 
Notice that based on these binary variables, each of the possible normalized TRL 
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these binary variables SRLi is transformed to: 
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Based on the computation of the SRL with these decision variables, Model SCODmin 
belongs to the class of binary, integer-valued, non-linear problems. For a system with n 
technologies containing m (m≤(n-1)n/2) distinct integrations, and assuming all technologies 
and integrations are at their lowest levels, there are 9n+m potential solutions to Model 
SCODmin. Evaluating each possible solution is prohibitive, so to generate a more timely 
optimal solution, a meta-heuristic approach developed by Ramirez-Marquez and Rocco 
(2008) was applied to the system under development and is described below. This 
approach, called Probabilistic Solution Discovery Algorithm (PSDA) has the capability of 
producing quasi-optimal solutions in a relatively short period of time. However, it must be 
mentioned that the results cannot be proven as the optimal solution because by taking a 
probabilistic approach, the algorithm can only select subsets of the entire feasible set from 
which to find a solution. Every time the algorithm is run a different subset is selected. 
Nevertheless, prior tests have indicated that PSDA results tend to be better than results 
from alternative meta-heuristic approaches (Ramirez-Marquez & Rocco, 2007). 
As used in the solution of the minimization problem, the algorithm follows three inter-
related steps: 
 Strategy Development—a Monte Carlo simulation is used to identify the 
potential TRL or IRL levels the technologies and links can advance or 
mature; 
 Analysis—each potential solution is analyzed by calculating its associated 
cost, schedule and SRL; 
 Selection—through an evolutionary optimization technique, a new optimal 
set of technologies and integration links (with their corresponding TRLs 
and IRLs are chosen based on the cost, schedule and SRL values).  
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3.2. Notional Example and Results 






















Tech 1: Remote Manipulator System (RMS); Tech 2: Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator 
(SPDM); Tech 3: Electronic Control Unit (ECU); Tech 4: Autonomous Grappling (AG); Tech 5: 
Autonomous Proximity Operations (APO); and Tech 6: Laser Image Detection and Radar (LIDAR). 
 
The following notional example will use a simple system of six technologies and 
seven integrations (see Figure 1 above) to demonstrate the steps involved in calculating the 
SRL value and minimizing the cost subject to constraints on system maturity and schedule. 
By evaluating the SRL of this system, an estimate of its actual readiness can be obtained 
before being deployed. In year 1 (current year), when reviewing the SRL for this system in 
its current state, the calculations yielded an SRL of 0.48. Referring to Table 3, this value 
indicates that this system should be in the Technology Development phase, with the 
technologies close to maturity (lowest TRL is 6) while integration elements are behind, one 
as low as level 2 only. For the system used in this example, Tables 4 and 5 present the 
incremental budgetary and time requirements to mature each technology and integration 
element from its current level to the next. For example, to mature Technology 1 from its 
current TRL of 8 to 9 will require another $900,000 and 349 labor-hours. In order to fully 
mature all the technologies and integration elements, an additional $26.574 million and 
19,122 labor-hours are required. 
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Table 4. Estimated Incremental Cost (x1000) and Time  
for Each Technology Effort 
Technology  1 2 3 4 5 6 
TRL Level Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7       $876 127 $467  280 $780 450 
8     $689 476 $421 341 $531  236 $123 21 
9 $900  349 $765 432 $734 299 $853 568 $189  48 $389 300 
 
Table 5. Estimated Incremental Cost (x1000) and Time  
for Each Integration Effort 
Integration 1,2 1,3 2,3 2,4 3,5 4,5 5,6 
IRL Level Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time
1               
2               
3           $453  200 $123  80 
4           $581  400 $219  380 
5           $721  658 $595  532 
6 $100  140     $275 164   $900  700 $700  621 
7 $175  180 $200  93 $50  25 $540 320 $345 324 $1,200  954 $808  862 
8 $400  300 $400  165 $450 320 $632 432 $457 400 $1,432  1021 $1,003 997 
9 $600  500 $650  389 $550 465 $745 690 $678 500 $1,765  1238 $1,110 1145
 
If, for example, management wants to increase maturity from the current value of 
0.48 (Technology Development stage) to 0.69 (Engineering & Manufacturing Development 
stage), using a maximum of 40% of the remaining time (7,649 labor-hours), the PSDA cost 
minimization model calculated a minimum additional development cost of $5.914 million and 
would require 3,797 labor-hours. 
In addition, the development plan that can achieve this desired SRL value of 0.69 
with the least cost will be attained if the subsystems that are based on each technology 
element reach the maturity levels listed in Table 6. The latter shows that of the six 
subsystems, two are ahead (SRL1,3,), two are behind (SRL4,5) and two are close to the same 
level (SRL2,6) as the whole system. This insight can become useful when the maturity levels 
are associated with systems engineering activities. That is, the spectrum of SRLi’s can 
indicate levels of variation in the systems engineering activities, which are needed to mature 
the entire system. 
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Table 6. Subsystem and Composite SRLs 
SRL1 SRL2 SRL3 SRL4 SRL5 SRL6 ∑ Composite SRL = ∑/6 
0.856 0.707 0.815 0.461 0.593 0.722 4.154 0.692 
 
Table 7 summarizes the additional results for the targeted SRL values and Table 9 
indicates the development plan for each improvement scenario. 
 
Table 7. Best Solutions for Desired SRL Values 
SRL Time (man-hrs) Year 
Targeted Computed Targeted Computed
Computed Minimum 
 Cost ($ x1000) 
1 0.48 0.48 NA NA NA 
2 0.58 0.587 3,824 1,654 2,203 
3 0.69 0.692 7,649 3,797 5,914 
4 0.79 0.794 11,473 7,667 11,065 
5 0.89 0.896 15,298 11,309 16,888 
6 1.00 1.00 19,122 19,122 26,574 
 
Table 8. Development Plan 
TRL IRL Year Target SRL 1 2 3 4 5 6 1,2 1,3 2,3 2,4 3,5 4,5 5,6 
6 1.000 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
5 0.89 9 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 5 7 
4 0.79 8 9 9 6 9 9 9 9 9 5 8 4 6 
3 0.69 8 8 9 6 9 9 8 8 7 5 7 2 4 
2 0.58 8 8 8 6 7 6 7 7 7 5 6 2 4 
1 0.48 8 8 7 6 6 6 5 6 6 5 6 2 2 
 
It must be noted that the algorithm can only work if the management objectives are 
inherently feasible. If a prescribed objective is impossible to achieve—as when too little time 
or labor-hours are available—the algorithm will not produce a solution. 
3.3 First-to-Market/Deployment Strategy 
A very similar optimization procedure can be designed to determine how fast a 
system can reach a certain stage in the development lifecycle or how quickly it can be 
deployed. In this case, there may be a need to launch an experimental system in favor of 
maximum current and short-term effectiveness while disregarding long-term reliability. The 
objective may be to meet pressing needs in a war theater or commercial market as quickly 
as possible. 
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For example, there is currently a necessity to deliver Operationally Responsive 
Space (ORS) systems to meet shortfalls in tactical space capabilities (e.g., communications 
and imagery) that the warfighter needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are being satisfied 
through the development of small experimental satellites called TacSats (average cost=$87 
million) as well as improvements in the capabilities of small launch vehicles (GAO, 2008). In 
the private sector, the first company to develop commercially viable autonomous-recharging 
powertrain battery systems will enjoy first-mover advantages in the defense and commercial 
motor vehicle industry. Such a company will be able to create and sustain barriers to entry 
through control of the technology (property rights), brand recognition and so on. 
In such instances, the primary objective is to maximize the readiness of the system 
utilizing a given amount of limited resources. Sauser and Ramirez-Marquez (2009) 
developed an SRL maximization model—SRLmax—for such an application. As with the 
SCODmin model, this model recognizes that the technologies as well as the integration 
elements that form the system compete for resources and that in order to reach the highest 
level of readiness, a program manager must be able to allocate the limited resources 
optimally. Just as what had to be done in the SCODmin model, the program manager must 
be able to decide which technologies and integrations can be advanced to which levels of 
readiness at a certain point in time in order to reach the highest level of readiness for the 
system. The general mathematical form of SRLmax  follows:  
Maximize: SRL (TRL,IRL) 
Subject to: R1 (TRL,IRL) ≤  r1 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   Rh (TRL,IRL) ≤  rh 
As with the minimization model above, SRLmax belongs to the class of integer-valued, 
non-linear problems. 
Using the same data for the notional example above, the maximization algorithm 
indicated that to get to the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase of the lifecycle 
with an SRL value of 0.73, $7.724 million and 5,081 labor-hours will be required. For 
comparison purposes, the optimal development plans to get to the Engineering & 
Manufacturing Development stage, albeit at different SRL values (0.69 for cost minimization 
and 0.73 for SRL maximization) are presented in Table 9 below. 
Table 9. Comparable Development Plans 
TRL IRL Model  SRL 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1,2 1,3 2,3 2,4 3,5 4,5 5,6 
SCODmin 0.69 8 8 9 6 9 9 8 8 7 5 7 2 4 
SRLmax 0.73 8 9 9 6 9 9 8 8 8 5 7 2 5 
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The cost minimization strategy will reach this stage by year 3. On the other hand, 
when the objective is to deploy as quickly as possible, the system can be in production as 
soon as the prescribed resources are applied, provided the process and product 
technologies are amenable to accelerating the schedule. This assumes constant productivity 
that represents an ideal situation. In reality, there is more likely to be “process congestion,” 
which can lead to increased coordination and communication expenses, among other 
things. Therefore, for the maximization model, the estimated incremental costs for each TRL 
and IRL level must be adjusted upwards in order to reflect the cost implications of “crashing” 
the schedule. Depending upon these CTE- and integration link-specific cost increases, the 
formulated development plan is likely to be different from the one obtained from the 
minimization model. 
The results must be carefully examined by the program manager and adjusted 
according to a proper understanding of the technologies involved and the context for the 
system. For example, in the previous illustration, some of the integration links have to be 
examined more closely and compared to a pre-determined minimum acceptable readiness 
values. If the minimum IRL values of, say, 5 are required in order to proceed to production 
within acceptable risk limits, then, additional resources must be allocated to mature 
integration links (4,5) and (5,6) to this level. This threshold IRL value may be higher for a 
cost minimization strategy (whereas long-term reliability is an important lifecycle variable) 
and lower for the first-to-deployment experimental strategy that characterizes the TacSats 
program in which long-term reliability is not quite as important as delivering the capability 
sooner rather than later. 
It must also be noted that the solution is driven by the estimates of cost and labor 
inputs. The effectiveness of the optimization models are very dependent on the accuracy of 
the estimates of the resources required to proceed from one readiness level to the next. If 
these values are unrealistic, sub-optimal solutions will be generated. 
Furthermore, given the high levels of uncertainty associated with complex systems 
that are under development, estimates of costs which are farther into the future may be less 
reliable than those which are closer to the current period. Thus, estimates have to be 
continually refined and reapplied to the optimization algorithm in order to fine-tune the 
development plan accordingly. 
4. Monitoring Progress 
The metrics that measure readiness together with the development plans generated 
by the appropriate optimization model serve as the foundation for a mechanism that can 
measure and communicate accomplishments during the development of complex systems. 
As a general principle, EVM may be retained as the preferred tool for project managers 
tasked with developing each of the critical technology and integration elements. To consider 
all the projects that an enterprise has to manage, Project Portfolio Management (PPM) has 
been suggested by De Reyck et al. (2005) and Martinsuo and Lehtonen (2007). In between, 
to manage the development of a system, which is a set of projects that are related because 
they share a common objective or client—a program management tool is required. 
Developing such a tool, which we refer to as System Earned Readiness Management 
(SERM), is one of the activities we intend to pursue next. SERM is intended to be very 
similar to EVM. It must answer the following questions: 
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 What amount of readiness is expected from the tasks planned? 
 What level of readiness was accomplished by the tasks completed? 
 How many resources did the accomplished level of readiness cost? 
 How many resources were allocated to reach this level of readiness? 
 What was the total budgeted resources to fully mature the system? 
 What are now the expected total resources required to develop the 
system? 
4.1 Work Breakdown Structure for SERM 
SERM will require a breakdown of the tasks necessary to define the system, develop 
the critical technology elements and integrate them into the desired system. The tasks could 
be oriented towards the phases of the system lifecycle at the highest levels (i.e., Materiel 
Solution Analysis, Technology Development, Engineering & Manufacturing Development, 
Production & Deployment, and Operations/Support) and continue to be disaggregated into 
the TRL and IRL levels that have to be attained and, if necessary, down to the jobs that 
must be completed to reach the desired readiness for each time period. An abbreviated 
example is shown in Table 10 below. 
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Table 10. WBS for SERM 
1. SYSTEM A 
1.1Materiel Solution Analysis Phase 
1.1.1 Materiel Solution Analysis Decision Review 
1.1.1.1 Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 
recommendations 
1.1.1.2 Initial Capabilities Document(ICD) 
1.1.1.2.1 Preliminary concept of operations 
1.1.1.2.2 Description of needed capability 
1.1.1.3 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
1.1.1.3.1 Determine acquisition phase of entry 
1.1.1.3.2 Identify the initial review milestone 
1.1.1.3.3 Designate the lead DoD Component(s) 
1.1.1.3.4 Prepare Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
1.1.2 Satisfy phase-specific entrance criteria for initial review milestone 
1.1.2.1 Proposed materiel solution 
1.1.2.2 Secure full funding for Technology Development Phase 
 
1.2. Technology Development Phase 
1.2.1 Management 
1.2.1Materiel solution 
1.2.2Technology/system development strategy 
1.2.3 Acquisition decision memorandum 
1.2.2 CTE 1 
1.2.2.1 TRL =3 
1.2.2.2 TRL =4 
1.2.2.3 TRL =5 
1.2.3 CTE 2 
1.2.3.1 TRL =3 
1.2.3.2 TRL =4 
1.2.3.3 TRL =5 
1.2.3.4 TRL =6 
1.2.x CTE n……etc. 
 
1.3. Engineering & Manufacturing Phase 
1.3.1 Management 
1.3.1.1 Key performance parameters … etc. 
1.3.2 CTE 1 
1.3.2.1 TRL = 6 ... etc 
 
1.4. Production & Deployment Phase 
 
1.5. Operations & Support Phase 
 
4.2 Determining Earned Readiness and Baseline 
A readiness-oriented baseline should reflect the cumulative increase in the readiness 
of the technology and integration elements of the system.  Readiness is allocated 
throughout the system by assigning the TRL and IRL values to the tasks completed if and 
only if they satisfy the definition for that readiness level. Thus, it is possible that under 
SERM, a planned task may be completed during the specified time frame but if it fails to 
advance the maturity of that particular technology or integration link, that completed task did 
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not earn any readiness values. By doing this, a program manager can clearly see which 
activities have failed, in order to identify the sources of cost overruns and find and 
communicate explanations for exceeding the budget. 
This scenario is not unlikely given the high amount of uncertainty involved with 
developing complex systems. This uncertainty—the result of novelty, high technological 
content and very long development lifecycles—can lead to late identification of requirements 
and design flaws, requirements churn (due to inaccurate statements of user needs), delays 
in integration and testing and the need for significant unplanned work—rework as well as 
revisions in the system architecture and technology choices (Brownsword & Smith, 2005). 
5. Conclusion 
This paper suggested the development of a new program assessment and 
evaluation system that relies on the readiness measurement of a system’s critical 
technology elements (using TRL) and the integrations that link them to each other (using 
IRL), which are then combined to estimate a System Readiness Level (SRL) in order to 
determine the readiness of the system as a whole. SRL can then be combined with the 
prescribed strategy for developing the system (either minimize costs or be the first to deploy 
the system) and used in an appropriate constrained optimization model to formulate the 
optimal development plan. Based on this plan, the progress of the system development 
effort can be monitored and evaluated using System Earned Readiness Management 
(SERM). 
Of the various concepts enumerated here, only TRL has been accepted as a 
generally valid principle. IRL, SRL and SERM are all new, and thus require substantial 
efforts to verify and validate. It is necessary to apply them to a sufficient number of programs 
that have recently been completed or are currently being implemented. It must be noted that 
EVM for project management became more widely accepted only when the graduate 
students in the DoD’s academic institutions were able to apply it to defense acquisition 
projects and show its benefits (Abba, 2001). The early anecdotal evidence from the few 
attempts to apply SRL has been positive and may justify a similar approach to verify and 
validate it. 
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There are many challenges facing complex system development in today’s 
environments. Systems have become far more complex, operating in a net-centric 
environment, with ever increasing threats to system security posing a challenging design 
and development task for program managers and systems engineers. We have seen an 
increasing number of major DoD system development programs experiencing difficulties and 
failing to achieve their intended goals successfully. Reasons for these difficulties and 
failures include both technical and programmatic type issues. At the top of the list has been 
the failure to properly assess the technical maturity of complex systems during system 
development, leading to cost overruns, program delays, program cancellations, and 
unacceptable system performance. Recently introduced corporate or program portfolio 
management ideologies supporting system development in the DoD have shown some 
promise in providing a more dynamic approach to project management. Advantages include 
the ability to make dynamic changes to the mixture of technology investments in a 
development program and increased probability of attaining the desired end-state goals at 
planned cost and on schedule. The programs need to consider external technology shifts 
and ensure the programs and their technology investments stay ahead of the critical “S-
Curve.” The dynamics of program management, including effective decision-making, also 
play an important role in ensuring end-goal success. Missing from corporate portfolio 
management are good maturity metrics to assess the system development process 
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throughout the lifecycle. This paper addresses the application of system maturity metrics 
and decision theory ideologies to a portfolio management framework supporting multi-
technology based system development. The application of previous research performed by 
the Stevens Institute of Technology in the area of system maturity metrics including 
“systems readiness levels” will be leveraged and applied to existing problem sets resulting in 
a dynamic decision-making process.  
Introduction 
As we look at current lifecycle system development, we see an increasing number of 
major Department of Defense (DoD) system development programs experiencing difficulties 
and failing to achieve their intended goals successfully. Reasons for these difficulties include 
both technical and programmatic type issues that are experienced throughout the system 
development lifecycle. At the top of the list has been the failure to properly assess the 
technical maturity of these complex systems during system development, leading to cost 
overruns, program delays, program cancellations, and unacceptable system performance. 
Evidence of this is seen in the often cited Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
that reviewed and analyzed major defense acquisition programs. This report concluded that 
the causes and reasons for failure in major defense acquisition programs were due to a 
majority of programs failing to meet a TRL 7 level before entering the system development 
phase (1999). These findings were echoed again in a more recent GAO report that showed 
an increase from the previous year in the number of programs with immature technologies 
still maturing technologies late into the system development and production lifecycles 
(2008). It is troubling that nine years after the original report, we are still reporting the same 
types of problems with these acquisition programs. The evidence is overwhelming and 
shows that serious attention to the application of lifecycle system maturity metrics is 
essential to reversing the present trend in major acquisition program failures. Figure 1 below 
shows the maturity levels of critical technologies for DoD programs.  
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System Development Challenges 
There are many challenges facing system development in today’s fast-paced 
environments. Systems have become more complex, operating in a net-centric environment, 
with ever increasing threats to system security posing a challenging design and 
development task for program managers and systems engineers. Complicating this scenario 
are the added constraints of budget, shorter development lifecycles, and available 
experienced workers. These demands have further increased the pressure on program 
managers and systems engineers to achieve expected success in the areas of technical 
performance, budget, and schedule. Further concerns are the failure of developers to make 
the necessary decisions to integrate newer technologies, and they continue to invest in 
existing technologies that produce no added benefits while the rapidly changing 
technological world moves on. This is known as the “S Curve” effect and is illustrated in 
Figure 2 below. These developers face the risk and unintended consequences of becoming 
irrelevant quickly by not reacting fast enough to these external forces (Christensen, 2003). 
 
Figure 2. Technology S-Curve 
Need for an Integrated Environment 
For success in today’s accelerated, system acquisition development programs, we 
need to ensure the existence of an integrated environment that consists of a management 
process that is guided by a defined lifecycle framework and at the same time, a maturity 
metric process that maps to this same lifecycle framework and supports the management 
process. This integrated environment allows for maximum interaction between these 
domains to support the manager’s decision-making process, whether the organization is 
small, medium, or large. This integrated environment will consists of the following three 
components: a defined accepted lifecycle framework, a realistic portfolio management 
process, and metrics to include financial, technical, and technology maturation. Since this 
paper is looking at DoD based programs, we will refer to the DoD 5000.2 lifecycle 
framework. For the system maturity metrics, we can apply the System Readiness Level 
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(SRL) model, developed by Stevens Institute of Technology, to a portfolio management 
based environment, which is becoming more popular in DoD programs. 
System Life Cycle Framework

























Figure 3. Integrated Environment 
 
What is a Lifecycle Framework?  
A lifecycle is an inherent part of all system development and encompasses a 
framework that that defines all the necessary systems engineering phases and lifecycle 
activities that are necessary to support system development production and post 
development activities. Within the lifecycle are decision points or milestones when 
technology, performance, and schedule are assessed (INCOSE, 2006). In its simplest 
definition, a lifecycle is described as “The system or product evolution beginning with the 
identification of a perceived customer need, addressing development, test, manufacturing, 
operation, support, and training activities, continuing through various upgrades or 
evolutions, until the product and its related processes are disposed of” (Kossiakoff & Sweet, 
2003). Obvious in Kossiokoff and Sweet’s definition is the existence of least three stages, 
the conceptual development, engineering development, and post development. Within each 
stage are the activities described in Kossiakoff and Sweet’s lifecycle definition. In the real 
world, there are some subtle variations in the comparison of lifecycle models across the 
different system development domains. This paper will focus on the DoD’s “DoD 5000 
Acquisition Lifecycle Framework” model, which has benefited DoD acquisition based 
programs successfully by provided a basic common system development lifecycle 








Figure 4. Lifecycle Model Comparisons 
 
What are Maturity Metrics?  
In the past, we have made considerable improvements in the tracking and monitoring 
of program metrics focusing on the financial status through improved software IT systems. 
We have also done well in metrics associated with performance testing of systems. Missing 
is the lack of better metrics supporting support the lifecycle assessment of system maturity. 
Technology maturity is a main area of concern among developers as many system 
development efforts have failed because of the inability to assess the system technology’s 
state of progress or development. This can often lead to failure of a technology to perform in 
a system or be integrated into a system. The need to assess the maturity level of the 
technologies and systems in the development process becomes a critical factor in the 
decision-making process throughout the system development lifecycle.  
What Maturity Metrics Do We Have?—Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
The need to assess the maturity level of the technologies and systems in the 
development process becomes a critical factor in the decision-making process throughout 
the system development lifecycle. This has led to the introduction of a metrics assessment 
process supporting the assessment of maturity of different types of technologies used in a 
system development program. One of these metrics, the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
was originally introduced by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for 
the development and support of their space mission programs and later adapted for use by 
other agencies, including the DoD. The TRL describes the maturity level of that technology. 
There are nine TRL levels used to describe the maturity of a particular technology, starting 
from a TRL 1, in which basic principles have been observed and reported, and progressing 
to a maximum of TRL 9, in which the technology has been proven in a successful 








Table 1. NASA’s Technology Readiness Levels Summary 
 
What’s New in Maturity Metrics—System Readiness Level (SRL) 
While the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) works well in providing a common 
maturity assessment metric in system development involving individual technologies, it does 
not address those projects with systems involving multiple technologies. The introduction 
and application of the System Readiness Level (SRL) provides a potential solution to this 
problem (Sauser, Verma, Ramirez-Marquez & Gove, 2006). The SRL metric indicates the 
systems maturity level of a system composed of multiple technologies undergoing a lifecycle 
system development effort. It is a system maturity index that can provide a “snapshot” view 
of the system maturity throughout a system development lifecycle. The SRL is formulated by 
incorporating the currently used TRL index along with a newly introduced index, Integration 
Readiness Level (IRL). The IRL describes the level of integration maturity between any two 
system components that are integrated. Applying the IRL methodology for a particular 
system yields a unique IRL matrix reflecting that system’s physical architecture.  
 
 =




Table 2. Integration Readiness Levels 
 
Though the SRL concept is not fully mature or accepted universally, it provides the 
beginnings of an effective system maturity assessment process framework that can support 
and improve the decision-making process throughout the system development lifecycle by 
reducing uncertainty and risk. The SRL metric provides the following benefits: 
 Common metric methodology that is easy to apply 
 Integrates well into system lifecycle framework 
 Supports the management decision-making process. 
 Provide a more precise “system level” maturity assessment  
 
Calculating the SRL   
This excerpt for Sauser, Verma, Ramirez-Marquez, DiMarzio, and Devanandham 
(2008) describes the SRL computation as follows: 
The computation of the SRL is a function of two matrices:  
1. Matrix TRL provides a blueprint of the state of the system with respect to the 
readiness of its technologies. That is, TRL is defined as a vector with n entries 
for which the ith entry defines the TRL of the ith technology.  
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2. Matrix IRL illustrates how the different technologies are integrated with each 
other from a system perspective. IRL defined as an n×n matrix for which the 
element IRLij represents the maturity of integration between the ith and jth 
technologies.  
In these matrices, the standard TRL and IRL levels corresponding to values from 1 
through 9 should be normalized. Also, it has been assumed that on the one hand, a value of 
0 for element IRLij defines that the ith and jth technologies are impossible to integrate. On the 
other hand, a value of 1 for element IRLij can be understood as one of the following with 
respect to the ith and jth technologies: 1) completely compatible within the total system, 2) do 
not interfere with each others functions, 3) require no modification of the individual 
technologies, and 4) require no integration linkage development. Also it is important to note 
that IRLii may have a value lower than 1, illustrating that the technology may be a composite 
of different sub-technologies that are not absolutely mature. 
In any system, each of the constituent technologies is connected to a minimum of 
one other technology through a bi-directional integration. How each technology is integrated 
with other technologies is used to formulate an equation for calculating SRL that is a 
function of the TRL and IRL values of the technologies and the interactions that form the 
system. In order to estimate a value of SRL from the TRL and IRL values we propose a 
normalized matrix of pair-wise comparison of TRL and IRL indices. That is, for a system with 
n technologies, we first formulate a TRL matrix, labeled [TRL]. This matrix is a single column 
matrix containing the values of the TRL of each technology in the system. In this respect, 
[TRL] is defined in Equation 1, where TRLi is the TRL of technology i. 





















Second, an IRL matrix is created as a symmetric square matrix (of size n×n) of all 
possible integrations between any two technologies in the system. For a system with n 
technologies, [IRL] is defined in Equation 2, where IRLij is the IRL between technologies i 
and j. It is important to note that whenever two technologies are not planned for integration, 
the IRL value assumed for these specific technologies is the hypothetical integration of a 
technology i to itself; therefore, it is given the maximum level of 9 and is denoted by IRLi 


























Although the original values for both TRL and IRL can be used, the use of 
normalized values allows a more accurate comparison when comparing the use of 
competing technologies. Thus, the values used in [TRL] and [IRL] are normalized (0,1) from 
the original (1,9) levels. Based on these two matrices, an SRL matrix is obtained by 
obtaining the product of the TRL and IRL matrices, as shown in Equation 3. 
(3)  [ ] [ ] [ ] 11 ××× ×= nnnn TRLIRLSRL  
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The SRL matrix consists of one element for each of the constituent technologies and 
from an integration perspective, quantifies the readiness level of a specific technology with 
respect to every other technology in the system while also accounting for the development 
state of each technology through TRL. Mathematically, for a system with n technologies, 
[SRL] is as shown in DoD (2005). 











































where IRLij=IRLji.  
 
Each of the SRL values obtained in DoD (2005) would fall within the interval (0,n). 
For consistency, these values of SRL should be divided by “n” to obtain the normalized 
value between (0,1). Notice that [SRL] itself can be used as a decision-making tool since its 
elements provide a prioritization guide of the system’s technologies and integrations. Thus, 
[SRL] can point out deficiencies in the maturation process.  
The SRL for the complete system is the average of all such normalized SRL values, 
as shown in Equation 5. Equal weights are given to each technology and hence a simple 
average is estimated. A standard deviation can also be calculated to indicate the variation in 
the system maturity and parity in subsystem development. 









⎛ ⎞+ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=   
where ni is the number of integrations with technology i. 
 
The SRL metric can be used to determine the maturity of a system and its status 
within a developmental lifecycle.   
Applying the SRL Methodology 
In the following SRL examples, we take two different system architectures, each 
consisting of six technologies, and track the System Readiness Level metrics through the 
system development lifecycle, calculating the SRL metrics at each program decision point. 
We also look at the effects of IRL maturity on the composite SRL position along the system 
lifecycle by calculating the SRL for IRLs = 1, 5, and 9. This information can support the 
decision-making process by providing us with valuable information about the maturity of the 
system undergoing development and the status of the system’s individual components. The 
two examples shown in the following sections illustrate the SRL composites mapped across 
the entire system lifecycle. One can derive some interesting points by reviewing the data in 
these tables. For example, using the traditional TRL methodology and looking at Milestone 
C, we see that all the TRLs are equal to TRL 7. If we look at the SRL composite value for a 
maximum IRL value set equal to 9, we see that the table data shows the system maturity 
aligned with Milestone C, which in the traditional sense means we have a TRL equal to 7. 
Introducing the new SRL methodology, we can show that for a TRL 7, and a lower 
Integration Readiness Level of IRL 5, the SRL composite value then drops the SRL of the 
system to a point close to Milestone B. This point could perhaps shed some light in the area 
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of COTS applications where developers have assumed their COTS components to be at a 
high TRL level, assuming easy and straightforward integration, and find themselves with 
great difficulty in the integration process.   
SRL Example 1 
 
Table 3. SRL Example 1 Mapping to System Lifecycle 
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SRL Example 2 
 
Table 4. SRL Example 2 Mapping to System Lifecycle 
 
Push for Portfolio Management   
As systems become more complex, management of their development efforts 
become more difficult. The management environment has become a critical focus for many 
organizations seeking to ensure the success of their programs and projects. The quest for 
new innovative approaches supporting the management decision-making process, including 
new software management tools, are at the top of the list. Portfolio management is defined 
as the management of an optimized group of projects aligned towards a central goal, theme, 
or strategy—sharing common resources within an organization. Portfolio management 
principles can be applied on the corporate level as well as the program or project level. In 
order to corporate portfolio management principles to be effective in an organization, that 
organizational behavior and process must be aligned towards a common goal or strategy 
(Sanwal, 2007). Though, the application of portfolio management strategies to different 
domains are evident from the many coined references like “corporate portfolio 
management,” “project portfolio management,” and “enterprise portfolio management,” their 
basic approaches are the same. Recently introduced corporate portfolio management 
(CPM) ideologies supporting system development in the DoD have shown some promise in 
providing a more dynamic approach to project management. The DoD’s Joint Net-Centric 
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Operations (JNO) group has adopted a capability portfolio management process to ensure 
that the portfolio is aligned with strategic objectives, the capability mix is synchronized, 
integrated, and optimized to meet warfighter needs, while being delivered more rapidly and 
efficiently. The overall goal of applying joint capability portfolio management is to help 
manage groups of similar and like capabilities across the DoD enterprise to improve 
interoperability, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability 
effectiveness (JNO, 2007, April). 
Developing a CPM Strategy   
The portfolio management process begins with a vision or desired capability that 
defines the strategic focus of the organization. This can be driven by internal corporate 
goals and/or by external customer/stakeholder requirements or needs. These requirements 
or needs are then translated to high-level, long-term research development goals and 
objectives, which can then be developed and achieved through a well defined, executed 
program. The final deliverable to the customer will be a technological capability, which is 
delivered to the customer through a technology transfer process. These high level principles 
are highlighted in a recent INCOSE paper titled, “A Systems Approach to the Transition of 
Emergent Technologies into Operational Systems—Herding the Cats, the Road to Euphoria 
and Planning for Success,” which discusses the critical elements needed to support and 
enable successful technology transition through the lifecycle development process (Austin, 
Zakar, York, Pettersen & Duff, 2008).  
Four Key Questions Driving CPM Strategy 
1. What are we trying to Accomplish? (Euphoria) 
This question asks “”Where do you want to be?” and drives an end-state vision and 
goal based on high-level corporate strategy and stakeholder requirements.  
2. What can we do now? (Herding the Cats) 
Here, we must determine “Where are we now?,” “What can we do now?,” “What are 
our technical assets, past accomplishments, and available resources?” and “Can they be 
aligned with the desired end-state goals?  
3. What is our plan to get there? (the Road to Euphoria)   
Based on the answers to the first two questions, identify the technology gaps, and 
develop a roadmap or plan to reach the desired goals.  
4. How are we doing? (the Metrics)   
Here, we need to determine how well the system lifecycle development is maturing 
so that corrections and modifications can be implemented if necessary. 
 =




Figure 5. Lifecycle Corporate Portfolio Management 
 
Portfolio Enterprise View 
Based on the answers to the “Four Key Questions Driving CPM Strategy” discussed 
in the previous section, the selection of projects is based on their alignment to the desired 
capabilities and sub-objectives as well as available resources, including funding and 
available manpower.  
Implementation of the portfolio management approach to project management 
eliminates the traditional approaches that led to multiple concurrent, often duplicative and 
“stove-piped” solutions that were inefficient, often subjected to irrational, “below the line” and 
“salami slice” budget cuts. These cuts can result in key capabilities being lost, leading to 
programs not being able to meet their objectives. Portfolio management presents an 
“enterprise” approach, providing for synchronized investments to deliver maximum capability 
through the prioritization of your investments by maintaining an optimal mix of investments in 
objectives aligned to your strategy. 
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Figure 6. Portfolio Project Enterprise View 
 
 
Figure 7. Historical/Enterprise Approaches 
 
Lifecycle Portfolio Management  
Lifecycle portfolio management includes the capture of a variety of metrics (financial, 
performance, and maturity metrics) that are analyzed and the results support some type of 
decision-making process. At this point, optimization is considered a way to keep the portfolio 
better aligned to meet it strategic goals.  
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The strength of portfolio management lies in the capture of metrics that measure the 
vital functions of a development effort and how well the development process is going. 
These metrics provide input to the optimization and decision-making process. These metrics 
can be captured on a quarterly basis and/or tied to key, program-specific development 
milestones. Progress against these milestones can provide key insight to the user regarding 
current program status, risk and progress. After the initial strategy development phase, a 
proposed approach for applying the maturity metrics to the portfolio management process 
would include performing the following: 
 Initial assessment of selected technologies in portfolio mix, which includes the 
initial assessment TRL/IRL/SRL data, resource data.  
 Quarterly cycle assessments of TRL/IRL, SRL, and funding and at milestones A, 
B, C of the DoD 5000.2 system lifecycle framework. 
 Ongoing, search for new and viable technologies that may be available now or in 
the near future for possible integration or substitution into existing portfolio mix.  




Figure 8. CPM Lifecycle Activities 
Optimization 
One of the key focuses of successful portfolio management is trying to maintain an 
optimal mix of technology development efforts aligned with the organizations strategic vision 
or goals. In addition, we need to understand how well or how fast these individual 
technologies are maturing relative to each other or if any new external technologies have 
been developed and can be immediately substituted, allowing for more dynamic changes to 
the portfolio mix. How do you decide between competing system design alternatives or 
which individual TRL or IRL to improve? The use of optimization modeling techniques can 
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provide great insight and support to trade-off analysis and decision-making throughout the 
system development lifecycle.  
Two recently developed optimization models, System Cost of Development 
(SCOD) Minimization and SRL Maximization are examples of using optimization 
techniques to help provide better decision-making, control-based resource constraints. The 
first model, SCOD Minimization, considers minimizing the development cost associated to 
increasing SRL to some predefined user level, λ. This model’s objective is to minimize 
development cost (a function of TRL and IRL development) under constraints associated 
with schedule and the required SRL value (Magnaye, Sauser, Ramirez-Marquez & Tan, 
2008). The second model, SRL Maximization, maximizes the SRL (a function of TRL and 
IRL) under constraints associated with resources. This model recognizes that the 
technologies compete for resources and that benefits can result in an improved SRL via the 
optimal allocation of such resources (Sauser & Ramirez-Marquez, 2009). In summary, 
optimization modeling should help provide the decision-maker, whether it is the program 
manager or the systems engineer with the best balance between the SRL and all the 
associated resources to help achieve the desired end-state goals. We must remember that 
optimization should be considered only a tool used along with other inputs, like metrics, to 
help provide depth to the decision-making process. 
Decision-making  
CPM decision-making is a complex undertaking as there are many elements and 
events that need to be understood and analyzed in a real-time manner. The pressures of 
schedule, cost and performance hold true along with an associated more real-time element. 
Adherence to the DoD 5000 acquisition framework’s critical decision point assessments at 
milestones A, B, and C affects the optimization process.  
1. Optimal mix of research development investments to achieve capability 
goals based on maturation, cost, etc. 
2. Allocation of resources to investments (Funding/Manpower) 
3. Corrections to mix of research investments in reaction to the introduction 










Figure 9. Portfolio Management Decision Engine 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to introduce the concepts of SRL metrics to multi-
technology based system development environment in a portfolio management 
environment. The proposed application of these concepts and ideologies presents a new, 
potentially viable alternative to previously methodologies using TRL metrics. Stressed in this 
paper was the belief that you must consider an integrated approach to ensure that the 
portfolio management process and system maturity metric assessment process are 
synchronized closely to a lifecycle framework in order to meet your strategic goals. Looking 
ahead, research in the following areas would further contribute to the body of knowledge in 
System Maturity Metrics:  
 SRL software tools to implement a combined SE, CPM and Road Mapping. 
 Application of SRL metrics to support CPM environment. 
 What additional maturity metric variables are needed to support the decision-
making process?—security readiness  
 Application of SRL model to other lifecycles outside the DoD. 
 Robustness of SRL to variety of differing physical architectures.  
 Impacts of disruptive technologies on systems maturity forecasting. 
 SRL applications to COTS environment and lifecycle development 
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Abstract 
A core tenet of spiral development and evolutionary acquisition concepts is the ability 
to insert new technologies into an existing system on an as-needed basis, as they mature, in 
order to minimize risk and maximize affordability. Through this continual rolling in of evolving 
components the system continues to offer more advanced capability. This creates an 
elaborate tradeoff scenario in which dissimilar attributes must be examined, weighted, and 
analyzed for best value and applicability to user needs and requirements, including timing. A 
further complication for system-of-systems is added by the need to give equal consideration 
and analysis to each technology’s ability to be integrated with existing system components 
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in a functional architecture as well as any impact on current and interconnected capabilities. 
To address this need for a multi-attribute decision-making tool, NAVSEA and the Northrop 
Grumman Corporation, along with partners at the Stevens Institute of Technology and 
SPAWARSYSCEN Pacific, have collaborated to define a holistic approach for evaluating 
technology insertion options from a complex system-of-systems integration perspective. 
Through this paper, we will discuss the tool’s potential to aid the decision-maker in the 
selection of best value technologies and its potential utility as a critical piece of the unified 
system engineering and acquisition process.  
Overview of the Current System-of-systems (SoS) Acquisition 
Environment 
Current Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition activities continue to push the 
integration envelope with the development of larger and more complex systems-of-systems. 
In many ways, this development paradigm invalidates many of the models, historical 
databases, and even engineering expertise that have been used for decades in the 
development of stand-alone systems. Similarly, the system-of-systems revolution has made 
management of acquisition programs more difficult, as keeping accurate and current control 
of the countless moving parts of systems development is nearly impossible due to the 
exponential growth of technologies and integrations being incorporated under a common 
system-of-systems banner. This fact necessitates the development of a new set of tools and 
best practices in order to manage the many unique aspects of development associated with 
system-of-systems. 
Unique SoS monitoring, assessment, and management needs 
Nowhere is the need for enhanced monitoring capabilities more visible than in the 
SoS development maturity. For the better part of two decades, the Technology Readiness 
Level (TRL) methodology has been key in gauging the current maturity status of a given 
piece of technology within the DoD. By monitoring capability development from concept 
definition through operations and support using the TRL series of nine levels of maturity, the 
readiness of a technology for integration into a system has been adjudicated. In countless 
development efforts, TRL has been key in indicating progress and has aided dramatically in 
keeping numerous programs on track. Indeed, it has been incorporated as a critical tollgate 
criterion in the Defense Acquisition Milestone process. However, when TRL is applied to 
components within a system-of-systems, the model of using individual technology maturity 
as a measure of readiness to integrate into system development quickly breaks down. TRLs 
do not account for integration maturity or the complexity of bringing together any number of 
independent technologies to function as a common system. Similar problems also become 
apparent with many other technology development tools when applied in a system-of-
systems context. This lack of adequate system-of-systems level development monitoring 
tools and methodologies has resulted in a rash of complex development and acquisition 
projects going astray. The General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that a lack of insight into 
the technical maturity of complex systems during development has contributed to an 
environment of significant cost overruns, schedules slips leading to program delays, 
canceled acquisition efforts, and reduced system performance at fielding (2006). In case 
after case, failure is not commonly found at the technology development level, but rather at 
the point of combination of two or more elements.  
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In order to mitigate this identified risk, PMS 420, the Littoral Combat Ship Mission 
Module Program Office has previously implemented an emerging concept known as the 
System Readiness Level (SRL). By pairing the traditional TRL scale with a new series of 
criteria known as the Integration Readiness Level (IRL), a more complete look at true 
system maturity can be obtained (Sauser, Ramirez-Marques, Magnaye & Tan, 2008). Under 
this methodology the readiness of each technology is still considered, but instead of being a 
stand-alone metric for determining readiness for incorporation, it is analyzed in concert with 
both its integration requirements and the maturity of other technologies with which it 
interfaces. The SRL methodology has been highly successful on the program and has paid 
dividends in terms of both increasing decision-maker visibility into true system status and 
allowing for pre-emptive actions to be taken to mitigate potential developmental issues. PMS 
420 is looking to expand upon the foundation of system readiness monitoring laid by the 
SRL concept and expand it to new uses in both guiding technology selection, insertion and 
tradeoffs as well as for use in cost modeling in order to understand the impacts of 
implementing technology options. 
Initial Step—Understanding the Current System 
A core tenet of systems engineering is to fully understand and capture the 
architectures of the system being developed. This includes obtaining a comprehensive 
background on the individual components and technologies as well as the ramifications of 
their proposed integration or networking. In case after case, however, it can be seen that 
programs have entered acquisition with incomplete or inaccurate mappings of these most 
basic of considerations. The SRL concept enforces a degree of accountability by requiring 
consideration be given to mapping of an architecture and the maturity of the individual 
pieces being brought together prior to action being taken.  
Upon the start of the Mission Module Program, the ability to pull together and assess 
a wide variety of components at numerous developmental maturity states was a necessity. 
As the provider of a set of interchangeable and standards-based mission modules for the 
Littoral Combat Ship, PMS 420 was tasked to leverage a considerable amount of technology 
from existing programs of record in a “come as you are” development effort. This was done 
to facilitate quick fielding of desperately needed capability in the areas of mine 
countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare. This rapid development 
environment resulted in the selection of technologies from a considerable mix of existing 
GOTS and COTS products along with new development efforts. Initially, integration of the 
capabilities was not an objective, but it rapidly became a necessity. Thus, the Mission 
Module Program needed to track not only the widely varying maturity status of the 
technologies but also the various integrations activities between them as a critical function of 
management control. The SRL methodology was used to capture this complex and diverse 
acquisition effort and provide snapshots of program status, technology maturity and 
integration risks and issues.  
SRL Concept 
Since being introduced by NASA in the early 1990’s, the TRL has steady gained 
widespread acceptance as a powerful tool for its use in assessing technology maturity. In 
order to build upon the successes of this tool, the SRL methodology leverages the traditional 
TRL scale as its core for assessing the maturity of individual technologies within the system-
of-systems. The TRL scale is then paired with a parallel evaluation scale, known as the IRL, 
to capture integration status between individual components. Much like the TRL, IRL is a 
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nine-level scale capturing evolving levels of maturity for two components. Though it is 
natural for integration to slightly lag technology maturity, the IRL closes follows the TRL 
scale as it tracks integration maturity development from concept to operational system. 
Table 1 provides a high-level definition of the IRLs (Gove, Sauser & Ramirez-Marquez, 
2009). The development of SRL has been led by a joint team of researchers from the 
Stevens Institute of Technology, Northrop Grumman Corporation, SPAWARSYSCEN 
Pacific, and PMS 420. Full reports on the creation and validation of the SRL concept have 
been provided in a series of academic papers and presentations. The concept has 
powerfully displayed insight into complex system-of-systems development maturity. 
Table 1. Integration Readiness Level Definitions 
IRL Definition 
9 Integration is Mission Proven through successful mission operations. 
8 Actual integration completed and Mission Qualified through test and demonstration, in the system environment. 
7 The integration of technologies has been Verified and Validated with sufficient detail to be actionable. 
6 The integrating technologies can Accept, Translate, and Structure Information for its intended application. 
5 There is sufficient Control between technologies necessary to establish, manage, and terminate the integration. 
4 There is sufficient detail in the Quality and Assurance of the integration between technologies.
3 There is Compatibility (i.e., common language) between technologies to orderly and efficiently integrate and interact. 
2 There is some level of specificity to characterize the Interaction (i.e., ability to influence) between technologies through their interface. 
1 An Interface between technologies has been identified with sufficient detail to allow characterization of the relationship. 
 
One of the most commonly recognized shortcomings of readiness scales is their 
inherent subjectivity in evaluation due to the fact that ratings are often determined by 
individual assessors using qualitative data. The SRL methodology implements an analytical 
approach to help to mitigate some of these concerns. Steps have also been taken to 
enhance the quality of the TRL and IRL evaluations that feed it by creating detailed 
evaluation criteria to minimize the opportunity for subjective interpretation. In order to assess 
the SRL of a given system, each component of the end capability (i.e., single system or a 
system-of-systems) is rated with respect to its TRL or IRL. These are then combined into a 
TRL and IRL matrix as shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. SRL Calculation 
 
After normalizing, the matrices are multiplied forming a SRL vector. This vector is 
known as “component SRL” and represents each of the technologies within the system, 
considering all its integrations. These individual technology SRL assessments provide 
powerful insight into the maturity and integration status of each technology from an end 
capability perspective. Additionally, they offer an indication of which elements are lagging 
and which are ahead in development within the system. The individual SRL scales can also 
be averaged to provide an overall SRL rating for total system-of-systems capability. This 
single score is known as a “composite SRL” and functions as a roll-up of the individual 
component SRLs, providing insight into the level of maturity and integration of the total 
capability. It is important to note that each assessment is critical to assessing the state of 
the overall system. Simply examining an overall SRL score does little without understanding 
the impact of maturity and integration status of each individual component. In a large 
system, a single immature piece could easily be masked in a composite SRL number but 
such an act would be evident when assessed at a component SRL level. Likewise, 
composite SRL provides a good indication of overall development status and the magnitude 
of remaining work, but it could mask the inability of the system to function due to a single 
capability with low levels of maturity or integration at a key juncture within the overall 
system-of-systems. 
An overview of the overall SRL assessment is provided in Figure 2. It is important to 
note that the actual SRL calculation is one part of a larger exercise in defining and 
evaluating the overall system architecture. 
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3 SRL = IRL x TRL 
(Normalized) 
SRL1 SRL2 SRL3 = 0.54 0.43 0.59  
Composite SRL  =  1/3  ( 0.54 + 0.43 + 0.59 )   =   0.52 
Component  SRLx represents Technology “X” and its IRLs considered 
The Composite SRL provides an overall assessment of the system readiness
Component SRL  = 
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Figure 2. SRL Analysis Process 
 
SRL Applications in Decision-making 
The SRL methodology has proven to be of tremendous use and utility in evaluating 
current status and then providing the needed insight in order to determine the appropriate 
course of action. In a complex SoS environment, it is not always immediately clear where 
resources should be applied for most efficient application in order to maximize system 
maturity and minimize risk. By allowing for trade-off analysis and “what-if” scenarios, the 
SRL lends itself to analysis of overall system impact, which allows for a wide variety of 
combinations to be tried before dollars are ever spent. In this way, a new technology or 
development option can be inserted into the architecture and its impact on overall maturity 
analyzed. An example of this trade-off analysis as applied on the Mission Module program 
can be found in Figures 3 and 4.  
The figures represent the architecture of one SoS on the Mission Modules Program. 
Technologies are located in blue boxes while the lines between them denote integrations. 
The assessed TRL and IRL ratings can be found in teal and purple boxes, respectively. The 
component SRL ratings are denoted by small triangles across the top of the development 
scale at the bottom of the figure, while the overall composite SRL readiness number 
appears underneath the scale. The overall system maturity is exceeding the scheduled 
development position, which is indicated by the dotted red line and is determined via an SRL 
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software components 
Include all technologies that make-up 
the overall system 
Step 6: Document status via roll-
up charts 
Populate reporting chart templates 
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outcomes to highlight both current 
status and performance over time 
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to program Integrated Master Schedule mapping. However, one of the system technologies, 
the MVCS (RMMV), has fallen significantly behind in planned development. This technology 
serves as a vital communication link in the command-and-control chain between the ship 
and an unmanned vehicle. With a risk item in the system development identified, mitigation 
options were generated, including increasing development resources or inserting an 
alternate technology. After examining projected performance, cost, and schedule numbers 
for each option as well the impact on overall system maturity, it was determined that a more 
mature technology would be inserted for initial spirals. While this option offered less 
capability in the near-term, it ensured performance requirements were met while enhancing 
overall system maturity and reducing risk. 
 
Figure 3. Initial System Readiness with Lagging Technology 
 
The SRL assessment incorporating the insertion of the more mature technology is 
shown in Figure 4. By inserting this more mature technology, the component SRL of that 
element has risen above the scheduled development point along with the component SRLs 
of all of the technologies with which it integrates. Previously, these levels were determined 
to be held lower although they were mature because they were interfacing with a lower 
maturity component. Additionally, the overall composite SRL has seen a dramatic increase 
as indicated by the advancement of the indicator below the SRL development scale. Cleary 
this example indicates an instance in which the insight provided by both component and 
composite SRL was critical to identifying and assessing areas of system development risk. 
 
 =




Figure 4. Enhanced Readiness via Capability Trade 
 
Technology Insertion/Integration Challenge for Systems-of-
systems 
There are many reasons for the insertion of new technologies into existing systems-
of-systems. Activities can range in scope from simple obsolescence work focused merely on 
keeping system functionality at a given level all the way to incremental elements of 
continued development. The latter case represents an opportunity for not only replacement 
of an element, but also potential changes to the existing architecture that is currently 
completely functional. The impacts of such insertion can be equally varied. Ideally, the new 
technology or set of technologies fit seamlessly with that of the old while increasing 
performance. However, this is seldom the case and, in some cases, the addition can cause 
a reduction in the current state of the system. Other impacts include forcing its functionality 
and performance to vary widely with impacts ranging from cost to reliability, maintainability, 
and availability. In most cases, failure of technology insertion can be traced back to a 
common failure cause—integration. This can include not giving proper consideration to the 
original requirements of the functional system or how the requirements have evolved due to 
the realities of operational use. Consideration must be given early and often to how original 
systems had been designed and what modifications must be made to allow the integration 
to proceed. It is also important to note that two mature (TRL 9), even operational 
technologies, will no longer be at an equivalent level of maturity when combined. Simply put, 
significant risk exists when two mature products are brought together as the combination 
often does not result in a product of equivalent maturity. 
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 139 - 
=
=
Instances in which integration of mature, proven technologies can produce 
unintended consequences are numerous both inside and outside of DoD acquisition. A 
perfect example of this occurred with the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA) in the 
mid 1990’s and took a full eight years to resolve (Fraser, Leary & Pellegrini, 2003). MBTA 
operates the oldest light rail system in North America with sections dating back over 100 
years. In order to enhance handicapped accessibility it was determined that a new series of 
railcars would be needed. A competitive bid was sent out and the winner leveraged 
completely mature and well understood component technologies integrated into a new 
design. A prototype was constructed and entered into testing in 1998, less than three years 
after contract award. Testing proceeded as planned and the design entered revenue service 
in early 1999. However, this entry into service marked the beginning of a four-year period in 
which braking performance issues and derailments caused repeated withdrawal from 
service. During this time an extensive investigation into the performance issues was 
conducted.  
The investigation noted many areas where integration of the well-proven 
technologies with each other and into the existing system infrastructure introduced 
unintended issues. These included difficulties in matching dynamic car acceleration and 
braking performance to those cars already in the fleet as well as the integration of the new 
wheel design to existing rails. In both cases the new car design met requirements, but 
failure to properly identify and account for the complexities involved with the integration of 
technologies, even well understood technologies, caused significant issues. In this case, the 
application of SRL could have been a significant aid as it would have allowed for the 
tracking of the technologies in the new design and their integration with one another as well 
as the overall integration to the existing system and operational environment. It cannot be 
sufficiently emphasized that performance of technology in a stand-alone environment does 
not mean that the technology can be inserted at a system level without significant planning, 
monitoring, and assessment. 
Impact of Degree of "Design for Integratability" Inherent in Individual Systems 
(i.e., standards-based, common elements, non-planned, etc.)  
In the command-and-control world, an approach to mitigate unplanned integration 
has been developed and is commonly referred to as Service-oriented Architecture. In this 
manner, a common set of standards are used to define interfaces and data types allowing a 
variety of elements from different developers to be quickly integrated into a common whole. 
Depending on the system, the degree to which standards are applied and designed 
inherently brings about different levels of integratability. Two development projects 
beginning simultaneously can have drastically different trajectories based on the degree to 
which the technologies were designed to integrate. This difference can be seen by either 
enhanced IRL scoring or a far more rapid rise through the TRL maturation process due to 
significant amount of “pre-work” done via standards incorporation.  
Another important consideration when it comes to integration is its multiple aspects. 
Depending on someone’s background, talk of integrating an avionics box into an airframe 
can have drastically different meanings. To a software engineer, integration means getting 
the box to exchange data with the countless other computers, sensors and control 
mechanisms on the pan. To an aerospace engineer, integration means the accounting of 
the systems weight in the overall performance of the plane. To a mechanical engineer, 
integration means ensuring the box fits in the rack; to an electrical engineer, integration 
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means the type and amount of power required. Even to a human-factors expert, integration 
will mean balancing functionality with the pre-existing cockpit workflow. While these 
examples are relatively simplistic, it very rapidly becomes clear that integration is not just a 
single attribute that can be tracked as such; instead, it must be tracked at countless levels 
and, indeed, even the influence of the different types of integration must be taken into 
consideration.  
In a real-life example of the above situation, the Army’s canceled Aerial Common 
Sensor (ACS) program can be examined. In this instance, a highly capable intelligence 
gathering system was to be integrated onto an existing airframe design. Early focus on the 
intelligence system design and architecture produced a cutting-edge solution that met or 
exceeded customer requirements. However, it quickly became apparent that the design 
would be too heavy for the selected airframe, and the program was subsequently canceled 
after other mitigation attempts failed. In this case, it was not the integration of emerging 
technologies that posed a problem but rather the simple matter of vehicle payload, further 
underscoring the need for a comprehensive architecture analysis and integration monitoring 
methodology at all levels of systems design. 
Consideration of Integration Types 
In cases such as these, it is important to note that a single view of the previously 
discussed network diagram and SRL assessment may not be enough. In the PMS 420 
program, IRL criteria have been broken into different types to account for software and 
hardware, in addition to physical aspects such as weight and clearances.  
In essence, it looks at internal and external integration to a SoS. These can be 
considered individually for greater detail or summed up in a roll-up chart to appease 
management. In this way, countless implications and variations of integration can be tracked 
in a single place. 
Reduction of Integration Risk in a System-of-systems 
As discussed above, integration of components is one of the key areas of risk for 
developmental and production activities. While the SRL methodology will provide insight into 
the potential risk for mangers to understand, it does not inherently provide methods for 
reducing the risk. One way PMS 420 is seeking to reduce that risk is through the increased 
use of common components across the SoS in order to drive down integration uncertainty. 
Basically, an expansion of the open architecture concept, PMS 420 is seeking to define and 
manage the interfaces to be used by concepts seeking evaluation for insertion while 
allowing the technical capability to mature/change internally to the externally defined 
interfaces. An example of this process is how all mission package services were devised to 
operate upon a common operating system on common hardware. Within an individual 
mission package this capability was further allocated to individual mission systems, thereby 
providing processing and storage capabilities while requiring they support a minimal level of 
integration for use of common core capabilities. The drive towards Service Oriented 
Architectures for software base capabilities is another example of how integration risk can 
be minimized by increasing the use of common capabilities vice having each system try to 
provide an end-to-end solution. 
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Future Planned Expansion of the SRL Methodology  
While the use of the present SRL methodology described above has helped the 
Mission Modules Program in terms of effectively managing system-of-systems procurement 
by providing additional insight into the technical and integration risks associated with the 
incremental acquisition or spiral development of capabilities, the efforts to date are just 
beginning to scratch the surface of providing management with the information required to 
make informed decisions and to apply these decisions in a predictive method for selecting 
technologies for future increments and spirals. Several areas have been identified as areas 
of investigation designed to further increase management insight in helping to resolve these 
deficiencies. These focus areas include the incorporation of methodologies designed to 
allow for the program office to gain better insight on the impact of inserting a new technology 
across the spectrum of the SoS’s existing performance capabilities, the inclusion of cost 
factors and monitoring into the tool to allow for both predictive determination of “should cost” 
factors, and the use of the tool to provide insight into cost versus performance status 
monitoring. Additionally, for the Mission Module Program there is a desire to increase the 
use of common components across the warfare areas. This drive for commonality could 
impact performance and a method of analyzing the cost benefits versus performance risks 
prior to implementation is needed. All these focus areas are areas of growth for the 
methodology and will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Technology Insertion/Integration Focus Area 
One of the challenges of managing technology insertion into spiral or incremental 
programs is determining the value added and understanding the potential of a capability lost 
by inserting a new capability. Historically, technology insertion into a stand-alone system 
has only focused on the cost versus capability gained determination. In a system-of-
systems, especially a constrained system-of-systems design such as the mission packages, 
the value of the capability gained on a individual system has to be assessed in terms of the 
impact and cost to that system as well as to the entire system of system. For example, 
Figure 4 is an example of how technology blocks for the MVCS control the present limitation 
on how far an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) can be from the LCS. A new manufacturer 
may devise a new communications capability that can greatly enhance the USV’s 
operational range without increasing its cost or weight. While initially a great potential for 
improvement, the effectiveness of implementing the change is only beneficial if the greater 
range can be utilized and the impact of incorporating it does not impact the ability of the 
package to conduct all of its assigned missions. Thus, the impacts and limitations imposed 
by the directly linked components of the USV need to be understood but, more importantly, 
the total Mission Package impacts need to be understood. If the new capability added 
sufficient weight to the USV string, shown in Figure 4, it might create a condition in which 
the total weight of the package exceeded limitations, and a sensor might have to be 
removed from the helicopter to remain within the weight constraint. The loss of the sensor 
might mean that the Mission Package could no longer complete all assigned missions—so 
what appeared to be an improved capability at the start can turn into a negative if the 
impacts are not understood early enough to enable informed decision-making. One method 
that PMS420 is investigating for asserting this determination is using reliability block 
diagrams developed by the mission packages to predict end-to-end mission capability 
reliability, shown in Figure 5, and overlaying the TRL’s and IRL’s development through the 
SRL methodology to increase the understanding of the risk areas involved across a package 
when deciding to implement changes.  
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Figure 5. PMS 420 Reliability Block Diagram 
 
Cost Prediction and Monitoring 
Up until now we have been talking about the engineering implications of integration. 
As well all know, however, the real world is about more than just technical development. In 
order to have a successful system development effort, it is imperative that the design not 
only function, but also be built at the price that is affordable to the buyer. This is especially 
critical at a time when acquisition costs have soared, and it seems that even the most well-
understood jobs cannot be completed on time or within budget. A fundamental failure in this 
area again relates to integration. Though the unique art and science that is cost estimation 
has been steadily expanding in experience for decades, the knowledge available for 
appropriately modeling and estimating the level of effort required to integrate various pieces 
of technology into a holistic capability is limited.  
Degree of "Design for Integratability" Dramatically Impacts Cost Estimates  
As with the previous examples of integration maturity being at different levels based 
on the degree to which technologies have been designed to integrate, cost is a similar and, 
in some sense, even more complicated operation. While there is a significant amount of 
data available to determine the cost of a new ship based on its displacement or on a new 
piece of software based on its lines of code, the understanding of how these two elements 
connect is far less understood. From the perspective of a cost estimator, who in many cases 
is outside the bounds of the program, the degree of work it takes to modify a pair of 
technologies to work together is somewhat of a mystery. The systems that have been 
designed with a standards-based approach may require little more than being brought 
together whereas other systems may require significant modification and extension of 
existing documents.  
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Cost Estimation Relationship Plans  
In order to better capture this and estimate it for the PMS 420 effort, steps are being 
taken to categorize the integration at hand. In this way, a standards-based approach can be 
costed based on similar historical efforts while a dramatic revamping can be costed entirely 
differently. This information is being combined with technical status data to form an 
overarching assessment tool known as a System Maturity Model. In this effort, inputs on 
both technical development and factors impacting cost are collected side-by-side with cost 
and technical development information. Care is taken to specify the data types requested 
and examples are provided to ensure that the responses received are the type and quality 
requested. This requirement for data is then forwarded to subject matter experts for input. 
The data is then collected and used to populate algorithms that produce cost and technical 
assessments for the program. In the near-term, these assessments take the form of the 
CARD, PLCCE, and Milestone B documentation, but over the life of the program they will 
also form the foundation of program status reports and monitoring tools. By combining this 
information together from a system-of-systems perspective, the interdependencies of cost 
and technical development from a holistic perspective can be most accurately captured. As 
outlined above, the technical and integration maturity of the components are used to form 
the basis of cost estimates for development. From there, a variety of other information can 
be applied to expand that initial acquisition cost model into an estimate of total program 
lifecycle cost. Key elements include the operations and maintenance, CONOPS, as well as 
the technology insertion and obsolescence pans. By leveraging the architecture diagrams of 
how future technologies will be applied to the system over the course of time, a more 
accurate assessment can be obtained. A significant amount of unknowns and guess work 
can be reduced since detailed plans for what technologies may be inserted and in what 
manner that may happen. This eliminates surprise modernization service life extension 
efforts later in the program from running wildly out of control. 
Conclusion 
System-of-systems development is here to stay and will undoubtedly only grow more 
complex as the technologies that make up the systems continue to evolve, expand, and 
push the leading and often bleeding edge of technology. With this evolution, complex 
systems integration begins to require a paradigm shift in how assessment, analysis, and 
management techniques must be used and what tools are applicable. No longer can the 
development of individual technologies be considered in isolation; rather, these 
developments and their integration with one another must be defined and analyzed in new 
and enhanced ways. It is only by considering the impacts of all technologies and 
integrations as a whole that the acquisition approach can be improved. As discussed above, 
the implementation of a methodology that combines assessment of the technology maturity 
of component pieces with the assessment of their integration level has been shown to add 
value. The next step in improving this technique is to continue to expand its use in assisting 
in technology insertion assessments by using it as a predictive tool. Beyond that, the goal is 
to incorporate cost inputs into the tool to provide further insight to management on the 
existing risks thereby being accepted in the selection of technologies for incorporation into 
mature systems-of-systems.  
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Chair: Lorna B. Estep, a member of the Senior Executive Service, recently assumed the position 
of Executive Director, Air Force Global Logistics Support Center, Air Force Materiel Command. 
As Deputy Director for Supply, Directorate of Logistics, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, Estep was responsible for the Materiel Support Division of 
the Supply Management Activity Group, a stock fund with annual sales of $7 billion. She directed a 
wide range of logistics services in support of Air Force managed spare parts, to include 
transformation programs, requirements determination, budgeting, acquisition, provisioning, 
cataloging, distribution and data management policy. She also provided supply chain management 
policy, guidance and direction in support of headquarters, air logistics centers, and US Air Force 
worldwide customers. 
Estep started her career as a Navy logistics management intern. She has directed the Joint Center 
for Flexible Computer Integrated Manufacturing, was the first program manager for Rapid 
Acquisition of Manufactured Parts, and has served as Technical Director of Information Technology 
Initiatives at the Naval Supply Systems Command. In these positions, she has developed logistics 
programs for the Department of Defense, implemented one of the first integrated and agile data-
driven manufacturing systems, and directed the development of complex technical data systems for 
the Navy. 
As the Director of Joint Logistics Systems Center, Estep had the duties of a commanding officer for 
a major subordinate command. In addition, she acted as the Logistics Community Manager, an 
emerging organization to coordinate and implement the revised Defense Department logistics 
strategy for achieving Joint Vision 2010 through modern information techniques and processes. 
She has also served as Chief Information Officer for the Naval Sea Systems Command in Arlington, 
VA, and Executive Director of Headquarters Materiel Systems Group at Wright-Patterson AFB. Prior 
to her current assignment, she served as Deputy Director for Logistics Readiness at the Pentagon, 
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where she developed combat support concepts, doctrine, and sustainment policy with the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders. 
Discussant: Stan Z. Soloway is President and CEO of the Professional Services Council, the 
principal national trade association of the government professional and technical services industry. 
PSC is widely known for its leadership on the full range of government acquisition/procurement and 
outsourcing and privatization issues. Soloway assumed the presidency in January 2001. PSC has a 
membership of over 325 companies of all sizes, performing services of all kinds for virtually every 
agency of the government. 
In addition to serving as President of PSC, Soloway was confirmed by the Senate in June 2007 as 
a member of the Board of Directors of the Corporation for National and Community Service. He 
writes a monthly column in Washington Technology magazine and was a member of the 
congressionally mandated, national panel on the future of government outsourcing chaired by the 
Comptroller General of the US. Soloway is also a Principal of the Council for Excellence in 
Government, where he also serves as a charter member of the Council’s “Senior Advisors to 
Government Executives” program. He is a member of the Board of Advisors of the National 
Contract Management Association and received the prestigious Federal 100 Award in 2005. He 
also serves as an advisor to the Missile Defense Agency for the MDA’s upcoming “MiDAESS” 
procurement for SETA support. 
Prior to joining PSC, Soloway served as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition 
Reform) and concurrently as Director of Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s Defense Reform 
Initiative. As Deputy Under Secretary, he was the department’s senior official responsible for the 
development and implementation of far-reaching reforms to DoD’s acquisition processes and 
policies and for the oversight of the training, education and career development of the 200,000-
member defense acquisition workforce. As director, DRI, Soloway led significant department-wide 
re-engineering and reform initiatives in areas as diverse as privatization and outsourcing, electronic 
commerce, financial management reform, logistics transformation, and the quality of life for 
American troops.  
In recognition of his leadership at the DoD, Soloway was awarded both the Secretary of Defense 
Medal for Outstanding Public Service and the Secretary of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public 
Service. 
Before his appointment to the DoD, Soloway was a public policy and public affairs consultant for 
more than 20 years and a highly regarded expert on acquisition, privatization, and outsourcing 
issues. He also co-produced the critically acclaimed “Great Confrontations at the Oxford Union,” a 
series of prime-time specials that aired nationally on public television. He earned a degree in 
political science from Denison University, where he was elected to the National Men’s Journalism, 
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Achieving Performance-based Lifecycle Management 
Presenter: Mr. Louis A. Kratz is the Vice President and Managing Director for Logistics and 
Sustainment, Lockheed Martin Corporation. Kratz is responsible for coordinating Lockheed 
Martin’s logistics and weapon system sustainment efforts. He leads Lockheed Martin’s Automatic 
Identification Technology implemtation, including RFID and UID. After successfully completing 
eight pilot projects, Kratz is now guiding Lockheed Martin’s enterprise implementation of RFID. 
He also guides Lockheed Martin’s logistics strategic planning, performance-based logistics 
efforts, logistics technology development, logistics human capital development, and cross-
corporate logistics business initiatives. Previously, Kratz served as the Assistant Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Logistics Plans and Programs) within the Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness). As such, he was responsible for guiding 
the DoD’s logistics transformation to meet the operational requirements of the 21st Century. Kratz 
oversaw the DoD’s long-range logistics planning to meet the requirements of the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) and Joint Vision 2020. 
Mr. Lou Kratz 
Vice President and Managing Director  
Logistics & Sustainment 
Corporate Engineering & Technology 
Lockheed Martin Corporation 
10530 Rosehaven Street, Fairfax, VA 22030 
E-mail: Louis.kratz@lmco.com  
Phone: 703-251-7266 
Author: Mr. Bradd A. Buckingham is an analyst for Lockheed Martin Corporate Engineering 
and Technology, Logistics and Sustainment. He holds a Bachelor of Liberal Studies degree in 
Conflict, Politics, and National Policy from the University of Mary Washington. Buckingham 
currently provides research and analytic support in theater opening and sustainment, and in 
support of Army, USMC, and Defense Logistics Agency Depot management. His prior experience 
includes supporting the Army Manufacturing and Technology Program at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as 
well as providing support to the Joint Defense Manufacturing and Technology Program’s 
(JDMTP) Warfighter Brochure, and serving as a subject-matter expert for Army ManTech Small 
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program. Buckingham was also the acting Army 
representative for the JDMTP SBIR Working Group. 
Mr. Bradd A. Buckingham 
Analyst 
Logistics & Sustainment 
Corporate Engineering & Technology 
Lockheed Martin Corporation 




In July of 2008, Mr. John J. Young, Jr., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, issued a memorandum titled Implementing Lifecycle 
Management Framework. The memorandum addresses the need for Performance-based 
Lifecycle Management and is the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most recent effort to 
improve weapon system readiness while reducing costs and cycle-times.  
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Since the end of the Second World War, the United States DoD developed and 
refined an acquisition process focused on responding to a predictable, monolithic threat. 
The process built upon several underlying principles, including a desire for US technological 
superiority, a competitive industrial base, and a relatively long planning and requirements 
horizon. Over the course of 60 years, the DoD attempted to improve its acquisition and 
lifecycle process through a series of incremental changes to address requirements creep, 
cost growth, funding instability, and technical risk. 
Currently, the US faces significant economic and national security threats from near- 
peer competitors, rogue states, and transnational terrorist organizations. This multiplicity of 
threats requires an agile, cost-efficient process to mature and sustain military capabilities. A 
fundamental change to DoD lifecycle management is required to achieve that necessary 
agility. 
This paper explores fundamental changes within government and industry to evolve 
a highly agile and responsive lifecycle process. Such a process would include effects-based 
requirements to enable effective cost/performance trades, a commercially driven research 
and development model to instill technology and requirements discipline, and industry 
provided lifecycle product support based on best-in-class performance. This paper 
summarizes those changes to enable and enhanced readiness. 
“The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind  
is getting an old one out.” 
—B. H. Liddell Hart 
Background 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition and sustainment processes are 
straining under the demands of the Global War on Terror, an increase in Congressional 
oversight, and an emerging shortage of skilled acquisition and sustainment professionals. 
Significant cost and schedule growth, extended development cycles, schedule delays, 
elongated logistics response times, and increasing backorders are evidence of those 
strains. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) documented a 36% percent cost 
growth for major defense acquisition programs and characterized DoD logistics as high risk 
(GAO, 2008a). Additionally, the DoD continues to struggle to keep pace with and develop 
new technologies and is no longer the catalyst driving the development of new revolutionary 
technology (Hagar, 2008).  
In July 2008, the Defense Science Board (DSB) issued its report, “Creating an 
Effective National Security Industrial Base for the 21st Century: An Action Plan to Address 
the Coming Crisis.” The report provided several specific recommendations to enable the 
DoD to achieve lower costs, field capabilities faster, and improve logistics support. The DoD 
also recently issued revised guidance on implementing a lifecycle management framework 
that focuses on lifecycle metrics, aligning resources and readiness, and implementing 
performance-based lifecycle product support (Young, 2008). 
Our current national security posture and federal budget dictate that the DoD and 
industry continue to explore and refine new acquisition and sustainment processes to 
enable greater agility and capability at reduced costs. Capitalizing on market forces as an 
alternative to government regulations will permit the DoD to achieve the desired agility. In 
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order to comprehend the challenges the DoD faces in achieving that agility, one must first 
review the path that the DoD and industry have traveled since World War II. 
The World War II Acquisition and Logistics Environment 
The acquisition process during the Second World War focused on mass production 
of weapon and support systems, as the American economy served as the heart of the Allied 
war effort. The United States produced over 2.4 million vehicles, 88,000 tanks, and 303,000 
aircraft during the war with the lend-lease program exporting $57.4 billion worth of 
equipment to its allies. The US industrial complex was beyond the range of enemy attack, 
resulting in production numbers that exceeded that of the Allies and the enemy combined 
(Dana, 1998). The ability of US industrial base to rapidly transition from civilian to defense 
production enabled the Allied victory in World War II (Dana, 1998). 
Acquisition and Logistics during the Cold War 
In 1945, as Americans celebrated the end of World War II, US industrial capacity 
transitioned from a wartime footing to a commercial market burgeoning with pent-up 
demand. Commonality in manufacturing processes, similarity in products, and a dramatic 
increase in demand for consumer durables made for a relatively smooth transition to a 
peacetime, consumer-driven economy.  
The subsequent emergence of the Soviet Union as a peer competitor gave birth to a 
dedicated defense industry that focused on developing and manufacturing the increasingly 
complex systems needed for deterrence (Defense Science Board, 2006). Weapons system 
acquisition during this period displayed several critical market characteristics:  
1. A monolithic threat enabled the US to concentrate on relatively stable and 
predictable requirements 
2. A national decision to capitalize on technology to seize and maintain 
qualitative superiority led the DoD and industry to concentrate on equipment 
performance 
3. A robust set of industrial competitors enabled the DoD to experiment, 
develop, and prototype needed technologies while capitalizing on competitive 
market forces 
4. A national decision to forward deploy forces in Europe and Korea encouraged 
large logistics footprints of supplies, personnel, and maintenance facilities to 
also be forward deployed 
5. A national will that supported DoD efforts and provided funding at 
approximately 5-15% of the GDP (Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, 2006)  
6. A supportive environment of exploratory technology that tolerated test failures 
and allowed new data findings 
The DoD and industry became increasingly governed by unique government 
practices—first in engineering and manufacturing, then in finance and business, with the 
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DoD specifications and standards numbering 30,000 by 1980 (Poston, 2003). These 
specifications and standards drove a wedge between defense and commercial industries 
and served as significant barriers for non-defense firms trying to enter the defense market. 
By the early 1980s, the need to improve DoD acquisition was apparent. Numerous 
studies and academic research efforts documented DoD challenges with requirements 
stability, technical/risk management, funding stability, and schedule adherence (GAO, 
1982). After nearly three decades of Cold War, the national will was shifting to demand more 
efficiency and accountability within defense acquisition.  
The Reagan Era 
Beginning in the early 1980s, a series of incremental policy directives attempted to 
address skyrocketing weapons costs and increasing development schedules. In April 1981, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci presented thirty-two initiatives for reducing 
weapons systems costs, shortening development time and improving weapons readiness 
and support.(Carlucci, 1981). One goal of the initiatives was to control cost growth by 
attempting to achieve realism in cost estimating.  
Secretary Carlucci introduced the concept of Preplanned Product Improvement (P3I), 
a means to deploy systems and sequentially upgrade them over time (Carlucci, 1981). This 
strategy was intended to minimize technological risk, and quicken the pace of modernization 
of the nation’s armed forces. Other recommendations included the production of weapons 
systems at more efficient rates, reduction in the number of DoD directives, more 
advantageous use of competition, and greater use of standardized subsystems and support 
equipment. These initiatives represented a comprehensive list of measures with the 
potential to lower costs, but did not address the major causes of cost growth in weapons 
systems such as technical risk, requirements creep, and cost-plus business arrangements 
(Foelber, 1982).  
During this period, Congress also took steps to curb the rising cost of weapons 
systems including the introduction of more rigorous DoD reporting requirements, the 
establishment of audit procedures for acquisition activities, and wider use of multi-year 
contracts (Lockwood, 1983). 
The Packard Commission 
President Reagan established the Packard Commission in 1986 to reduce the 
inefficiencies in the defense procurement system, with an emphasis on the acquisition 
process. The Commission’s conclusions supported the results of numerous prior studies, 
reporting that the acquisition process suffered from schedule delays, cost overruns, and 
inefficient performance (Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986). The 
Commission recommended streamlining the acquisition process, increasing the amount of 
tests and prototypes, and improving planning.  
A subsequent review of 269 completed defense contracts found that the Packard 
Commission’s recommendations were ineffective in reducing cost overruns. Despite 
implementing over two dozen initiatives, there was no considerable progress in defense 
program cost performance for over 30 years (Christensen  Searle &Vickery, 1992). The 
recommendations did little to fundamentally change the DoD reward mechanisms that 
favored expensive, long programs. (See Table 1.) 
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Table 1. The Effect of Packard Commission Recommendations  
on Defense Cost Performance  
(Christensen, Searle & Vickery, 1992) 
 















5.6 4.1 6.2 2.8 7.6 8.1 
Final overrun after 
implementation 
(%) 
9.5 15.3 7.2 12.7 6.1 17.0 
Difference (%) 3.9 11.2 1.0 9.9 -1.5 8.9 
Statistical 
significance (p) 
0.055 0.014 0.294 0.003 0.206 0.110 
 
The End of the Cold War 
By the end of the Cold War, an industrial structure, an acquisition process, and a 
logistics system existed that were mismatched with the priorities of the American people and 
the global environment. The DoD had honed an acquisition process that focused on 
providing technologically superior systems with industry geared up to produce those 
systems in large quantities. With the dissolution of Soviet Union, the American public shifted 
its priorities to domestic issues. Multiple administrations through the 1990s responded to this 
shift in focus through force reductions, base closures, and industrial consolidation 
(GlobalSecurity.org, 2003).  
Specifications and Standards Reform 
In 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry issued DoD policy to increase access to 
state-of-the-art technology and adopt the same business practices as world-class 
commercial suppliers. The directive attempted to reduce the complexity and costs that the 
DoD incurred when purchasing major weapon systems and their numerous maintenance 
requirements.  
Secretary Perry chartered a detailed cost analysis allowing the DoD to determine the 
most important cost drivers in the quest for standards reform. The study concluded that, on 
average, the DoD paid a regulatory cost premium of approximately 18 percent. The study 
also indicated that significant cost savings were achievable through reductions in DoD 
regulation and oversight (Coopers & Lybrand/TASC Inc., 1994). Since Secretary Perry 
introduced his plan to reform the acquisition process, over 1200 commercial standards have 
been adopted by the DoD; however, the DoD has not fully capitalized on commercially 
available solutions  (OSD(PA), 1994).  
The procurement accounts declined in the late1990s, with fewer new systems under 
development and existing weapons platforms aging and continuing service past their 
intended lifecycles. This extended use resulted in increasing operations and maintenance 
(O&M) costs, which contributed to a lifecycle “death spiral” of further deferred modernization, 
as shown in Figure 1 (Gansler, 1998). 
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To attack this “death spiral,” the Under Secretary launched an aggressive acquisition 
and logistics reform effort. Key initiatives included increased use of commercial items, 
evolutionary acquisition, streamlined acquisition documentation, and performance-based 
logistics. These initiatives emphasized greater civil-military integration and were directed 
towards increasing acquisition and logistics agility.  
Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) 
Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) is the DoD’s procedure 
to define acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs. 
JCIDS was created in 2003 to address shortfalls in the DoD requirements generation system 
identified by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, including not considering new programs in the 
context of other programs, not sufficiently considering combined service requirements, not 
effectively prioritizing joint service requirements, and not accomplishing sufficient analysis.  
The JCIDS process codifies a DoD policy shift away from threat-based assessments 
to capabilities-based assessments of Warfighter needs. As a replacement for developing, 
producing and fielding systems based on perceived threats to the nation, JCIDS policy 
enables the development of capabilities based on strategic direction and priorities defined in 
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The Global War on Terror 
Despite the perceived “peace dividend,” the migration from a bi-polar world to a 
multi-polar world proved more challenging than anticipated. The DoD continued to rely on 
acquisition processes, organizations and infrastructure largely developed in the years 
following World War II. Technical superiority had proven successful against a peer 
competitor; however, rapid advancement in commercially available computing and 
telecommunications gave rise to multiple new threats: e.g., transnational terrorism and 
rogue state actors. This multiplicity of threats demanded greater agility and innovation at the 
same time DoD acquisition and its associated industrial base were contracting. September 
11, 2001, proved these threats very real, initiating the ongoing Global War on Terror 
(GWOT). 
Executing the GWOT is an expensive endeavor. The total amount of GWOT funding 
provided over the past seven years is approximately $804 billion. This makes the GWOT 
more expensive than both the Korean ($460 billion) and the Vietnam ($650 billion) wars 
(Serafino, 2001). (See Table 3.)  
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Table 3. Cost of Selected Wars (in billions of $2007) 
(National Priorities Project, 2007) 
 
The GWOT to date has provided the United States with lessons directly related to 
DoD acquisition and sustainment. These lessons include: 
 Our requirements process is slow to react to a rapidly adaptive adversary. 
 Our acquisition process consumes billions of dollars against threats generated at 
a fraction of that cost. 
 Our mass logistics structure is insufficient to support rapid, dispersed forces. 
In September 2008, Secretary Robert Gates spoke at the National Defense 
University and addressed these issues: 
The need for the state of the art systems—particularly longer range 
capabilities—will never go away, as we strive to offset the countermeasures 
being developed by other nations. But at a certain point, given the types of 
situations we are likely to face—and given, for example, the struggles to 
field up-armored HUMVEES, MRAPs, and ISR in Iraq—it begs the 
question whether specialized, often relatively low-tech equipment for 
stability and counterinsurgency missions is also needed.  
Secretary Gates continued: 
And how do we institutionalize procurement of such capabilities—and the 
ability to get them fielded quickly? Why did we have to go outside the 
normal bureaucratic process to develop counter-IED technologies, to build 
MRAPs, and to quickly expand our ISR capability? In short, why did we 
have to bypass existing institutions and procedures to get the 
capabilities we need to protect our troops and pursue the wars we are 
in? Our conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution in 
years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions—the wars we are in—
require 75 percent solutions in months. The challenge is whether in our 
bureaucracy and in our minds these two different paradigms can be made 
to coexist. 
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Time for Change 
Since the end of World War II, the United States DoD developed and refined an 
acquisition process focused on responding to a predictable, monolithic threat. This process 
built upon several underlying principals including a desire for US technological superiority, a 
competitive industrial base, and a relatively long planning and requirements horizon. Over 
the course of 60 years, the DoD attempted to improve its acquisition and lifecycle process 
through a series of incremental changes to address requirements creep, cost growth, 
funding instability, and technical risk.  
Currently, major weapon system programs within the DoD are taking longer to 
complete, costing more, and delivering quantities far lower than originally intended. The total 
acquisition cost of the DoD's 2007 major programs has increased by almost $300 billion 
over preliminary estimates (GAO, 2008a). Weapon system programs often begin without 
adequate information pertaining to requirements, technology, and design maturity. Lacking 
such knowledge, program managers often rely on unrealistic assumptions that increase 
program risk, cost growth and schedule delays (GAO, 2008a). Finally, the geopolitical 
environment has changed dramatically over the past 60 years, as summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4. Geopolitical Differences 


































National Will: National  will skeptical  and increasingly 
unwilling to accept  continued  rampant defense spending
 
The United States DoD can no longer afford to follow the path of incremental change 
to its acquisition and logistics process and must fundamentally transform its current 
acquisition practice. The acquisition and logistics environment of the 21st century needs a 
course of action that will decisively enable greater agility and efficiency through effects-
based requirements; commercially driven research and development; and industry-provided 
lifecycle product support processes.  
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Becoming Highly Agile and Responsive 
Effects-based Requirements  
“Requirements creep” has been a persistent problem within defense acquisition 
since World War II. This “creep” is driven by the DoD focus on technological superiority and 
the military services historic bias towards unique requirements. The JCIDS process (and 
subsequent portfolio management) was intended to correct these problems; however, the 
Joint Staff was never fully resourced to develop capstone and integrating concepts. As a 
result, the JCIDS process continues to be dominated by Service-driven requirements.  
To compensate, DoD is implementing an increasing number of common critical 
performance parameters to enhance system inter-operability and “jointness.” These 
requirements tend to be overlaid on top of Service-driven performance requirements. 
Requirements packages for major systems continue to be large, complex, and, in many 
cases, contradictory. 
In order for the DoD to enhance agility, it must begin with a requirements process 
that is appropriately focused on the military effort that is required. Requirements would be 
characterized based upon desired effect or outcome, rather than as a specific system. Such 
an approach would make maximum use of Joint Staff resources for integrated “Concepts of 
Operation,” while fostering innovation within the Services and industry to develop competing 
solutions. Industry would be empowered to provide a specific capability rapidly, within the 
constraints of the “Concept of Operations.” 
The Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program (JMVP) 
currently offers a good example of what an innovative and agile DoD acquisition process 
could look like. The MRAP program is the largest and fastest military acquisition 
buildup since World War II, with the DOD utilizing an acquisition strategy to rapidly 
acquire and field MRAP vehicles. The MRAP acquisition program established minimal 
operational requirements and relied heavily on commercially available products (GAO, 
2008b). 
The DoD designated the MRAP program as DoD’s highest priority acquisition, which 
helped contractors and other industry partners to rapidly respond to the urgent need and 
meet production requirements with industry partners. This facilitated rapid fielding by 
generally meeting or exceeding planned production rates. This agile and responsive 
acquisition process saved lives and made an exponential contribution to warfighter 
readiness (GAO, 2008b). 
Industry-driven Research and Development  
The DoD acquisition process reinforces unique solutions via built in bias for large, 
long cost-plus development programs. These programs inherently embody incentives for 
cost and schedule growth and limited incentives for efficiency. The DoD and the Congress 
have attempted to regulate efficiency for 20 years via increased oversight and reporting, but 
the overall process seems impervious to incremental change. 
Advances in technology research and development (R&D) are currently led by the 
commercial world, where R&D has increased steadily at a rate of about 5% per year for 
more than 20 years. During this same 20-year period, DoD and government R&D spending 
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dropped 2.5% per year (Gansler, 2000). In order for the DoD to capitalize on commercial 
investment, it must actively engage the commercial market.  
The “new normal” of persistent conflict and stabilization engagement demands a 
“new normal” research and development business model. Such a model would be more akin 
to the commercial development process, where industry manages product R&D (and is fully 
responsible for technology maturation of that product). The DoD would continue to invest in 
basic research within the 6.1 and 6.2 accounts and in test and evaluation of competing 
prototypes.  
This approach would incentivize industry to control requirements creep, select 
mature technologies for product integration, and develop solutions in an incremental, timely 
fashion. Such a system would inherently incentivize industry, since industry would be 
funding the development (versus the cost-plus development of today) and provide a 
meaningful business driven mechanism to moderate technical risk and ensure technical 
maturity (versus the technology readiness levels used today). 
Such on approach may not be applicable for complex, high-risk defense items 
(aircraft carriers, as an example); however, it should be appropriate for a growing number of 
items required for “persistent presence.”  In addition, this approach will require fundamental 
change within the DoD to accept industry-natured technologies and equipment built to 
commercial standards. 
Industry Provided Lifecycle Product Support  
The DoD has recently embraced an innovative approach for procuring logistics 
support for its weapons systems. In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the DoD 
mandated the implementation of Performance-based Logistics with the goal to gain the most 
efficient and effective performance of weapons systems  throughout their lifecycles, and to 
build successful business partnerships that align with the goals of all involved parties for the 
duration of these programs (Berkowitz, 2005). PBL is a business partnership model 
designed to align the interests of both the DoD and the logistics service provider: creating 
value and the desired outcomes of both partners. This yields a more cooperative venture 
than merely achieving service level agreements or getting the lowest price from the provider.   
PBLs have demonstrated success by providing superior logistics support for simple 
parts such as aviation tires, subsystems such as engines, and complete weapon systems 
(e.g., F-22). PBLs have demonstrated improved weapons systems readiness and equipment 
availability through the development of incentives for industry investment and partnerships. 
There are more than 200 PBL efforts DoD-wide that have demonstrated material availability 
above 95 percent and commercial response times of 2-4 days (versus DoD average of 16 
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BENEFITS  PROGRAM 
AVAILABILITY 




+ 23%; 98% 
RFT  B-2 
47.2% MC (Record 
Level)  F/A-18 
-74% LRT; -33% 
RTAT 
F/A-18 SMS 32%  E-8 
99.5% Lch Rt; 97.6% 
ME  F/A-18 SMS - 84% LRT 
H-60 Avionics 14%  ALR-67(v)3 97% Avail  H-60 Avionics - 85% LRT 
Tires 17%  Sentinel 95% Avail  Tires 
-92% LRT; -100% 
B/O’s 
AEGIS 30%  Shadow 96%+ OR  APUs - 82%LRT 
F-404 Engine 46%  TAIS 98%+ Avail  LANTRIN - 90% LRT 
T-700 35%  Javelin 99%+ OR  F-404 Engine - 25% RTAT 
CIWS 9%  ITAS 99% Avail  T-700 
-74% RTAT; -100% 
B/O’s 
Mk41 VLS 8%  CGS 99% Avail  AH-64 Apache - 35% RTAT 
Sea Sparrow 14%  HIMARS 98.7% Avail  
Pegasus 
Engine - 59% RTAT 
Navy Spt 
Equip 32%  C-17 
93.5% Dpt Rel ; 
85.4%MC  CH-47 (UK) - 44% RTAT 
Nimrod (UK) 40%  C-17 Engines 70% TOW incr  F-22 - 20% RTAT 
AN/ALQ-126B 50%  T56-15 Engines + 35% TOW  B-2 - 20% RTAT (Depot) 
AN/USM-638 40%  APS-137 + 40% TOW  CIWS - 99% B/O’s 
LANTRIN 17%  AN/PSS-14 95% Eff Rate  Sea Sparrow - 90% B/O’s 
EA-6B Flt 
Cont 47%  F414 Engine 97% Avail  F-404 - 66%B/O’s 
F-22 + 15% MC  Patriot - 99% B/O’s  RFTLTS - 96% LRT 
        
RFT - Ready for Tasking TOW - Time-on-Wing    
MC - Mission Capable B/O’s - Backorders    
OR - Operational Readiness LRT - Logistics Response Time    
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Benefit ($M)  PROGRAM 
Total Cost 
Benefit ($M)  PROGRAM 
Annual Cost 
Benefit ($M) 
F-22 $14,000  ARC-210 $5.4 (8.6%)  F-22 $500 (39%) 
ALR-67(v)3 $62.7 (40%)  TH-57 $15.3 (7.9%)  CASS CSP $30 (54%) 
TOW-ITAS $350  H-60 $41 (6.5%)  TOW-ITAS $6.3 (34.5%) 
F/A-18 $688  Sea Sparrow $2.2 (6.3%)  ARCI $4 (24.7%) 
CGS $10.3 (65%)  AN/WSN-7 $0.88 (1.3%)  MK 41 VLS $1.1 (16.4%) 
MIDs-LVT $62 (54%)  AN-PSS14 $17  F-117 $124 (14.5%) 
AN/AAS-44 $31 (25.2%)  Sentinel $301.70  Navy Tires $46 (15%) 
APUs $4 (20.9%)  T-45 $85  GBMD $1.60 
AEGIS FCS $8 (19.3%)  C-17 $477  TAIS $0.01 
F405 Engine $61 (17.2%)  Navy Spt Equip $1  H-46 $0.35 
Cockpit Disp $71 (16.5%)  AN/ALQ-126B $2.10  Program 
Flying Hour Cost 
Reduction 
F100 $2 (16.3%)  AN/USM-638 $0.50  LANTIRN $9.6 (14.6%) 
AH-64 & CCAD $100  C-17 59%  F-404 Engine $79 (13.4%) 
CH-47(UK) $250  Tornado (UK) 51%  F-414 Engine $6.40 
Javelin 10%  Harrier (UK) 44%  Patriot $1 (13.1%) 
RFTLTS $0.50  Nimrod (UK) 8%    
 
The wide use of performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts ultimately puts the 
focus on readiness and rapid, agile support. PBL enables the DoD to select providers based 
on competitive value, producing partnerships with preferred providers that overtime will 
improve the DoD’s overall support capabilities (Estevez, 2005). 
Conclusion 
Despite fond memories of past glories, cost and schedule control have been 
persistent problems within defense acquisition since World War II. The DoD acquisition and 
lifecycle processes have proven to be impervious to incremental improvements, despite 
decades of study and recommendations. It is certain that for the foreseeable future we as a 
Nation will face a severely constrained fiscal environment that will put added downward 
pressure on defense and other discretionary budget elements. This situation necessitates 
an enterprise-wide Defense Department application of the proven lifecycle management 
practices that will ensure greater performance improvements and simultaneous cost 
savings. These significant savings opportunities in turn can be deployed to address the 
significant force modernization and recapitalization requirements that we face today and in 
the future.  
The United States cannot be certain of the international security situations it will 
confront in the next two decades. The world security environment is likely to be dramatically 
different and more active than the Cold War years, the years following, and the current 
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GWOT. This uncertainty requires an acquisition process that is agile and efficient, enabling 
the DoD to rapidly field and sustain capabilities. Such a process would include: 
• Effects-based requirements 
• Commercially driven product development 
• Industry-provided product support 
 
These elements present fundamental change to DoD’s lifecycle processes to meet 
the needs of the 21st century. 
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Abstract 
Design of a resource strategy for logistics support requires decision-makers to 
choose to use contracted, blended, or organic support, or a combination thereof, for 
acquisition products. Non-cost issues have received much less attention than cost in 
resource strategy design—even though policy requires the incorporation of many non-cost 
issues. This lack of attention is partially due to the large number of issues that can impact 
strategy design, the diversity of issue features and impacts, and the diversity of 
characteristics of programs, their environments, and potential strategies. Although many 
issues that should be included in logistic planning have been identified, little guidance is 
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provided for how program management teams can incorporate them into logistics support 
resource strategy design. Tools that facilitate describing logistics requirements and the 
impacts of resource strategies on program success can potentially improve resource 
strategy design, assessment, and documentation for review. The structure and use of the 
Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map for helping program management teams consider 
a broad range of logistics support resource strategy design issues are described. An 
example application illustrates the Map’s use. Implications for practice and potential future 
developments tool are discussed.  
Keywords: Logistic support, resource strategy, strategy design and assessment 
Introduction 
“‘[The] logistic process is at once the military element in the nation’s economy and the 
economic element in its military operation.’ […] Logistical conditions and capabilities largely 
determined what was strategically available and tactically feasible […] logistics is always the 
indispensible servant of victory, and ‘like any indispensible servant, it is frequently the 
master’” (S. B. Duncan, as cited in Rose, 2006, p. 191) 
The ability to provide effective and efficient logistics support for deployed military 
systems is a critical part of successful program management. At least two important 
questions must be addressed to meet this acquisition goal:  
1) What types of resources will be used to provide what logistics support? i.e., 
What is the logistic support resource strategy?  
2) Given the logistics support resource strategy selected, how can logistics 
operations be managed to maximize effectiveness and efficiency?  
The Department of Defense has addressed logistics operations (the second 
question) at length. Logistics support operations can be assessed by both their 
effectiveness in meeting requirements and their efficiency of use of funds. Performance of 
logistics support operations in meeting requirements is measured with metrics such as the 
average response time and other metrics developed through Performance-based Logistics 
(PBL). These metrics are used to assess the effectiveness of logistics operations. Costs—
including monies paid to contracted logistics support providers, government expenses 
incurred to contract and manage those providers, and funds for organic logistics support—
are used with performance measures to assess the efficiency of the use of funds (Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU), 2005). 
In contrast, logistics support resource strategy design (the first question) has 
received much less attention beyond the preference for the cheapest alternative. As used 
here, a logistics support resource strategy describes the sources (contracted, organic, or 
blended) of support provided to meet different logistics support requirements. However, a 
DoD program’s logistics support resource strategy is important because it profoundly 
impacts total program performance. Figure 1 describes the relative costs in a product’s 
lifecycle. As shown, operations and logistics costs are large when compared to Research 
and Development, Investment, and Disposal costs. Therefore, the effective and efficient 
design of a program’s logistics support resource strategy is critical to overall program 
success.  
 =




Figure 1. Relative Costs during a Product Lifecycle  
(DAU, 2004, November, p. 43) 
 
Most naval logistics support is provided by two types of resources: commercial 
organizations that contract with the government to provide material, equipment and services 
(a.k.a., Contractor Logistics Support, CLS) and internal military resources that provide the 
same material, equipment, and services. These are referred to as “contracted” and “organic” 
forms of logistics support, respectively. Three logistics support resourcing strategies are 
commonly considered: 1) contracting for all logistics support, 2) providing all logistics 
support with organic resources, and 3) providing some support through contracts and the 
remainder of support from organic resources, referred to as a “blended” strategy.  
The three strategies are very different from one another in their characteristics, 
challenges for the government, and risks. The decision to provide support entirely with 
contracted resources (CLS) is an outsourcing strategy that often requires significant 
government contracting effort; it also requires contract management expertise and 
experience on both the government and contractor sides of the agreement. Contracted 
logistics introduce challenges to the government that include reduced control of resources 
and increased sensitivity to the goals of private enterprises. In contrast, by providing all 
logistics support with organic resources, program managers apply a “make” (versus “buy”) 
approach to providing logistics. Organic logistics support (OLS) presents challenges of 
developing and retaining adequate expertise, building the infrastructure of diagnostics, 
spares, maintenance facilities, etc.; such support also can increase resource allocation risks. 
Different again is a blended strategy, which can be a disaggregation of meeting the same 
support requirements between contracted and organic resources, an interdependent 
allocation of different types of support among different resources, or a combination of the 
two. Blended logistics resource support strategies bring with them the challenges of 
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comparison between contracted and organic performance and operational interface 
management. These differences make forecasting the impacts of specific logistics support 
resource strategies and logistics support performance and cost very difficult. This inability to 
forecast, in turn, makes logistics support resource strategy design difficult.  
Problem Description  
The logistical features and characteristics of programs and their environments vary 
widely. Some impacts on resource strategy design (i.e., the use of CLS, blended, and OLS) 
can be described and assessed in monetary terms, such as differences in labor costs 
between contracted and organic personnel. Other aspects may have significant impacts but 
are intangible, such as reductions in commitment or morale of contracted suppliers due to 
many large rapid changes in government needs or the introduction of a more lucrative 
opportunity for using their resources. Many potentially important aspects lie between these 
two extremes.  
Logistics support resource strategies also vary widely. This diversity is partially due 
to differing abilities of resources to fulfill different logistics requirements. For example, the 
contractor that develops a critical technology for a new weapons system may be the only 
organization capable of providing its logistics support. If logistics support is viewed as a 
single, monolithic set of requirements, then a resource strategy can be described by 
specifying the resources that fulfill sets of requirements. But different logistics support 
requirements can often be better met by different support resources. Therefore, total 
logistics support is often disaggregated into sets of requirements—each potentially with a 
different logistics support resource strategy or design.  
The disaggregation of logistics support can be based on technical knowledge, 
workforce characteristics, and legal and ownership issues. Contractors may own specific 
product knowledge, software, facilities, or technical data that are required to provide logistics 
support, or may have access to necessary or preferred business relationships (e.g., supply 
chains of critical components). Legal (often proprietary) constraints or extraordinarily high 
prices for access may require some logistics support requirements to be clustered for supply 
by specific firms. Clustering based on this third criterion is typically contractor-specific. 
Therefore, good logistics support resource strategy design includes an analysis of how 
clustering support requirements for resourcing can impact the attractiveness of specific 
strategies. 
Due to the uniqueness of programs, environments, and strategies, no one logistics 
support resource strategy is always best for all programs. Each strategy has a different set 
of features and characteristics that provide different advantages and disadvantages relative 
to other strategies. Those advantages and disadvantages generate benefits and costs. For 
example, the contracted logistics support organization may have developed a piece of 
equipment that is unique to the system being supported and, therefore, would have an 
intimate knowledge of its design and manufacturing. This provides special expertise in 
system maintenance and repair that is not available organically. That expertise may reduce 
repair times, costs, or both. Likewise, organic resources may be fully dedicated to the 
program and available with zero notice. This allows the organic resources to respond faster 
to unexpected increases in demands for logistics support, which could reduce response 
times experienced by warfighters. An example of this type of advantage of organic support 
is found in Coryell’s (2004) case study of logistics support for the Army’s Stryker program, in 
which a change in logistics support resource strategy was driven by the flexibility provided 
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by organic resources. Anecdotal evidence suggests that contracted, blended, and organic 
strategies each provide a broad and diverse spectrum of advantages and disadvantages. 
However, selecting the best logistics support resource strategy for a specific program is 
difficult because of the need to identify the important features and characteristics of the 
program, its environment, and potential strategies and to assess their impacts on logistics 
support resource strategy selection. Given this multitude of potential drivers of and 
influences on logistics support, how can acquisition program managers select the 
best logistics support resource strategy for a specific program?  
DoD Policies Regarding Logistics Support Resource Strategy   
Basic DoD logistics policy, as described in the Acquisition Logistics Guide (Defense 
Systems Management College, 1997) suggests six comparison criteria when performing 
tradeoff studies among alternative system designs and logistics support strategies (pp. 8-
10): 
 Lifecycle cost comparisons, 
 Diagnostic characteristics (e.g., Built-in-Test (BIT)), 
 Energy characteristics, 
 Battle damage repair characteristics, 
 Transportability characteristics, and 
 Facilities requirements. 
As this list indicates, cost and measurable logistic performance metrics have 
predominated logistics support resource strategy selection policy. The Guide (pp. 8-11) also 
suggests nine supportability issues for use in logistics strategy design:   
 Operations and maintenance personnel and staff-hour constraints, 
 Personnel skill-level constraints, 
 Lifecycle and Operations and Support (O&S) cost constraints, 
 Target percentages of system failures correctable at each maintenance level, 
 Mean down time in the operational environment, 
 Turn-around time in the operational environment, 
 Standardization and interoperability requirements, 
 Built-in fault-isolation capability, and 
 Transportability requirements (identification of conveyances on which the 
system and its components are transportable). 
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Only two of the nine (personnel skill-level constraints and operations and 
maintenance personnel and staff-hour constraints) reach beyond cost and logistic 
operations metrics. Acquisition procedures as specified in DoD 5000.2-R also emphasizes 
cost in assessing logistics strategies, saying “Life-cycle costs [...] shall play a key role in the 
overall [logistics support concept] selection process” (DoD, p. 90).  
While cost and logistic operations performance should and will remain a centerpiece 
of logistics support analysis, more recent DoD policy has shifted to increase the importance 
of other criteria in logistics support resource strategy design. The Acting Under Secretary of 
Defense (USD) (AT&L) has promulgated the Performance-based Logistics (PBL) approach 
(2004, January 23). Later that same year, the USD (AT&L) established the following high-
level performance metrics for Performance-based Logistics (2004, August 16):   
 Operational Availability, 
 Operational Reliability, 
 Cost per Unit Usage, 
 Logistics Footprint, and 
 Logistics Response Time. 
Only one of these high-level performance metrics (Cost per Unit Usage) is cost 
based. The other four metrics address readiness (availability, reliability, and response time) 
and impacts of logistics (footprint). This ratio clearly shows the importance of integrating 
non-cost logistics support issues into logistics support design, including resource strategy.  
The Performance-based Logistics guidelines (DAU, 2005) also leave no doubt about 
the importance of non-cost factors in selecting a logistics support resource strategy. The 
Business Case Analysis requires: 
Consideration of performance and cost risk will explicitly consider contract versus 
organic risk management, financial accountability, and recovery actions. The risk 
assessment should address the probability and confidence level of the following 
events: poor performance, cost growth, extended labor disputes, and changeover in 
PSI / PSP. (p. 3-30) 
The guidelines explicitly describe the resource strategy addressed in the current 
work as an important logistics support design decision (Figure 2).  
 =




Figure 2. An Illustration of the Role of Logistics Resource Strategy in Performance-
based Logistics  
(DAU, 2005, p. 2-3) 
Coryell’s (2004) case study of logistic support in the Army’s Stryker program 
demonstrates the role of non-cost factors in logistic support resource strategy design in 
implementing the PBL policy. A cost analysis was performed, suggesting the use of purely 
organic support (Figure 3). However, a different, non-cost issue drove the logistic support 
resource strategy design. Specifically, the design shifted from a primarily contracted strategy 
to a more blended strategy based on the differences in the flexibility of logistic support that 
could be provided by organic and contracted resources.  
 
 =




Figure 3. Cost Analysis Results of Stryker Logistic  
Support Resource Strategies  
(Coryell, 2004, p. 63, Figure 15) 
Logistics Support Strategy Improvement Efforts 
Several evaluations of DoD logistics support resource strategies have identified 
areas for improvement. The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) found little data 
had been collected that could verify the cost effectiveness of logistics strategies (2002). The 
same report expressed concern over several aspects of logistics support, including:   
 Ability to develop and maintain critical technical skills and knowledge, 
 Deployment of contractors to the battlefield and how protecting and 
supporting these contractors may affect their troops’ ability to accomplish 
their missions, 
 Ability to shift funds in response to changing conditions, and 
 Availability of affordable technical data to develop additional or new sources 
of repair and maintenance to ensure a competitive market. 
Performance-based Logistics (PBL) is a major DoD effort to improve logistics 
support, including resource strategies. PBL explicitly addresses the resourcing issue. 
The Business Case Analysis (BCA) portion of PBL is particularly relevant to the 
current work. The PBL guide (DAU, 2005) describes the BCA as “an expanded cost/benefit 
analysis created with the intent of determining a best-value solution for product support” (p. 
3-27). The analysis includes much more than traditional economic factors such as cost, 
including:   
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 Performance measures,  
 Capitalization/asset ownership,  
 Size of footprint, 
 Reliability growth, 
 Lifecycle costs, 
 Diminished manufacturing sources management, 
 Obsolescence/Obsolescence mitigation plan, 
 Technology insertion, 
 Risk management, 
 Minimum and maximum essential logistics capabilities (peacetime to full 
mobilization requirement), 
 Existing infrastructure, 
 Common consumables support, 
 Reliability and maintainability forecasts at the major system,  
 Supply chain responsiveness, and 
 Surge capabilities. 
Notice here the shift from a focus on cost (“expanded cost/benefit analysis”) to 
indentifying the broader “best-value solution.” The factors to be considered include many 
that are difficult or impossible to measure in monetary terms (surge capabilities) or even 
quantify (e.g., technology insertion). The PBL BCA provides a useful enumeration of some 
of the non-cost factors that should be considered in logistics support resource strategy 
design. However, the guidelines provide little assistance about how to incorporate those 
factors into logistics support resource strategy design. The next section describes a tool for 
this purpose.  
A Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map 
As described, the features and characteristics of programs, their environments, and 
specific resource strategies vary widely, as do their impacts on logistics support. The 
qualitative nature of many important features and characteristics precludes the use of 
precise mathematical modeling for inclusion in logistics support resource strategy design. 
However, they can be structured in ways that facilitate objective assessment and inclusion 
in strategy design. Examples include the different types of flexibility that contracted, 
blended, and organic strategies provide programs. A useful tool for inclusive resource 
strategy design will identify and model both qualitative and quantitative features and 
characteristics and how they impact the attractiveness of different resourcing strategies. The 
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incorporation of qualitative factors in strategy assessment can improve strategy selection by 
prompting decision-makers to use these factors in decision-making. It is important to note 
that the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map does not replace critical thinking or 
analysis by the program management team, but can facilitate that thinking and 
analysis to improve logistics support resource strategy design.  
An Excel®-based Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map (Map) (Appendix B) has 
been developed to facilitate logistics support resource strategy design. The Map facilitates 
five aspects of designing a logistics support resources strategy for a specific set of 
requirements:  
• Identifying and describing logistics support resource strategy criteria that are relevant 
for meeting specific logistics support requirements; 
• Quantifying the relative importance of logistics support resource strategy criteria to 
meeting specific requirements or sets of requirements; 
• Qualitative assessment of the degree to which the program and strategy (as they 
relate to the requirements) favor the use of organic resources, contracted resources, 
or a blend of organic and contracted resources; 
• The quantification of the support for the use of contracted, blended, or organic 
resources to meet specific criteria and the aggregation of that support for sets of 
criteria for specific requirements; this can facilitate the grouping of requirements for 
logistics support acquisition.  
• The aggregation of priority-weighted support across criteria for comparison of 
different program strategies; and  
• Documentation and support of logistics support resource strategy decisions for use 
in program reviews.  
The sorting function in Excel® allows the reorganization of the criteria considered to 
facilitate team discussion and strategy assessment. For example, criteria can be sorted by 
those that apply to a particular logistics support requirement, by the type of criteria, or in 
descending order from those most supported by contracted resourcing to those least 










Figure 4. Partial Screenshot of Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map 
In addition, the Map facilitates the documentation of the strategy modeling. Each row 
in a Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map represents a specific criterion that may be 
used to assess a resource strategy to meet one or more support requirements. Each column 
of the Map describes a characteristic of the criteria, as follows:   
 Importance of Criterion, 
 Logistic Support Resource Strategy Criterion, 
 Criterion Type, 
 Logistic Support Requirement, 
 Degree of Program & Strategy Support,  
 Reasoning behind Assessment, 
 Locations of Supporting Information, 
 Degree of Support for Contracted Logistics Support, 
 Priority-weighted Degree of Support for Contracted Logistic Support, and 
 Cumulative Degree of Support for Contracted Logistics Support. 
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Components of a Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map 
Importance of Criterion (Column B in the spreadsheet): This value is the quantified 
assessment of the relative importance of specific criteria in meeting the requirement named 
in Column E in the spreadsheet. Consistent with ranking criteria from the most to least 
important, smaller values indicate more important criteria. Duplicate use of the same 
importance value and fractional values are accommodated, but values less than one are to 
be avoided (see “Priority-weighted Degree of Support for CLS” below). All criteria are initially 
assessed to have essentially no importance (value = 99). This forces the program team to 
identify and select criteria to be used in assessment by assigning them a smaller importance 
value. Criteria that are not selected (i.e., value remains 99) are ignored in the quantitative 
assessments.  
Logistics Support Resource Strategy Criterion (Column C in the spreadsheet): In 
this Map, 51 potential criteria are provided in 8 categories. These suggested criteria were 
developed based on a review of civilian and military logistics support literature. For example, 
Fine and Whitney (1996) group the reasons to make (organic support) or buy (contracted 
support) into issues of capacity and knowledge. They go on to discuss the roles of several 
factors in the make-buy (organic versus contracted) decision for product support—including 
the ability of a buyer to provide the support needed (more supports organic), relative costs, 
the quality of system performance, the criticality of the product to organizational success 
(more supports organic), the availability of qualified suppliers, product complexity, skill of 
suppliers, competitive advantages of suppliers, profit for suppliers. Parmigiani (2007) 
investigates the impact of product specificity (which would increase with product maturity) on 
firms’ tendency to outsource; her findings suggest increased maturity increases blended 
support over outsourcing and increases organic support over blended strategies. Military 
research also provided the basis for potential criteria. For example, Wild (2006) discusses 
the roles of direct (logistic operations) costs, indirect (logistic supervision and management) 
costs, transaction (contracting) costs, control (e.g., responsiveness), economies of scale 
(e.g., fleet size), internal capabilities, profits and competitive advantages (e.g., bargaining 
power), coordination of the value chain, and information and property rights in outsourcing 
by the DoD. Several of the criteria suggested by the literature were investigated by others in 
more depth to assess their applicability to DoD acquisition. For example, Coryell (2004) 
performs a case study of the shift from predominantly CLS to a more blended logistics 
support strategy in the Army’s Stryker program. He concludes (p. 61) that the primary 
reason for the change was not cost, but the need for more flexibility in combat operations.     
In the Logistic Support Resource Strategy Map, all criteria are worded so that the 
more the criterion is met or is true, the stronger support is provided for an organic logistics 
support resource strategy. Criteria descriptions can be changed and customized to fit 
program needs; five spaces for new criteria are also provided. For example, one criterion 
that reflects logistics support costs is “CLS unit cost to provide logistics support operations.” 
A very high value for this criterion (i.e., CLS costs are very high) supports the use of organic 
logistics support resources. The opposite is also true. The less the criterion is met (i.e., CLS 
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Criterion Type (Column D in the spreadsheet): Criteria are categorized as being one 
of eight types:  
 Business relations, 
 Cost, 
 Funding, 
 Information and technology, 
 Labor resources, 
 Logistics operations performance, 
 Product characteristics, 
 Program characteristics, and 
 Program environments. 
All criteria of a given type can be grouped to facilitate discussion and assessment by 
sorting.  
Logistics Support Requirement (Column E in the spreadsheet): This cell for each 
criterion can be used to specify which logistics support requirements are being addressed 
with the strategy being assessed. This may be useful when a logistics support resource 
strategy is being assessed that has different requirements that may be addressed with 
different criteria. Requirement descriptions can be changed as needed to reflect program 
and strategy characteristics.  
Degree of Program and Strategy Support (Columns F through P in the 
spreadsheet): The Map provides 11 possible degrees of program and strategy support for 
the use of organic support to meet requirements from “Very high,” which supports the use of 
organic resources, to “Very low,” which supports the use of contracted resources. All criteria 
are worded so that the more or better organic logistics support fills the criteria, the higher the 
assessment that is given (see “Logistics Support Resource Strategy Criterion” above). 
Therefore, an assessment of “Very High” indicates that using only organic resource strategy 
can meet the criterion very well; an assessment of “Very Low” indicates that using only 
contracted resource strategy can meet the criterion very well; and assessments between 
these extremes indicate the ability of various amounts of blended strategy to meet the 
criterion best. The degree of support that the strategy provides for filling the criteria with 
organic resources is indicated by inserting an “X” in the cell that represents the level of 
support.   
Reasoning behind the Assessment (Column Q in the spreadsheet): Space is 
provided to document the basis for the assessed degree of support provided by the strategy 
to meet the criteria.  
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Locations of Supporting Information (Column R in the spreadsheet): Space is 
provided to document the location of information that supports the assessed degree of 
support provided by the strategy to meet the criteria with organic resources.  
Degree of Support for CLS (Column S in the spreadsheet): The Map quantifies the 
assessed degree of support provided by the program and strategy to meet the criteria with 
organic, blended, or contracted resources into integer values from 0 to 10; these reflect the 
degree of support for contracted resources, with 0 reflecting little support for contracted 
resources (i.e., strong support for organic resources) and 10 representing strong support for 
contracted resources. The juxtaposition from increasing qualitative assessment supporting 
organic resources to increasing quantified support supporting contracted resources (i.e., 
“Very High” support for organic is assigned the lowest numerical value and vice versa) is 
purposeful and intended to assist the assessment team in adopting multiple perspectives for 
improved assessment and logistics support resource strategy planning.  
Priority-weighted Degree of Support for CLS (Column T in the spreadsheet): The 
Map integrates the assessed importance of the criteria and degree of support into a priority-
weighted degree of support for the use of contracted resources. Values range from 0 to 10 if 
the recommendations for assessing each criterion’s importance described above are used,1 
with large values reflecting important criteria that strongly support the use of contracted 
resources and vice versa (less importance, less support for CLS, or both). These values are 
generated by dividing the degree of support (range = {0,10}) by the importance of the criteria 
(range = {1,98}). As an example, if a strategy of contracting all logistics support to a new 
contractor was being assessed, if the criterion “Risks associated with a new CLS contractor” 
were considered the most important criterion (Importance of Criteria = 1), and the risks were 
considered to be very low (“X” in “Very Low” cell, column P), then the Priority-weighted 
Degree of Support for CLS would be 10 (= 10/1). In contrast, if the assessments for the 
same criterion for the same strategy were that the criterion was ranked third among criteria 
(Importance of Criterion = 3), and the risk was assessed to be between that for a balanced 
blended strategy and a contracted strategy (e.g., 8, “X” in column N) then the Priority-
weighted Degree of Support for CLS would be 2.67 (=8/3). Note that the Priority-weighted 
Degree of Support for CLS directly (linearly) reflects the assessments of criteria importance 
and the strategies support of organic, blended, or contracted support. Values, or differences 
in values, are directly proportional to those assessments. For example, the change from a 
value of 10 to a value of 2.67 in the example above is the product of the reduction in the 
importance (8/10) and the support degree (1/3). Users of the Map should not read more 
meaning or validity into these values than their underlying structure suggest.  
Cumulative Degree of Support for CLS (Column U in the spreadsheet): The Map 
aggregates the Priority-weighted degrees of Support for CLS into a single quantitative value 
that represents the strategy’s overall support for CLS. This single value can be useful in 
comparing different logistics support resource strategies. This value is the sum of the 
Priority-weighted degrees of support for CLS for all criteria used for strategy assessment 
(importance < 99) divided by 10.2 Possible values range from zero to the number of 
                                                
1 Assessments of criteria importance less than one generate Priority-weighted Degree of Support for 
CLS values that do not accurately reflect the relative positions of criteria due to division by very small 
values.  
2  The sum is divided by ten solely to keep maximum value equal to the number of criteria used for 
assessment.  
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significant criteria. Note that, ceteris paribus (all else equal), a strategy that uses more 
criteria will have a larger Cumulative Degree of Support for CLS. Therefore, care must be 
taken in comparing strategies using the Cumulative Degree of Support for CLS to be sure 
that the strategy assessments use the same number of criteria.  
Application Process for the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map. The 
following steps can be used to describe and assess a set of logistics support requirements 
for resource strategy planning.  
Phase I: Create Criterion/Requirements Sets for Assessment 
1. Develop a rich description of the logistics support resource strategy to 
be assessed.  
2. Identify the logistics support requirements or sets of requirements to be 
supported by a single resource strategy. Group requirements into sets 
that must be or are planned to be supported with the same logistics support 
resource strategy.  
3. Identify the rows that describe criteria to be used for assessment for 
each requirement set. Use the criteria types and specific criteria suggested 
in the Map in columns C and D as a basis for discussing and indentifying 
criteria to be used to assess the resource strategy for each requirements set. 
Enter requirement set names or identifiers in the "Logistics Support 
Requirement(s)" column (E) of the rows of criteria to be used to assess each 
requirement set. Copy and insert entire rows of criteria needed for multiple 
requirement sets. Specify and add assessment criteria if required by altering 
criteria or entering additional criteria not listed into a row with a column C with 
the label "blank." To retain the Map’s ability to consistently quantify the 
characterization of a program and strategy on the criteria, describe the 
criteria so that more of the criteria supports the use of Organic Logistics 
Support.  
Phase II: Assess Criterion/Requirement Set Needs in Logistics Support Resources   
4. Assess and quantify the importance of each criterion. Sort the rows of 
assessments (“Assessments” range) by Logistics Support Requirement 
(Column E) to gather the criteria being used to assess the resource strategy 
for different requirement sets. For each criterion/requirement set (i.e., each 
row), enter a number in the "Importance of Criterion" column (B) that reflects 
the relative importance of the criterion relative to the other criteria for that 
requirement set. Although almost all values are allowed,3 it is suggested to 
restrict values to the range of 1 to 10—with 1 representing the most important 
criteria, and 10 representing the least important criteria. The Map can use 
multiple uses of the same importance value for different criteria and fractional 
importance values as well as unique integer values, but values less than one 
are to be avoided (see “Priority-weighted Degree of Support for CLS”).   
                                                
3  The default value of 99 reflects criteria that are not used. Therefore, users must purposefully 
identify all criteria to be used by changing their importance value.  
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5. Qualitatively assess the support provided by different resource 
strategies. For each criterion/requirements set (i.e., each row), evaluate how 
well organic, blended, or contracted logistics support is expected to meet the 
criterion for the specified requirements set. State the assessment in terms of 
the ability of organic support to meet the criterion by answering the question, 
“Based on this criterion, how well do the program and proposed logistic 
support resource strategy support the use of organic logistics support?” with 
answers from “Very High” (which strongly supports the use of an organic 
strategy), “Balanced” (which suggests that there are both advantages and 
disadvantages to both organic and contracted support), or “Very Low,” (which 
strongly suggests that a contracted resource strategy can meet the criteria 
much better than an organic strategy). For example, if the contracted 
developer of a product to be supported owns critical product information, the 
assessment for the criterion “Availability/affordability of technical data to the 
DoD” would be “Low” or “Very Low,” supporting the use of contracted 
resources (the developer in this case). Assess each criterion in isolation, as if 
it were the only criterion impacting the logistics support resource strategy 
design.  
6. Quantify support assessments. For each criterion/requirements set (i.e., 
each row), quantify assessments by entering the letter "X" in the appropriate 
box in Columns F through P. Assessments to the left (closer to “Very High”) 
indicate that an organic strategy outperforms a blended or contracted 
resource strategy for the specified criterion and requirements set. Use the 
letter “X” and only a single assessment for each criterion/requirement set if 
numerical estimates of support are desired. Upper and lower case “X”s are 
equivalent. Typing over existing text does not cause problems.  
7. Document assessments. For each criterion/requirements set (i.e., each 
row), add notes in the “Reasoning behind assessment” cell that explain the 
basis for the assessment. Likewise, enter references to data, reports, etc., in 
the “Locations of supporting information” cell as pointers to support for the 
assessment. 
Phase III: Review, Discuss, and Revise Assessments from Different Perspectives  
8. Review the most important criteria. Sort criterion/requirement sets by 
“Importance of Criterion” in ascending order (select "Assessments" range, 
then Data/Sort/Column B, Smallest to Largest, no headers) to view the 
criteria assessed to be most important in logistics support resource strategy 
design. Review, discuss, and revise as required to reflect criteria importance. 
For example, criteria reflecting legal constraints that must be met should be 
assigned a small value (e.g., one).  
9. Review criteria that suggest support for Organic or Contracted 
Logistics Support . Sort criterion/requirement sets by "Degree of Support for 
CLS (0-10 scale)" in ascending order (select "Assessments" range, then 
Data/Sort/Column S, Smallest to Largest, no headers) to view the 
criterion/requirement sets that are most strongly supported by organic 
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logistics support.4  Review, discuss, and revise as required. Sort 
criterion/requirement sets by "Degree of Support for CLS (0-10 scale)" in 
descending order (select "Assessments" range, then Data/Sort/Column S, 
Largest to Smallest, no headers) to view the criterion/requirement sets that 
are most strongly supported by contracted logistics support. Review, discuss, 
and revise as required.  
10. Review drivers of a contracted resource strategy. Sort 
criterion/requirement sets by "Priority-weighted degree of Support for CLS " in 
ascending order (select "Assessments" range, then Data/Sort/Column T, 
Smallest to Largest, no headers) to view the criterion/requirement sets that 
are both important and that strongly support a contracted resource strategy.  
The Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map is designed primarily for qualitative 
assessment and the identification of shared and differing impacts of a resource strategy on 
logistics support. Assessments are based on the perceptions and judgments of program 
team members about the program, logistics support resource strategy issues and their 
impacts. Those impacts can suggest information to develop that will improve resource 
strategy design, groupings of support requirements for effective and efficient acquisition, 
possible or beneficial evolutionary paths of support that indicate changes in government 
management needs, or alternative logistic support resource strategies. However, the Map 
also uses those assessments to calculate degrees of support for Contracted Logistics 
Support (and, by inference, lack of support for OLS) that can support strategy design 
choices. 
Example Application of the Logistics Support Resource 
Strategy Map 
The use of the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map will be illustrated with an 
application to the Predator A Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. See the attached tool as applied to 
the Predator A case and the following description of the application of the procedure above.  
Phase I: Create Criterion/Requirements Sets for Assessment 
Drew et al. (2005) provide a rich description of the Predator A program as it relates 
to logistics support (Step 1 in the Process for the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map 
above). A brief summary is included in Appendix A. As described by Drew et al. (2005, p. 
74),  
The Predator system consists of three elements—the air vehicle, the Ground Control 
Station (GCS), and the ground-based mission command and control station (CS). 
The GCS, which helps land and takeoff the air vehicle, is where the mission pilot is 
housed. The ground-based mission command and control station oversees the 
mission plan and its implementation, makes command decisions when needed, 
collects and disseminates the mission data, and interacts with higher Air Force 
echelons.  
                                                
4  Hiding rows with values of zero may facilitate viewing and review.  
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For simplicity and economy, the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map was 
applied to the vehicle portion of the Predator system. Note that this choice by the authors 
implies two potentially important decisions in logistics support resource strategy design: 1) a 
disaggregation of the logistics support of the system into at least two parts, vehicle support 
and other support,5 and 2) the provision of all vehicle support with a single resource strategy 
(all organic, blended, or all contracted). These choices effectively perform Step 2 in the 
Process for the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map above. Therefore, the description 
of the Logistics Requirements for the example as being for “all,” refers only to the Predator A 
vehicle.  
 
Figure 5. Predator A 
(Drew et al., 2005) 
Predator A Vehicle Logistics Support Resource Drivers  
The Predator A program has a rich history. The portions that most strongly impacted 
the logistics support resourcing strategy for the vehicle are described here as the basis for 
illustrating the use of the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map. See Appendix A of this 
study and Drew et al. (2005) for a more detailed description and analysis. The acquisition 
history of Predator A strongly influenced its logistics support resource strategy. Predator A 
was developed to fill a specific operational need for continuous Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance ISR that was not being met. The program had strong support from 
multiple services, was in a rapid acquisition process (primarily bypassing the advanced 
development phase), and used accelerated production schedules to get units to the 
warfighters faster. The accelerated acquisition probably succeeded in delivering the product 
faster and reduced some oversight compared with traditional acquisition processes. 
However, it also imprinted the program with characteristics that impacted logistics support. 
Deployment occurred very quickly after successful testing. At that time, the developer was 
the only stakeholder knowledgeable enough about the vehicle to provide logistics support. 
No organic personnel existed with the requisite knowledge and skill sets to provide logistics 
support. In addition, the developer had paid for most of the development and, therefore, had 
                                                
5  This choice at this point in the logistic support resource strategy design does not preclude adopting 
the same resource strategy for combinations of the vehicle, GCS, and CS.  
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a large influence on the amounts and types of information gathered about the vehicle and 
owned most of the available data on vehicle performance.  
Program characteristics also impacted logistics in the Predator A case. Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) requirements and mission needs were dynamic during and after first 
deployment. The developer was generally successful in responding to these changes. But in 
doing so, the developer became the sole holder of critical product knowledge. In addition, a 
$5 million-per-vehicle cost limitation required extensive vehicle knowledge to make the 
retrofits and improvements for the increased capabilities common in high-technology, fast-
development products. These could only be performed by the developer.  
DoD organizational issues also impacted Predator A logistics support resource 
strategy design. No Air Force specialty code exists that covers most of the Predator A’s 
needs, limiting the availability of organic logistics support personnel. Training was conducted 
at Indian Springs Air Force Station in Nevada at a remote location considered unattractive 
by some military personnel. Training took two years, leaving only one year of productive 
work in a traditional three-year rotation.  
Based on the available information on the program and its logistics, and using Step 3 
above, the researchers considered 12 of the suggested possible criteria important in 
resource strategy design.  
 Quantity of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS, 
 Quality of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS, 
 OLS ability to provide required skills relative to CLS, 
 OLS availability of cross-trained personnel, 
 Availability/affordability of reliability and/or maintainability data to the DoD, 
 Minimum fleet size & replacement rate required to maintain continuous 
logistics support, 
 Vulnerability of CLS personnel to battlefield threats, 
 CLS unit cost to provide logistics support operations, 
 OLS speed of deployment relative to CLS, 
 Risk of labor disputes,  
 Product immaturity (inverse of product maturity), and 
 Classification of program and its logistics support as a core competence or 
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However, two important characteristics of the program that impacted logistics were 
not captured in the 12 criteria. The first was the impact of the $5 million-per-vehicle cap on 
required knowledge for retrofits and improvements. The second was the flexibility of the 
developer (but not organic resources) to react quickly to changing CONOPs and missions. 
Therefore, (in accordance with Step 3 above) two additional criteria were added:  
 Ability of OLS vs. CLS to do upgrades within $5 million total-unit-cost cap, 
and 
 Ability of OLS vs. CLS to react quickly to changing CONOPs and missions. 
Phase II: Assess Criterion/Requirement Set Needs in Logistics Support Resources   
The researchers assessed the importance of each of the resulting 14 criteria for 
designing the logistics support based on their understanding of the program (Step 4). For 
simplicity, we decided to use ordinal (integer) values to reflect the relative importance of 
criteria. Three criteria were considered most important and assigned the value one:  
 Quantity of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS, 
 Quality of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS, and  
 Product immaturity (inverse of product maturity). 
The first two criteria reflect the differences in the knowledge and specialized skills 
between the developer and the currently available organic logistics support work forces. 
Drew et al. (2005, p. 46) describe this difference as follows: “The contractor work force 
comprises mostly skilled mechanics with exceptional knowledge of the air vehicle. By 
contrast, the Air Force does not hire highly skilled mechanics; it ‘raises’ them,” which is 
typical of organic support resources. The third criterion reflects the dynamic nature of the 
product and its requirements. The supporting information about the assessments of these 
criteria is captured in the “Reasoning behind assessment” cell for each criterion. 
Interestingly, this criterion and the two that were added are different criteria types—with 
product immaturity describing a product characteristic and reaction times measuring labor 
resources. This difference can facilitate identifying different logistics-support and risk-
mitigation strategies.  
Three of the criteria were assessed to be important but not as important as those 
above; they are assigned a value of two, followed by supporting notes from their “Reasoning 
behind assessment” cells:  
 Ability of OLS vs. CLS to react quickly to changing CONOPs and missions—
NEW CRITERIA ADDED. 
 OLS’ ability to provide required skills relative to CLS—No trained OLS staff. 
 Program and its logistics support are classified as a core competency or 
mission of the DoD—Fills critical ISR need. Expanded to strike capability. 
Strong command support for the program. 
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 182 - 
=
=
Two of the criteria were assessed to be next in importance and assigned a value of 
three, followed by supporting notes from their “Reasoning behind assessment” cells:  
 Ability of OLS vs. CLS to do upgrades within $5 million total-unit-cost cap—
Cap hinders retrofits (even to improve capabilities). Requires intimate vehicle 
knowledge to constrain retrofit cost.  
 Availability/affordability of reliability and/or maintainability data to the DoD—
Developer paid for most of development. Not developed/available. 
Similarly, the remaining criteria were assessed the following importance values, 
followed by supporting notes:  
 Minimum fleet size & replacement rate required to maintain continuous 
logistics support—4. Current fleet of 100 supports CLS. Fleet expected to 
grow 12+ vehicles/yr. 
 Vulnerability of CLS personnel to battlefield threats—5. Forward sites require 
logistics support for takeoff, etc. 
 OLS speed of deployment relative to CLS—5. None. 
 CLS unit cost to provide logistics support operations—6. Slight advantage to 
CLS, see Drew et al. study (2005)).  
 Risk of labor disputes—7. No indication of a risk but could become one. 
 OLS availability of cross-trained personnel—8. None. 
Each of the 14 criterion were then assessed for the ability of organic support to fulfill 
the criteria (Step 5) from “Very High” (value=0) to “Very Low” (value=10). Those 
assessments were then quantified with the selection of a degree in the spreadsheet (Step 
6). These assessments were facilitated by the deep reflection of logistics issues required to 
perform the previous five steps. The quantified assessments were:  
 Quantity of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS—10. 
 Quality of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS—10. 
 OLS ability to provide required skills relative to CLS—10.  
 Ability of OLS vs. CLS to react quickly to changing CONOPs and missions—
10.  
 OLS availability of cross-trained personnel—9.  
 Availability/affordability of reliability and/or maintainability data to the DoD—8. 
 Minimum fleet size & replacement rate required to maintain continuous 
logistics support—8. 
 Vulnerability of CLS personnel to battlefield threats—8. 
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 Ability to OLS vs. CLS to do upgrades within $5 million total-unit-cost cap—8. 
 CLS unit cost to provide logistics support operations—6.  
 OLS speed of deployment relative to CLS—5.  
 Risk of labor disputes—5. 
 Product immaturity (inverse of product maturity)—1.  
 Program and its logistics support are classified as a core competence or 
mission of the DoD—1.  
The degree of support for each criterion was assessed in isolation, as if the other 
criteria did not influence the assessment. For example, high product immaturity alone 
suggests the use of organic support based partially on the reasoning that the many changes 
require a deep understanding of and sensitivity to requirements and users, which organic 
support is more likely to be able to provide. But this assessment might shift more toward 
support of contracted support if the difference in product knowledge of organic and 
contracted support resources is incorporated into the assessment of the product immaturity.  
Phase III: Review, Discuss, and Revise Assessments from Different Perspectives  
The researchers then reviewed the assessment using the Map. To review the criteria 
assessed to be most important (Step 7), we sorted the criteria in ascending order of 
“Importance of Criteria.” Our review of these criteria indicated that the quantity and quality of 
logistics support labor available are very important in the assessment, which is consistent 
with the hard requirement for very knowledgeable and specialized vehicle support. This 
review provided an opportunity to test the fidelity of the program as described in the Map, 
improve that fidelity, and build confidence in the Map’s usefulness.  
We then reviewed the assessment based on the degree of support for the use of 
contracted logistics support (Step 8); we did this by sorting the criteria in descending order 
based on the “Degree of Support for CLS.” This review revealed that two of the three most 
important criteria and one of the criteria rated with an importance of two were assessed with 
the maximum degree of support for the use of contracted resources. This suggests that 
contracted logistics support may be the best strategy for the Predator A vehicle.  
Finally, we reviewed the description of the drivers of a contracted strategy (Step 9) 
by sorting the criteria in descending order based on the “Priority-weighed degree of Support 
for CLS.” Comparing this review with the previous one revealed that the top four criteria do 
not change; this consistency suggests that relative influence of the criteria on a design does 
not alter the suggested design based solely on support for organic or contracted resources. 
The fifth criterion, if support for CLS is the basis (Vulnerability of CLS personnel to battlefield 
threats), moves four places lower when importance is included in the assessment—
suggesting that although this criterion suggests the use of contracted resources, it should 
have significantly less influence than other criteria.  
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Tool Evaluation and Implications for Practice 
The Map and its methodology for its use have several advantages as a tool for 
facilitating logistics support resource strategy design. These include:   
 Provide framework for assessment by providing structure of criteria and 
assessment methodology; 
 Provide support for improved assessment criteria identification due to 
the extensive list of possible criteria; 
 Provide support for improved assessment quality due to increased 
specification of criteria, focusing of assessment on organic, blended, and 
contracted resources, and signaling (with differing assessments) where more 
in-depth investigation may be needed; 
 Provide flexibility for adaptation to many different types of programs and 
products; 
 Provide high ease of use due to basis in the widely used Excel® 
spreadsheet application; 
 Provide high ease of understanding by users due to its transparency (no 
hidden or locked cells or complex equations); and 
 provides documentation of both assessments and reasoning behind those 
assessments, which can be used to support logistics support resource 
strategy designs in program reviews.  
The Map and the methodology for its use also have weaknesses, including:  
 Illusion of objectivity based on its use of a computer format, although 
assessments remain based on the judgments of the program team;  
 Lack of internal checks and balances; the Map and methodology have no 
way of identifying if criteria have been overlooked, ignored, or assessed 
incorrectly.  
The use of the Map by program teams can significantly improve logistics support 
resource strategy design processes through the advantages identified above. The Map can 
also improve program reviews by providing structured and clear documentation of the 
evaluation process used to design logistics support resource strategies. This documentation 
will allow easier and faster review, improvement, and approval of DoD programs. Use of the 
Map may help program teams to better manage the major acquisition challenge of logistics 








The current research extends previous research on the costs of logistics support 
resource strategies by modeling the impacts of programs, environments, and strategies on 
resourcing with organic, blended, or contracted resources. The structure of the Logistics 
Support Resource Strategy Map and methodology for its use are designed for ease of 
understanding and adaptation by users. The Map and methodology were initially tested by 
application to the vehicle portion of the Predator A unmanned aerial vehicle system. This 
test indicated that the Map and its methodology can significantly improve logistics support 
resource strategy design and can facilitate managing program reviews by documenting a 
program team’s assessment of the relative importance of specific program, environment, 
and strategy features and characteristics as they relate to logistics support resource strategy 
design and by focusing team assessments on resource design. However, the test also 
revealed that the successful use of the Map and its methodology is dependent on the deep 
reflection and evaluation of program team members. Additional validation and verification of 
the Map is needed to increase the confidence for its use in practice. This can be done by 
applying the Map to other DoD programs and by improving the Map and its methodology 
based on those tests.  
As discussed above, the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map is founded on the 
assessments of the program team. Poor or inadequately supported observations and 
assessments will generate poor results (i.e., garbage in—garbage out). Sensitivity tests by 
subject-matter experts can be used to improve user understanding of the impacts of 
different importance and assessment values on results. The results of such analyses can 
improve the Map’s usefulness.  
The Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map may improve DoD acquisition by 
improving logistics support resource design. In combination with other acquisition tools and 
methods, the Map can significantly improve program performance and reduce costs. The 
continued development and use of this and other tools for managing the acquisition process 
will provide better materiel to warfighters faster for less cost.  
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Chair: Mr. William M. Johnson is an independent consultant and sole proprietor of WMJ 
Associates LLC advising government and industry on management and leadership matters 
involving the acquisition of complex systems.  He is recently retired from 37 years of federal 
government service.  Prior to retiring, he was Deputy for Future Combat Systems Open Architecture 
in the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems. Throughout his career, he has 
developed and successfully pioneered innovative methods for providing the U.S. Navy’s fleet with 
the best possible products in a timely and affordable manner.  He has been widely acclaimed as a 
key leader in business process transformation and is a recipient of the Navy Distinguished Civilian 
Award, its highest civilian honor. 
Mr. Johnson graduated from Cornell University where he received the Bachelor of Science in 
Electrical Engineering in 1970 and the Master of Engineering (Electrical) in 1975.  In addition, he is 
a graduate of the Program Managers Course at the Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA in 1989 and the Senior Officials in National Security Program at Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA in 1994.  He has maintained ties with academia and has been the subject of case 
studies at both Harvard and the Naval Postgraduate School.  
After completion of undergraduate school, Mr. Johnson embarked on his career at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology Experiment Station, Atlanta, GA where he designed electronic circuitry used 
in testing of surface ship radar systems.  Mr. Johnson subsequently volunteered for active duty in 
the U.S. Navy where he served three years as an officer in undersea surveillance.   As a junior 
officer, he led efforts related to training and operational readiness that were twice recognized by the 
Commander Ocean Systems Pacific as the best under his command.  After leaving the Navy and 
completing graduate school, he embarked on a career in engineering and program management 
with the Department of the Navy.  Mr. Johnson is experienced in all aspects of design, 
development, fielding, support and acquisition of surface ship and submarine combat systems.  
Since 1980, Mr. Johnson has had significant responsibility for many of the Navy's submarine sonar 
and combat control systems programs.  Most recently, he led business process transformation 
efforts at the Naval Enterprise level. These efforts aimed to greatly increase the Navy’s ability to 
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take advantage of leading edge technologies and innovations.  He is most proud of the numerous 
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he was presented with the Superior Civilian Service Award by his Fleet sponsor for his pioneering of 
the highly acclaimed Acoustics Rapid COTS Insertion program which has been the model for 
technical and business process transformation within the Navy.  Based on actual expenditures, this 
program has been credited with a cost avoidance of $4B over a ten year period. 
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Commanding Officer of USS Mount Hood (AE 29) during Operation Desert Storm.  Major shore 
assignments included Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Readiness, Combat Logistics Group 
1, Head Integrated Logistics Support Policy and Assessment Branch, Staff of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, and Executive Director for Fleet Logistics Support of the Naval Sea Systems 
Command. He is an alumnus of the Naval Postgraduate School, graduating in 1983 from the 
Weapons System Engineering curriculum with a Master of Science degree in Mechanical 
Engineering. His is also a graduate of the Program Manager's Course of the Defense Systems 
Management College. Captain Wessman was designated an Acquisition Professional in 1992 and 
was awarded subspecialties in Weapons System Engineering, Naval Engineering, and Operational 
Logistics. His personal awards include the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious 
Service Medal (3 awards) and the Navy Achievement Medal. 
Following his transfer to the retired list in 1995, Captain Wessman worked for several small and 
large companies, applying his skills on behalf of customers in both the defense and commercial 
sector. He founded Wessman Consultancy Group, Inc. in 2003 and has provided logistics, program 
management and acquisition consulting services to a variety of customers, including the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense and the US Navy. He currently is a member of the Industry Expert Team 
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Abstract1 
This paper focuses on ways to reduce testing effort and costs associated with 
technology-advancement upgrades to systems with open architectures. This situation is 
common in Navy and DoD contexts such as submarine, aircraft carrier, and airframe 
systems, and accounts for a substantial fraction of the testing effort. This paper describes 
methods for determining when testing of unmodified components can be reduced or 
avoided, and it outlines some methods for choosing test cases efficiently to focus retesting 
where it is needed, given information about past testing of the same component. Changes to 
the environment of a system can affect its reliability, even if the behavior of the system 
remains unchanged. The new capabilities added by a technology upgrade can interact with 
previously existing capabilities, changing the frequency of their usage as well as the range 
of input values and, hence, changing their effect on overall system reliability. 
Keywords: open architecture, reducing regression testing, automated testing, 
statistical testing, dependency analysis, reuse, technology upgrades. 
                                                
1 This research was supported in part by ARO under project P-45614-CI and, in part, by NAVSEA 
under project number 09WX11455. 
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Current US Navy combat and weapon system test procedures require an integration 
test event with every change to the software or system configuration to certify that the 
software-intensive system-of-systems is stable and functional. As more systems are moving 
to a modular open architecture, software configurations are changing with increased 
frequency, requiring more testing, which is expensive and time-consuming.   
The Navy’s open architecture framework is intended to promote reuse and reduce 
costs. Ongoing research at the Naval Postgraduate School is developing improvements to 
the test and evaluation procedures that can contribute to these goals. Test and evaluation 
accounts for a large part of system-development cost, but the impact of open architecture 
ideas on this part of the process has been relatively modest so far. The purpose of this effort 
is to provide sound engineering approaches to better realize the potential benefits of Navy 
open architectures and to provide concrete means that support economical acquisition and 
effective sustainment of such systems. 
The specific goals of this research are to enable: (1) identification of specific testing 
and checking procedures that do not need to be repeated after given changes to a system, 
(2) limiting the scope and reducing the cost of retesting when the latter is necessary, and (3) 
a single analysis to provide assurance that all possible configurations that can be generated 
in a model-driven architecture will satisfy given dependability requirements. This paper 
reports some results that address the first two of the goals listed above. A roadmap and 
technical approach for reaching the third goal are outlined in Berzins, Rodriquez, and 
Wessman (2007). 
Technology upgrades are typically performed on a two-year cycle. They often involve 
migration to the best hardware and operating system version available at the time, where 
“best” implies a balanced trade-off between high performance and reliable operation. 
Typically, only a small fraction of the application code has been changed. However, current 
certification practices require all of the code to be retested prior to deployment, whether it 
has been modified or not. Retesting of an unchanged module can be avoided only if we can 
establish that it has not been adversely impacted by the change. Preliminary results on how 
to do that have been reported by Berzins (2008). In this paper, we further explore ways to 
determine whether it is safe not to retest an unchanged component under the assumption 
that the load characteristics of the component have not changed. We also address the 
problem of how to most effectively focus retesting for unchanged components in cases 
where the requirements and behavior of the component have not changed but the load 
characteristics have changed. 
The latter situation has great importance for assuring reliability of reusable 
components. Many past cases of well-publicized software failures involved reuse of software 
components in new environments that had different characteristics than the contexts for 
which the components were originally designed. These components failed in their new 
environments despite the fact that they were well-tested and found to be reliable in the field 
under previous deployment conditions. Examples include the Patriot missile failure 
(Marshall, 1992) and the failure of the European Ariane 5 rocket (Jézéquel & Meyer, 1997, 
January). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes methods for 
deciding when re-testing of unchanged components can be safely reduced or eliminated 
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entirely; Section 3 presents methods for efficiently retesting reusable components for use in 
deployment environments with workloads that are different from previous deployments; 
Section 4 identifies some relevant previous work; and Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
Deciding When Retesting Can Be Avoided 
Our previous work identified two types of analysis that could enable safe avoidance 
of retesting unchanged components under certain conditions: program slicing and 
invariance testing (Berzins, 2008). These techniques are applicable in cases in which the 
requirements, code, expected workload and available resources of the component are 
unchanged. This section briefly reviews the approach and then examines in more detail 
what additional analysis needs to be done to safely reuse such components in the next 
release without retesting them. 
Program slicing is a kind of dependency analysis that is based on the source code. 
Slicing algorithms are efficient enough to be used on practical, large-scale programs. If two 
different versions of a program have the same slice with respect to a service it provides, 
then that service has the same functional behavior in both versions, and retesting can be 
avoided if having the same functional behavior is sufficient to establish the reliability of the 
component (Gallagher, 1991, August).  
Invariance testing is a kind of statistical, automated testing that is applicable to 
components whose code has changed but whose specifications and requirements remain 
the same. The purpose of an invariance test is to confirm that the changes to the code have 
not changed the behavior of the services it provides. In this kind of a situation, it is easy to 
implement a test oracle procedure (explained below) that enables affordable checking of 
large numbers of automatically executed test cases. Invariance testing can increase the 
number of components that can be certified not to need retesting when combined with 
program slicing (Berzins, 2008). Invariance testing can also be used to educe the cost of 
retesting modules that need to be retested, even though their requirements remain 
unchanged. This includes unchanged components that depend on other modified 
components, which are identified by program slicing methods, as well as unchanged 
components whose expected workload has changed (see section 3). 
We can omit retesting of a service if slicing and invariance testing confirm that its 
behavior is unchanged in the new release and that the following additional conditions are 
met: 
1. The same functional behavior is appropriate in the new release, which occurs only if 
the requirements of the component are unchanged. 
2. The same functional behavior is sufficient to meet the requirements only if the 
requirements do not contain timing constraints. If this is not the case, the timing 
constraints need to be retested because changes to hardware, systems software, 
and other components in the system can all affect timing. This can be done by using 
a kind of invariance testing that measures timing and by the methods described by 
Qiao, Wang, Luqi, and Berzins (2006, March). 
3. Constraints due to shared resources need to be rechecked, which can usually be 
done via system-level stress testing. Such constraints include: 
a. Sufficient main memory and disk space 
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b. Sufficient I/O resources such as number of files that need to be open at the same 
time, printers, sensors, actuators, or other peripherals. 
c. Sufficient network bandwidth to support worst-case communications load. 
d. Effective access to showed databases and web services, including both timing 
and freedom from deadlocks. 
4. The slicing analysis is only valid under the assumption that the machine code that is 
actually running corresponds to the source code that was subjected to slicing 
analysis. 
5. The analysis depends on the assumption that the computer correctly translates the 
source code into machine language. 
The fourth assumption is frequently made without explicit acknowledgement in 
theoretical studies, but it cannot be adopted without verification in serious risk analysis 
because of the following plausible failure modes: 
1. Memory-corrupting bugs—these include out-of-bounds write operations on arrays 
and through invalid pointers. Such bugs can cause seemingly innocuous statements 
to overwrite parts of the program itself at runtime, with unpredictable and potentially 
catastrophic results. 
2. Deliberate cyber-attacks—compromise of system security via network or 
unauthorized insider access to systems can deliberately modify machine code at run-
time. 
Memory-corrupting bugs are faults in the code that should be detected by test and 
evaluation processes, and some types can be prevented. One class of memory-corrupting 
bugs is caused by premature deallocation of dynamically created objects. Garbage-
collection algorithms are supposed to prevent this class of problems so that garbage-
collected languages such as Java and Lisp should be immune to this type of problem. 
Software written in languages without garbage collection, such as C, C++ and Ada, needs 
special quality-assurance methods to look for premature deallocation. There exist a variety 
of tools that can be used for this task, including Valgrind (2009, April) (see the system 
commands Memcheck and Ptrcheck) and Insure ++ (2009, April).  
We note that in the absence of perfect computer security, which is not likely to be 
attainable in the near future, no amount of test and evaluation can detect or prevent failures 
of the second kind because they are not present in the system while it is being tested; they 
only appear later—after attacks at run-time. We, therefore, recommend adding a design 
modification that checks at run-time whether component code is still the same as it was in 
the test load for all mission-critical systems that do not already have such a capability. 
This can be done by packaging the machine code in blocks with secure digital 
signatures and adding a process that periodically checks the signatures while the system is 
running. To make this secure, the digital signatures have to be cryptographic checksums 
with strong encryption so that attackers cannot modify a code module and then forge a 
signature without knowledge of the secret key. The periodic checking process systematically 
scans the code modules and checks their digital signatures. If it discovers a modified 
module, it can repair that module and also report the problem to appropriate authorities. 
Repair can be accomplished by reloading the module from an uncorruptable source such as 
read-only memory or CD. Failure due to possible physical damage to media can be 
mitigated by redundant copies. The repair process checks the digital signature of the new 
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copy to verify its integrity and goes to alternative backup copies if there are any 
discrepancies. We note that this mechanism can be used to compensate for faults due to 
memory corruption regardless of whether they were caused by attacks or by faults in the 
code. The state of corrupted modules will usually have to be restored to the most recent, 
valid date after the corrupted code is repaired. Component designs may have to be 
augmented to provide this service. There is extensive literature on how to perform rollbacks, 
particularly in the context of database transitions. A discussion of this problem for object-
oriented components can be found in Vandewoude and Berbers (2005). 
The mechanism proposed above is similar to a scheme used by a telephone 
company to keep its software operational, despite the presence of memory-corrupting bugs, 
which were known to exist but whose source could not be located. This technology has 
been proven effective in practice and has been used for decades. 
The mechanism can also repair faults due to corruption of data if the scanning 
process understands the data structures and has code to check the invariant constraints 
associated with them. This can be incorporated into the architecture via a standard interface 
that every data type must implement for a service that checks all associated data constraints 
and repairs them if needed. 
Technology upgrades typically move to new hardware, which implies the use of new 
compilers and new versions of the operating system. Presumably, these underlying services 
are reliable, but, if we are to retest only a subset of the components in the new release, 
these assumptions need to be verified. This can be done using invariance testing, as 
explained by Berzins (2008). The correct operation of the new version of the compiler can 
be checked by combining invariance testing with the approach to testing translators 
described in Berzins, Auguston, and Luqi (2001, December). 
Retesting Unchanged Components under New Load Conditions 
The previous section discusses situations in which the following conditions hold: 
1. The code of the component is unchanged. 
2. The requirements and specifications of the component are unchanged.  
3. The expected workload of the component is unchanged. 
This section examines what should be done if the first two conditions are met, but the 
third one is not: the code and requirements of a component are unchanged, but the 
expected workload is different. This situation is expected when a component is reused in a 
different context. Such situations will be common when one of the stated objectives of open 
architectures is achieved: extensive reuse of common components across platforms. 
In these cases, some retesting is necessary. We would like to do this efficiently by 
reusing previous test results and focusing additional testing effort on the system behavior 
that will be exercised more in the new workload than it was in the previous ones. We, 
therefore, seek a systematic method to generate new test cases that characterize situations 
expected in the new deployment context that were not expected in the previous deployment 
contexts. This informal idea can be made precise in the context of automated statistical 
testing (Berzins, 2008). 
Automated statistical testing is characterized by the following properties: 
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1. Test cases are automatically generated by random sampling from an operational 
profile. An operational profile is a probability distribution that represents the relative 
frequency of different input values to the system under test in its expected execution 
environment. 
2. Pass/fail decisions for individual test cases are automated and done by a single test 
oracle procedure that applies to all possible inputs to the service or system under 
test. 
3. If the generated set of test cases runs without detecting any failures, a simple 
formula gives a lower bound on the mean number of executions with a 
corresponding statistical confidence level. 
The significance of the first two conditions is economic: after the fixed initial cost of 
implementing the operational profile and the test oracle, the marginal cost of running an 
additional test case is very small. This is because there is no additional human effort 
associated with additional test cases; only additional computer resources are needed to run 
more test cases, and computer time costs much less than human effort. 
The consequence is that very large numbers of test cases can be run economically, 
making it affordable to collect sample sets large enough to provide high statistical 
confidence levels in the results. Methods for determining the sample size needed to support 
conclusions of the form “the mean number of executions between failures is at least N with 
confidence (1- (1/N)” can be found in Berzins (2008). The significance of this is that it can 
enable practical testing to specified risk-tolerance levels, rather than testing until budget 
runs out. The latter does not provide high confidence in system reliability, although it occurs 
commonly in current practices. 
Figure 1 shows an example of the situation described above. The distribution g1 
represents the operational profile for the initial deployment of a hypothetical reusable 
component and g2 represents the operational profile characterizing a new environment in 
which the component is to be reused. Note that a wider range of input values is expected in 
the new environment. In this example, g1 and g2 are normal distributions; g1 has a standard 
deviation of 1.0, and g2 has a standard deviation of 2.0. 
 =




Figure 1. Operational Profiles for Two Different Deployment Environments 
 
Figure 2. The Derived Testing Profile 
Figure 2 shows the profile difference for incremental testing that is derived from the 
distributions in Figure 1 and the resulting testing profile under the assumption that the 
number of test cases needed to reach the reliability goals associated with both the previous 
and the new execution environment are the same. 
The profile difference is zero in the region where g1 > g2, and it is equal to the 
difference g2 – g1 everywhere else. The rationale for these choices is the following: 
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The region where g1 > g2 has already been adequately tested since the expected 
number of samples from this region that were checked during prior testing using the profile 
g1 exceed the expected number of samples from the same region that would be required in 
testing under the execution profile g2, characterizing the new deployment environment. 
Therefore, we can avoid this region in the second round of testing, which is accomplished by 
setting the testing profile to zero in this region.  
The remaining region needs more test cases for adequate coverage. If we consider 
an arbitrary slice of this region, we find that the area under g1 in this slice represents the 
expected number of test cases that were run in the previous round of testing governed by 
the profile g1. The area under g2 in the same slice represents the expected number of test 
cases from the slice that need to be run in the second round of testing. The total area under 
the profile difference represents the number of test cases needed for the second round of 
testing as a fraction of the number of test cases required in the first round of testing. In the 
example, this fraction is calculated to be .552. The testing profile is proportional to the profile 
difference, which must be normalized by dividing it by the probability mass under the curve 
to make all of the probabilities add up to 1. 
The more general case—in which the reliability goals in the two execution 
environments differ—has a similar rationale, but the two distributions have to be scaled to 
account for the differences in the number of test cases needed in each test. 
Let N1 be the number of test cases that were needed from profile p1 for the first 
deployment environment and N2 be the number of cases from a different profile p2, needed 
for the second environment. Then, in the general case, the profile difference is zero where 
N1*p1 > N2*p2 and is equal to (N2*p2 – p1* N1)/(N1 +N2) elsewhere.  
The testing profile is again the normalized profile difference, obtained by dividing it 
by the area under the profile difference curve.    
We are currently investigating effective methods for modeling operational profiles 
and for deriving model parameters from historical measurements of actual system loads. 
Such measurements can come from instrumenting systems to collect data during training 
exercises or actual missions. 
The inputs to the software module must be analyzed to determine dependencies 
among them. It is also necessary to look for dependencies between the interfaces and other 
external environmental factors within the context of the operational profile and testing goals. 
If dependencies exist, they should be characterized.  
Once the inputs and the relationship(s) among them are known, the next step is to 
estimate or specify the distributions that characterize the probabilistic behavior of the inputs. 
If there are dependencies, the notion of conditional distributions will be considered as a way 
to handle them. There also may be multiple possible distributions for each input, depending 
on the state of the environment. This also applies if the goals can vary from testing the 
normal range of inputs to testing extreme cases, which may be necessary for checking 
boundary conditions and checking the robustness of the component with respect to 
unplanned contingencies. 
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A histogram can be used to represent the new data resulting from the measurements 
to provide a visual check of the observations. However, it is advisable to fit a distribution 
based on a theoretical model of the expected distributions for the following reasons: 
1. Smoothing—the histogram will show irregularities due to granularity of the random 
sampling in the measurements. These are not physically significant and are most 
effectively mitigated by finding the best fit to a smooth curve that interpolates 
between the samples and smoothes out the gaps. 
2. Extrapolation—realistic probability distributions do not cut off suddenly but rather 
gradually decrease with long tails. Such tails are impossible to accurately estimate 
based solely on measured data because the number of observed samples is often 
too small to provide an accurate measurement near the extremes of the expected 
range of values. If we use the histogram as measured, it is likely that we will set the 
probability distribution to zero in places where it is actually small, but nonzero. Since 
this will result in tests that do not cover the full range of possible parameter values, 
we propose to use a theoretical model in this region and to do the extrapolation by 
matching the standard deviation of the actual measurements to the standard 
deviation of the theoretical model. This will smoothly extrapolate the tails out to or 
beyond the real limits of the input value range. Details about how to choose an 
appropriate theoretical model for this purpose are still under investigation. 
We are also planning to investigate the effectiveness of Bayesian methods for 
estimating the distributions based on the actual data. This approach will also need a 
theoretical model of the probability distribution function, which will be used as the prior 
distribution. 
 
Figure 3. A Stress-testing Profile, s(x), Compared to an Operational Profile, g(x) 
The methods outlined above should provide a systematic way to deal with the 
“known unknowns.” However, military environments are characterized by uncertainty and 
surprises. To hedge against the possibility of “unknown unknowns,” we recommend running 
additional tests on components to be reused in new environments with a “stress-testing 
profile” that purposely exaggerates the range of expected input values. This kind of stress 
testing is difficult to put on a scientific basis because we are trying to hedge against 
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possibilities that we have no basis for predicting. The following heuristics are proposed as 
strategies to try: 
1. Use a uniform distribution that extends from three to one hundred standard 
deviations in all directions from the measured mean of the distribution. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The curve g shown in blue represents the normal profile, which 
is the same as the curve g1 shown in Figure 1, and the curve s represents the 
stress-testing profile. The curve s has been scaled up by a factor of 10 to make it 
easier to see in the figure. 
2. Use a uniform distribution that covers the entire valid range of input values. This will 
include completely unexpected input values. 
Recalling that these strategies are intended to be used in the context of completely 
automated statistical testing, in which the marginal cost of running and analyzing additional 
test cases is very low, we recommend a mixed strategy that runs tests from all three of the 
proposed testing profiles, each with a number of samples derived from the risk-tolerance 
parameter k, specified by system stakeholders and the measured execution frequency 
parameters es according to the relation Ts = (kes)log2(kes), as explained in Berzins (2008). 
Ts represents the number of the test cases that are needed for testing services to the 
statistical confidence level implied by the specified risk-tolerance parameter. 
Relevant Previous Work 
Methods for detecting memory corrupting bugs via static and dynamic program 
analysis have been studied (Alzamil, 2006; 2008, November). Program slicing (Weiser, 
1984, July) has been used in a wide variety of applications, including testing (Binkley, 1998; 
Gupta, Harrold & Soffa, 1992; Harman & Danicic, 1995; Hierons, Harman & Danicic, 1999; 
Hierons, Harman, Fox, Ouarbya & Daoudi, 2002), debugging (Agrawal, DeMillo & Spafford, 
1993; Lyle & Weiser, 1987), program understanding (De Lucia, Fasolino & Munro, 1996; 
Harman, Hierons, Danicic, Howroyd & Fox, 2001), reverse engineering (Canfora, Cimitile & 
Munro, 1994), software maintenance (Gallagher, 1991, August; Cimitile, De Lucia & Munro, 
1996; 1994), change merging (Horwitz, Prins & Reps, 1989; Berzins & Dampier, 1996), and 
software metrics (Lakhotia, 1993; Bieman & Ott, 1994). More detailed surveys of previous 
work on slicing can be found in Binkley and Harmon (2004).  
The problem of state transfers for modules upgraded at run-time is addressed by 
Vandewoude and Berbers (2005). A method for assessing the impact of timing constraints 
on proposed system upgrades is described in Qiao, Wang, Luqi, and Berzins (2006, March). 
Conclusion 
Program slicing and invariance testing are methods that can be used to identify 
cases in which it is safe not to retest an unchanged component. These methods need to be 
augmented with other means for establishing the absence of other possible failure modes 
such as the possibility of memory-corrupting bugs and timing faults. This paper identifies 
ways to solve these issues. 
When components are reused in environments with substantially different load 
characteristics than previous deployment environments, it is important to test the 
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components under the new modes of operation. This paper presents systematic and 
efficient ways to accomplish that. 
Further work is needed to explore ways to address other possible failure models, 
including possible interference due to shared system resources, and to address the longer-
term goal of eventually eliminating the need for repeating integration testing after every 
system change. Specifically, more work is needed on methods for certifying the reliability of 
architectures independently from the components that they contain and for certifying the 
conformance of an implementation to a given architecture in order to attain the long-term 
goals outlined in the introduction. 
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Abstract 
Testing of complex systems is a fundamentally difficult task, whether locating faults 
(diagnostic testing) or implementing upgrades (regression testing). Branch paths through the 
system increase as a function of the number of components and interconnections, leading to 
exponential growth in the number of test cases for exhaustive examination. In practice, the 
typical cost for testing in schedule or in budget means that only a small fraction of these 
paths are investigated. Given some fixed cost, then, which tests should we execute to 
guarantee the greatest information returned for the effort?  In this work, we develop an 
approach to system testing using an abstract model flexible enough to be applied to both 
diagnostic and regression testing, grounded in a mathematical model suitable for rigorous 
analysis and Monte Carlo simulation.  Early results indicate that in many cases of interest, a 
good, though not optimal, solution to the fixed-constraint problem (how many tests for 
budget x?) can be approached as a simple best-next strategy (which test returns the highest 
information per unit cost?). The goal of this modeling work is to construct a decision-support 
tool for the Navy Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) offering 
quantitative information about cost versus diagnostic certainty in system testing.  
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1. Introduction 
Many of us commute to work every day in what has become a relatively complex 
system: an automobile. When this system fails us, we are forced to allocate resources (i.e., 
time and money) to diagnostic testing and repair of one or more components within the 
system. The budget for this testing and repair is generally constrained by our prudence and 
our pocketbooks; we hope that the service technician employs a testing strategy that 
develops the best answer (e.g., replace the alternator) for the least cost.  
There are several possible stopping criteria for this testing. In particular, a logical 
choice would be to stop testing when the cost of replacement of all suspect parts is less 
than the cost of conducting one more test. This presupposes, however, that our system 
under test is in a failed state. Suppose we replace a known defective part or perform 
upgrade maintenance on a component: how much testing must we accomplish to convince 
ourselves that the system will operate correctly under all conditions?   
In this paper we present a language of description and a mathematical model to 
describe a system under testing, with the goal of evaluating strategies in terms of the 
information returned by a set of tests. In this framework, then, testing is the mechanism by 
which we trade some fixed cost (e.g., time, money) for information about the state of 
subcomponents in our system. In general, we seek the maximum information available for 
the minimum cost. In the present study, we consider the following question: Given a fixed 
budget, what is the maximum information discoverable from a particular test suite?  
Mathematical models of component and system reliability have roots in the work of 
von Neumann (1952) and Moore and Shannon (1956a; 1956b), as well as the seminal text 
by Barlow and Proschan (1965). The focus of these early works is generally on assessing 
the overall system reliability, particularly with regard to the economics of preventative vice 
reactive maintenance (e.g., see, Bovaird, 1961). In the present work, the focus is on 
efficiently identifying either a defective-by-design or failed component in a complex system.  
This fault diagnosis is sometimes referred to as the test-sequencing problem, and 
has also been well studied (e.g., see, Sobel & Groll, 1966; Garey, 1972; Fishman, 1990; 
Barford, Kanevsky & Kamas, 2004). In general, these investigators start with a system in a 
known failed state with the goal of finding the most cost-effective sequence of diagnostics to 
locate the failed component (or components) under a given set of assumptions.  
In contrast to fault diagnosis, the general case of regression testing appears to have 
received less attention in the open literature, with more specific cases examined in the realm 
of software engineering (e.g., Leung & White, 1991; White & Leung, 1992; Weyuker, 1998; 
Tsai, 2001; Rothermel, Untch & Harrold, 2001; Mao & Lu, 2005). These studies typically 
start with a fully functioning system undergoing component modifications or upgrades, with 
the task of establishing that component modifications have not introduced new defects into 
the system. 
In the present study, we treat testing as a unified activity, with risk and cost as the 
common tension regulating the degree of testing required. From a fault-diagnosis 
perspective, we want to arrive at a replacement or maintenance decision quickly while 
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ensuring the system is restored to perfect functionality. From a regression testing 
perspective, particularly with the open architectures employed within the Integrated Warfare 
System, following an engineering change or upgrade to a component, we want to conduct 
enough testing to verify that the system remains in perfect function. The element of risk is 
that costs incurred for perfect knowledge may approach infinity, or may not be achievable 
with a given test suite. From a practical perspective, then, we accept with some level of 
confidence (e.g., 99% certainty, 95% certainty) that our diagnosis or prognosis is correct.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model 
formulation and fundamental definitions. Section 3 details the mathematical model derived 
from this framework. Section 4 outlines numerical experiments examining testing strategies 
in terms of this model and presents simulation results. Section 5 discusses conclusions and 
avenues for future work. 
2. Definitions and Model Formulation 
The growing use of commercial off-the-shelf technologies in current weapons 
systems (Caruso, 1995; Dalcher, 2000), coupled with the complexity of end-to-end systems 
(Athans, 1987; Brazet, 1993), suggests that we may never have enough information to fully 
specify our system as a white box, with all software, hardware and communication interfaces 
perfectly characterized. Thus, we construct our model with broad parameters that can be 
constrained as narrowly as available information permits.  
We characterize the model system S as a collection of modules and a suite of tests 
used to interrogate these modules. We examine the system through this test suite to identify 
defective modules or to determine that no defective modules exist. We assume that tests 
return ambiguous information about the state of modules within the system; that is, no single 
test is likely to return perfect knowledge about a particular module.  
Thus, in general, we expect that some sequence of tests must be applied to arrive at 
a correct diagnosis, where the term correct may require careful definition in terms of 
acceptable risk or required level of confidence. Stochastic simulation of the model system 
provides a framework in which different testing strategies may be applied and measured for 
further insight. Using this Monte Carlo approach, we may also test the bounds of our initial 
assumptions with additional simulation.  
2.1 System and module objects 
Within the system S, each module Mi represents the smallest diagnostic or 
replaceable unit, which does not necessarily correspond to a single physical component in 
the modeled system. We consider, for example, a motherboard comprised of a central 
processing unit (CPU), physical random access memory (RAM), a graphics adapter, and 
keyboard interface, each of which may cause the motherboard to fail. This might be 
modeled as a single module labeled Motherboard if the standard corrective maintenance 
action is to replace the motherboard. With more granular diagnostics and maintenance 
practices, however, we might model these components as MB_CPU, MB_RAM, 
MB_Graphics, and MB_Keyboard because each was testable and replaceable. 
Fundamental to this aspect of the model is a source of failure rate data for the 
system components. These failure rates become the a priori data in the larger probability 
model and do not necessarily need to be precise to add value to the iterative simulation 
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results. The relative rates among the modeled components (e.g., the Server module fails 
about five times as often as the Router module) should be close to the observed data in the 
physical system to provide the most realistic convergence in testing to a correct diagnosis. 
2.2 Test objects 
Tests are modeled as system of objects which, when executed, provide an 
ambiguous assessment of one or more modules within S. This ambiguity stems from two 
essential elements that map the tractable model to physical reality.  
The first ambiguous aspect is that any given test likely exercises only a portion of the 
functionality within a module. Each Mi is modeled as a unit circle Ai (Figure 1). Defects, when 
present, are assumed uniformly distributed on this circle. We assume that while multiple 
modules may be defective, only one defect exists per module. A defect in Mi is modeled as a 
random point on Ai or equivalently a random point on the interval [0, 1]. Although the module 
is the unit of replacement, we parameterize the sub-module details by treating them as a 
continuous space covered, in part, by a given test.  
 
Figure 3. The Simple Coverage of Test Tx on Module Mi,  
Indicated by the Gray Arc Aix. 
(The scalar measure of this coverage λ(Aix) = αix represents  
the fraction of Mi exercised by Tx.) 
 
We model the coverage of test Tx on module Mi as the arc Aix (Figure 1). When Tx is 
executed, or applied to the model system, the arc Aix on Mi is inspected for a defect. Given 
the assumption that defects appear uniformly on this unit circle, the probability that a defect 
in Mi will be detected by Tx is the measure of this arc λ(Aix) = αix. The scalar probability of 
detection by a test is precisely this user-specified functionality exercised by the test. This 
element of our language of description permits some ambiguity in characterizing the 
physical system without loss of rigor in modeling these tests and modules. In practice, given 
a sufficient number of real-world cases from the physical system, this estimate for Aix could 
be refined through analysis of simulation results. 
The second ambiguous aspect is that any given test likely covers multiple modules, 
such that any test result must be interpreted as applying to all modules covered by that test 
(Figure 2). For example, a positive result (FAIL) from a diagnostic test that covers the 
modules Carburetor, Distributor Cap, and Spark Plug Wiring indicates that at least one of 
these modules contains a defect (has failed), though additional testing would be required to 
identify which module is the culprit. Because we expect that a given test exercises multiple 
modules in the system, we speak more generally of the coverage of Tx on S (Figure 2). 
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Within the model, an executed test assumes one of two values: PASS or FAIL. A 
PASS result for a given test Tx indicates that no region covered by this test contains a 
defect. A FAIL result indicates that at least one of the modules covered by Tx contains a 
defect or is BAD in the model definition. While a FAIL result should reduce the set of 
modules that may need to be replaced, a perfect result—replacing only failed modules—will 
typically require some sequence of tests. Indeed, for a particular configuration of tests and 
modules, this perfect result may not be achievable. Analysis of simulation results should 
help identify those cases in which further testing will yield no new information.  
 
 
Figure 4. Notional Depiction of the Coverage of Tx on S,  
with Multiple Modules Exercised by This Test 
(A FAIL result from Tx indicates that at least one  
of the subset {Mi, Mj, Mk} has failed.) 
 
The use of vector arcs to model the coverage relationship between tests and 
modules enables precision when specifying the coverage by multiple tests on a single 
replaceable unit (Figure 3). Although several tests in the system suite may exercise a given 
module, it is likely in the physical system that these tests overlap significantly. This language 
of description, then, permits a user specification of the physical system in broad terms (e.g., 
the Remote Control test and Obstacle Detection test both exercise about 70% of the Garage 
Door Motor module, with about 20% overlap between the two tests). Even if these data are 
estimated from the physical system, existing case data and simulation results could be used 
to provide better specification of these joint coverages. 
 =




Figure 5. Overlapping Coverage between Tests Tx and Ty  
Are Characterized with the Arcs Aix and Aiy 
(The joint coverage is computable as the intersection of these arcs.) 
 
2.3 Summary 
This conceptual model captures the essential elements of a system with respect to 
testing, suitable for both diagnostic and regression work. The physical system is specified in 
terms of modules, tests, and coverages, with model elements constructed in such a way that 
imperfect information can still be used as an initial state.  
Although the model requires that the physical system be decomposable into discrete 
units of replacement, this does not limit the usefulness of this approach. Within the system, 
we expect different levels of maintenance (e.g., depot maintenance, field-level maintenance) 
and different levels of diagnostic techniques, all of which could be treated as different layers 
within this framework. We next formalize these model elements in mathematical language to 
construct a suitable computer simulation to investigate these testing strategies. 
3. Mathematical Analysis 
Our goal in this study of system testing is to maximize certainty for a given cost.  In 
developing a probability framework to model this process, we first form simple objective 
measures to characterize knowledge of the system state. We next examine a simple, step-
wise strategy to predict a test sequence that will maximize or minimize these measures. We 
then compare this strategy to a two-test approach.  
The motivation for examining a two-test (or k-test) strategy under fixed cost is that 
this problem very much resembles the classic knapsack problem (Corman, Leiserson & 
Rivest, 2002). Choosing at each step the single test that offers the largest increase in 
information (that is, inserting the largest item into the knapsack first) does not guarantee that 
we will, for a fixed cost, achieve the greatest information gain (maximize the content of our 
knapsack). It would be computationally advantageous, though, if we could demonstrate that 
for many cases of interest, a simple best-next strategy can approach a k-step strategy in 
information return (Cover & Thomas, 1991). 
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3.1 Module definitions 
Within our system S, we define Bi and Gi as the events that module Mi is bad or is 










Each bi represents information we have about the state of module Mi, and the 
collection {bi} gives us some insight into the health of S. Prior to any testing, we expect each 
bi is initialized based on an a priori failure rate for Mi. 
The probability bi is an intuitive measure of information, and we see that as bi tends 
to 0 (good) or 1 (bad), our knowledge about Mi becomes more certain. A classic, quantitative 
measure of this knowledge is the information entropy (Shannon, 1948): 
  2 2log (1 ) log (1 )i i i i ib bh b b= − − − −   (3.2) 
We see that as bi tends to 0 or 1, hi is minimized (Figure 4).  By applying tests from 
our diagnostic suite, we should become more certain about the state of a module (good or 
bad) and so act to nudge bi to the edges of the interval [0, 1]. We can measure this 





log (1 ) log (1 )
n
i i i i
i
H b b b b
=
= − − − −∑   (3.3) 
Entropy is computationally attractive as a continuous and differentiable function over 
the interval of interest (Figure 4), though hi may be less intuitive when deciding which 
modules to replace. A measure similar to entropy, though not differentiable at maximum 
entropy, is: 
  max( ,1 )i i ibq b= −
 
(3.4) 
We can think of qi as a quality gauge of this replacement (or maintenance) decision 
with respect to a particular module. If, for example, a particular module has a bi = 0.70, we 
may replace it knowing that this informed guess should be correct 70% of the time. This also 
means that in 30% of these cases, we will unnecessarily replace or perform more granular 
debugging on this module. Our number of correct diagnoses across the system will increase 
as each bi is adjusted, by testing, away from bi=0.5 towards either 0 or 1 (Figure 4). 
Although this is not a rigorous result, it can be shown that minimizing system entropy is 
approximately equivalent to maximizing the number of correct diagnoses. 
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Figure 6. Module Entropy h(bi) and qi = max (bi, 1-bi),  
with Notional Module Probability bi Indicated 
(The scalar δ represents the displacement of bi from maximum entropy (bi = 0.5).  
Note that by symmetry, h(bi) = h(1 – bi), with distance 2δ between these states.) 
 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Birnbaum, Esary & Saunders, 1961; 
Butterworth, 1972; Ben-Dov, 1981), we characterize our knowledge of S as a vector of these 
module probabilities, {bi}, where each component probability bi is on the interval [0, 1]. The 
true state of S is a bit vector with each component exactly 0 (good) or 1 (bad); in practice, 
we are unlikely to achieve this “perfect” knowledge, but computation of hi or qi permits some 
insight into this true state. 
Earlier studies typically examined scenarios in which S will function only if all 
modules are working correctly (serial system), some modules are working correctly (k-of-n 
system), or if at least one module is working correctly (parallel system). In the present study, 
we make no assumptions about whether S is in a known down state and instead focus on 
characterizing the health of the system—similar to literature in optimal maintenance 
strategies (e.g., Boivard, 1961; or Barlow & Proschan, 1965). The focus in the present work 
is on the nature of the test suite available to the diagnostician or maintainer, and the most 
effective use of that suite to better characterize S. We next present the mathematical model 
for tests and testing. 
3.2 Test definitions 
Similar to our model of modules, we define Px and Fx as the events that test Tx 
passes or fails, respectively. We expect either result (pass or fail) to return ambiguous 
information because a test likely exercises or covers only some fraction of the functionality 
of a module (Figure 1), and because the test likely exercises several modules 
simultaneously (Figure 2). Thus, a passing result for Tx indicates only that no defect was 
detected, while a failing result narrows the pool of suspect modules to those exercised by Tx. 
After execution of a test, we update the prior probability bi to the new probability bi’ 
based on the test outcome: 
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Using Bayes’ rule, we can compute these probabilities as: 
These results suggest that tests can be seen as operators that transform bi into bi’. 
We note that the module probability is unchanged if test Tx has no coverage on Mi. In this 
case, the conditional probabilities P(Px|Bi) and P(Fx|Bi) degenerate to the unconditional 
probabilities P(Px) and P(Fx), and so we have bi’ = bi. 
Because the execution of test Tx necessarily incurs some cost in budget or schedule, 
we are motivated to compute a forecast value, qix, from a weighted sum of the unconditional 
probabilities on Px and Fx (Equation 3.8). Given the prior state of the system as the set of 
module probabilities {bi}, this method can then be used to assess the expected change 
across the system for a particular test Tx. 
 
Using the expected value of bi after test Tx (Equation 3.8), we can form a composite 
measure over our system of n modules with the sum Q(Tx): 
We expect that if Q(Tx) > Q(Ty), then test Tx will return more information than test Ty 
(Figure 4). This value, however, is a forecast; the actual information returned for a particular 
test execution may vary widely by scenario.  
We note also that because Q depends upon our current knowledge of the system as 
the set of probabilities {bi}, and because this set is constantly updated by testing, the choice 
of a particular test Tx may yield widely varying Q(Tx) depending upon when Tx is executed in 
the test sequence.      
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To calculate qix we need the conditional probability P(Px|Bi), which we compute by 
first considering the unconditional probability P(Px). We note that a test Tx will pass if every 
module covered is either good (Equation 3.1) or bad but undetected. A test Tx will fail to find 
a defect with probability (1 – αix), or the complement to the fractional coverage of Tx on Mi 
(Figure 1). Considering all n modules in the system, then, we have: 
Given that module Mi is bad (bi = 1), we then have: 
Similarly, we note that P(Fx) = 1 – P(Px), and we can then see that: 
We see that if Tx has no coverage on Mi (αix = 0), Equations 3.11 and 3.12 reduce to 
the unconditional probabilities on Tx. Similarly, if Tx has perfect coverage (αix = 1), Equations 
3.11 and 3.12 reduce to 0 (Tx cannot pass if Mi is bad) and 1 (Tx must fail if Mi is bad).  
Using Equation 3.10 and its complement, the conditional probabilities given that Mi is 
good are: 
A quick check of the boundaries shows that if Mi is good and there are no other 
coverages on Mi (all αjx = 0), Equation 3.13 reduces to 1 (Tx must pass), and Equation 3.14 
reduces to 0 (Tx cannot fail).  Indeed, this set of equations (3.11-3.14) addresses 
computationally the ambiguity associated with test results, coverages and modules (Figure 1 
and Figure 2). 
3.3 Test strategies 
The objective function Q(Tx) (Equation 3.9) is necessarily a one-step method if we 
choose that Tx which maximizes Q. If we have only the budget or schedule to execute one 
more test, maximizing Equation 3.9 will yield the optimal result. In practice, though, we 
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classic knapsack problem (Corman, Leiserson & Rivest, 2002), we are not guaranteed that 
this simple, one-step strategy will generally yield the largest information gain for a given 
cost. 
As a simple example of this knapsack problem, consider three tests {T1, T2, T3} with 
a forecast information return of {Q(T1) = 3, Q(T2) = 4, Q(T3) = 6} for associated cost {3, 4, 5}; 
the units of information and cost are not important to our point and can be thought of as unit 
cost per bit. Given a fixed cost constraint of 7, the single best-next test choice is T3, with a 
cost-per-bit 5/6 and a net return of 5. The choice of T3, though, means that we cannot 
execute another test within the cost constraint of 7. This strategy, then, is clearly not optimal 
for the fixed constraint because the choice of T1 and T2, each individually more expensive 
than T3, yields a net information return of 7. 
To guarantee an optimal solution, then, we are obligated to compute 2k possible 
outcomes for a suite of k tests for all n modules in S. To mitigate this computational burden, 
we examine the real differences between an optimal solution and a good solution for our 
scenarios of interest. 
For additional insight, we consider a two-step strategy and its associated objective 
function with four components (Equation 3.15), computed over all modules (Equation 3.16): 
 
We note that in these pair-wise calculations (or in k-wise calculations), we must 
consider the possible intersection of coverages between Tx and Ty (Figure 3). That is, we 
expect two tests with significant overlap in module coverage should not yield a higher qixy 
than two paired tests with similar fractional coverages but no overlap or intersection 
between the two tests. Although the analytic work for these conditional probabilities follows 
Equation 3.11—3.14, we next turn to simulation to exercise this strategy for comparison to 
the single-step, best-next strategy.  
3.4 Summary 
We have presented the mathematical details supporting the abstract model 
presented in Section 2. We characterize our knowledge of the system health as a collection 
of probabilities {bi}, where bi indicates the probability that component Mi is bad (bi=1) or good 
(bi=0). Using a sequential Bayes’ approach, prior probabilities in {bi} are updated following 
test execution. As more tests are applied, each Tx should act to minimize entropy H 
(Equation 3.3) or increase our certainty about the state of each module as either good or 
bad. 
P( )P( ) P( | P( )
max maxP( | )P( P( | P( )
P( )P( ) P( | P( )




P( | P) ( )
)
)
x y i i x y i i
ixy
x y i i x y i i
x y i i x y i i
x y i i x y i i
P P B B F B B
P P G G F G G









⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
= +











==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 212 - 
=
=
The paper focuses on strategies to choose a test, or sequence of tests, to guarantee 
the best (or at least a very good) return on the budget or schedule allocated to testing. In the 
present work, our constraint is a given, fixed cost and our goal is to find the greatest 
information gain possible in the test suite within this cost. Although an optimal solution may 
often be computationally untenable, we next examine simulation results to better estimate 
the distance between “optimal” and “good.” 
4. Modeling Approach and Simulation Results 
In support of this research, a desktop simulation was developed to implement the 
analysis presented in Section 3 and to further examine the choices among test strategies. In 
addition to the best-next and two-step strategies, a random-strategy case was coded to 
select a test sequence randomly, and a pathological worst-case strategy was created to 
minimize rather than maximize the information return per test. The random and worst-case 
configurations were developed to provide some contrast to the “best” strategies. 
4.1 Model description 
The simulation code implements object models of Tests and Modules, collected 
under a System object. Configuration parameters are set in an XML text file (Figure 5). Each 
XML file represents a simulation, which is comprised of one or more configurations or 
simulation cases. Each configuration or case is then executed for some number of trials.  
Within each configuration, the number of modules and tests are explicitly set, while 
the module a priori failure rates and test-module coverages are established randomly within 
minimum and maximum parameters (Figure 5). These random coverages are reconfigurable 
between trials to permit a Monte Carlo investigation of the initial data. While these 
randomized scenarios provide some insight into systems testing, sufficient flexibility exists in 
the computer code and the XML configuration parameters to encompass more realistic 
systems. 
Because of the iterative nature of the model, the algorithm should be relatively 
insensitive to the initial conditions in the model with respect to module a priori failure rates. 
That is, the state vector {bi} is constantly adjusted through the application of tests, and we 









<!-- ========================= --> 
<!-- SAMPLE CONFIGURATION FILE --> 
<!-- ========================= --> 
<configuration> 
<!-- ==================== --> 
<!-- EXECUTION PARAMETERS --> 










<!-- ================= --> 
<!-- MODULE PARAMETERS --> 
<!-- ================= --> 
<NumberOfModules>10</NumberOfModules> 
<FailureRate> 
  <Minimum>0.5</Minimum> 
  <Maximum>0.5</Maximum> 
</FailureRate> 
<CostPerModule> 
  <Minimum>1.0</Minimum> 





  <Minimum>1</Minimum> 
  <Maximum>5</Maximum> 
</TestsPerModule> 
 
<!-- =============== --> 
<!-- TEST PARAMETERS --> 
<!-- =============== --> 
<NumberOfTests>35</NumberOfTests> 
<CostPerTest> 
  <Minimum>1.00</Minimum> 




  <Minimum>1</Minimum> 
  <Maximum>3</Maximum> 
</ModulesPerTest> 
<CoveragePerModule> 
  <Minimum>0.20</Minimum> 
  <Maximum>1.00</Maximum> 
</CoveragePerModule> 
</configuration> 
<!-- ==================== --> 
<!-- END OF CONFIGURATION --> 
<!-- ==================== --> 
</simulation> 
 
Figure 7. Sample Configuration XML File 
 
4.2 Model processing 
Prior to the start of a configuration run (set of trials), a failure deck is created based 
on the relative failure rates of modules within the system. Similar to a deck of playing cards, 
modules appear in the failure deck based on their standing relative to the minimum failure 
rate in the system; thus, if the minimum failure rate across the system is 0.2, a module with 
a failure rate of 0.6 will appear three times within the failure deck. The same deck is 
employed across all trials in a configuration run to simulate the relative appearance of 
failures in a physical system. No a prior assumption was made in the mathematical analysis 
(Section 3) about the number of, and the simulation code reflects this versatility.  
Prior to the start of a trial, a test deck with one entry for each test is created (copied) 
from the system configuration. Strategies (best-next, best-next-two, random, and worst) 
consume this list as the “next” choice is executed; thus, as a test is executed it is removed 
from the deck, insuring that no test will be executed more than once per trial. This also 
reduces the search space for the next test. A new test deck must be generated with each 
trial.  
A single trial is processed in the following manner: 
1. All module bi are initialized from failure rate data. 
 =




2. All module coverages are established; these are either duplicated from the 
previous trial or randomized subject to the same configuration parameters. 
 
3. Some p number of modules (where 0 ≤ p ≤ n) are selected from the failure 
deck and a defect is planted in each module. It is possible (and interesting) to 
run the simulation with no defects planted. 
 
4. A test is chosen based on a simple strategy (e.g., best, random, or worst) 
 
5. This test is applied to the system object 
 
6. All affected bi are updated based on the outcome of (5) 
 
7. If there is still a test in the test deck, return to (4) 
Although we are interested in improving test strategies under fixed-cost constraint, in 
these trials we simply execute until the set of tests is exhausted. The motivation for this 
approach is that by allowing the simulation to process all tests available, we also gain insight 
into the effectiveness of the given test suite; this line of investigation will be pursued in future 
studies.  
4.3 Simulation results 
Using a 2 GHz Intel processor, a simulation of 300 trials using the best-next, best-
next-two, random and worst strategies required about 17 minutes (for all four) using a 
randomized configuration of 40 modules and 100 tests, with one defect planted. The zero-
defect simulations required about the same execution. In all of these cases, the initial 
probability distribution was to set each module to bi=0.5 (maximum entropy). 
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Figure 8. Comparison of Mean qi among Simulations of a 40-module,  
100-test System with One Defect Planted 
(using the one-step (best-next), two-step (best-next-two),  
random and worst cases) 
 
Comparisons between the one-step and two-step approach (Figure 6) show little 
difference in the first 25 or so tests in terms of the mean maximum probability qi—
suggesting that the one-step approach would yield an acceptable return on a fixed budget or 
schedule for testing for the randomized system configurations tested. More realistic 
scenarios may show more significant divergence between one-step and two-step (and by 
extension, k-step) methods.  
Similar comparisons in terms of information entropy (Figure 7) show more 
displacement between the one-step and two-step methods, though both methods are clearly 
superior to the random and “worst” case methods. In a similar simulation configuration but 
with no defect (Figure 8), the information entropy shows similar descent. At the tail end of 
the testing process, though, the steady-state H is lower in the no-defect case (Figure 8) than 
in the one-defect (Figure 7) case. 
Although the best-next-two strategy appears somewhat better than the best-next 
strategy for the fixed-cost constraint, the CPU time required for this two-step simulation 
expanded roughly by a factor of four on a per-trial basis, which is consistent with Equation 








Figure 7. Comparison of Mean Entropy H among Simulations  
of a 40-module, 100-test System with One Defect Planted 
(using the one-step (best-next), two-step (best-next -two),  
random and worst cases) 
 
Figure 8. Comparison of Mean Entropy H among the NO DEFECT  
Simulations of a 40-module, 100-test System 
(showing only slightly lower entropy values for all cases,  
though slope of descent is similar in all cases) 
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5. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this study, we have developed a simple, effective framework to examine the 
testing of complex systems. The idealized numerical experiments demonstrate that a simple 
best-next approach is computationally efficient if not optimal, though the convergence to a 
correct diagnosis appears to be very close to a two-step approach. Further investigation with 
more exhaustive k-step testing strategies should confirm that for many cases of interest the 
simple best-next approach yields acceptable results for a fixed-cost constraint. 
A novel aspect of this approach is the focus on tests as distinct objects providing 
information about modules. Much of the previous work in this area has focused on 
knowledge of the initial distribution of failure rates, requiring almost perfect knowledge of 
these a priori data in order to be effective (Butterworth, 1972; Ben-Dov, 1981). In terms of 
software testing, previous studies have relied on some knowledge of the internal structure of 
components or reusable objects, or near-perfect knowledge of the module interconnections 
(Rothermel, Untch & Harrold, 2001; Mao & Lu, 2005). Here, we assume only that our system 
has some test suite; these tests may be derived from requirements documents, from formal 
system acceptance plans, or from daily systems operations. Application of this model 
requires only that we be able to characterize these tests in terms of approximate coverages 
on units of replacement. 
Although a variable cost per test is accounted for in the simulation code, the runs 
presented in this paper assumed a constant cost per test. In effect, we assume a unit cost 
per test, such that the number of tests becomes the associated cost. Further simulation work 
with more realistic configurations of modules, tests and coverages should yield more insight 
into operational diagnostic and regression problems. 
The treatment of tests as distinct objects readily enables use of this approach for 
simulation even when no bug or defect is known to be present. This testing scenario, which 
commonly follows a major system upgrade or engineering change to a system, is often 
referred to as regression testing. This zero-defect case may also be useful to evaluate the 
quality of a test suite with respect to all states of a system. In the zero-defect cases run in 
this study, the mean entropy (Figure 8) and maximum probability (not shown) do not go to 0 
and 1, respectively, as we would expect if all states were reachable from the test suite. This 
line of research would be particularly well-suited for the classic regression or test-retest 
problems.   
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Extract from: National Defense Industrial Association— 
Systems Engineering Division: Systemic Root Cause 
Analysis Task Group Report 
 
Background 
Since 2004, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics (USD (AT&L)), Systems and Software Engineering/Assessments and Support 
(SSE/AS) Directorate has been conducting Program Support Reviews (PSRs) for major 
defense programs to help identify and resolve program issues and risks and, ultimately, to 
improve the probability of program success. Through analysis of the PSR data, SSE/AS has 
identified systemic issues seen across Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and 
Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) that impede acquisition success. 
Objective 
The National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Systemic Root Cause Analysis 
(SRCA) Task Group was formed to analyze the data and attempt to extract the lowest level 
root causes of program failures.  The Group used information generated from SSE/AS’s 
analysis to derive a joint government-industry set of recommendations to address the 
systemic issues and improve the execution discipline of acquisition programs. Although the 
analysis focused on Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) programs, the results are scalable and 
can be applied to most acquisition programs. 
Results 
The Task Group developed recommendations and actions in three areas: 
 Acquisition Strategy and Planning  
 Decision Gate Review  
 Enhanced Staff Capability  
Acquisition Strategy and Planning (ASP) pertains to the early program planning that 
is critical to posture a program for success. The ASP recommendations and actions promote 
the following end-states: 
 Program planning is executable with a high degree of confidence. 
 Requests for Proposal and supporting documentation clearly define the 
government’s expectations in terms of requirements, planning, process, risks, and 
assumptions; they direct offerors to integrate their approach accordingly. 
 Independent schedule estimates are performed to support cost-estimating source 
selection and milestone decisions. 
Decision Gate Review (DGR) pertains to the Department of Defense (DoD) 
implementing objective criteria to assess technical maturity at key decision points.  The 
criteria should include independent reviews of program technical maturity and include 
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enforceable criteria specific to the decision gate.  The DGR recommendations and actions 
promote the following end-states:  
 Technical maturity assessed through systems engineering technical reviews; high-
confidence estimates achieved for both cost and schedule. 
 Government program office staffing verified by the Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA). 
 Trigger conditions defined for the conducting of in-process reviews. 
Enhanced Staff Capability (ESC) pertains to having an adequate number of people 
with the appropriate skill mix and the required experience to properly staff, manage, and 
execute a program. The ESC recommendations and actions promote the following end-
states:  
 The number, skills and experience of DoD acquisition personnel are adequate to 
properly staff acquisition programs. 
Recommendations 
The Task Group effort formally concluded with publication of this report (released via 
NDIA early Spring 2009). The Task Group offers the recommendations contained in this 
report to DoD and defense industry acquisition leadership, suggesting the following to them: 
 Consider and validate the Task Group-developed actions. 
 Assign action owners and develop Plans of Action and Milestones to implement 
selected recommendations. 
 Monitor progress of actions to closure. 
Summary 
The systemic root cause analysis concluded that the most significant causes were 
directly related to poor or inadequate activities early in acquisition strategizing and planning 
efforts and in conducting management gate reviews during the early stages of execution. 
The analysis also concluded that there was a significant root cause related to staff size, 
training and experience. 
The task group recognizes there is a strong relationship between disciplined systems 
engineering and good management decision-making in the critical, early stages of an 
acquisition cycle. The creation of a successful acquisition strategy, plan, and staffing profile 
are heavily reliant on judgment and program management analysis that are often 
significantly enhanced by the application of good systems engineering practices. 
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Chair: David Moore worked in purchasing, logistics and supply chain management within public 
sector and commercial organisations before entering academia. He has designed, developed and 
delivered a range of professional courses, Undergraduate and Masters’ programmes for 
organisations and universities. He has undertaken extensive education, training, speaking and 
consultancy assignments in the UK, USA, Europe, Middle East and Far East. Particular interests 
include outsourcing, using contractors for service provision, developing professionalism and 
humanitarian logistics. He has written a number of books, book chapters, and conference and 
journal papers. Moore completed his service in the Royal Logistic Corps as a Lt Colonel in 1999.  
Panelists: 
Stuart Young retired from the Royal Navy as an engineer officer in 2008, having served in a variety 
of postings at sea and in the UK Ministry of Defence. These included three years based in the 
British Embassy in Washington as a technical liaison officer, and as programme manager for a 
major multi-national technology development programme. In his final appointment, he was 
responsible for the development of acquisition management skills for military and civilian personnel 
across the MoD. Joining Cranfield University in 2008, he is Deputy Director of the Centre for 
Defence Acquisition, with a particular interest in the relationship between the MoD and Industry and 
the development of acquisition strategies for major defence programmes.  
Pete Ito earned a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of California at 
Berkeley, and a Juris Doctor (law) degree and a Master’s degree in International Affairs from 
George Washington University in Washington, DC. He worked for 25 years as a Foreign Service 
Officer for the US State Department, serving in South Korea, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands 
and Washington, DC. His primary focus was political affairs, particularly defence and security policy. 
He joined Cranfield University in September 2007, working as a researcher in the areas of strategic 
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Abstract 
The panel discussion will address four critical defence acquisition issues and 
programmes which illustrate the innovative approaches the United Kingdom is undertaking 
in this area. All four cases will echo the challenges facing the US and other countries and 
provide valuable "lessons learned" in a number of key areas. The first topic is the UK 
decision to acquire C-17 transports, which provides a good example of the benefits of 
capability management. The second topic is the UK implementation of a defence industrial 
strategy which demonstrates a concerted effort to identify those national defence 
capabilities that must be maintained, and those more efficiently addressed by foreign 
acquisition and/or cooperation. The third topic is the UK assessment of European defence 
cooperation, including the difficulties with such efforts and the impact of the controversial 
"re-evaluation" of the contract for the next generation of aerial tankers. The final topic is the 
UK experience with the Joint Strike Fighter program, in which the UK is the largest non-US 
participant, and which holds major implications on future military cooperation with the US 
Ultimately, the UK experiences show the benefits of more research on international efforts to 
identify best practices in acquisition management. 
“You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. Things that we had postponed for 
too long, that were long-term, are now immediate and must be dealt with. This crisis 
provides the opportunity for us to do things that you could not do before.”  
 White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel (Capital Journal, 2008). 
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While the military procurement challenges facing the United States are enormous, it 
is important to bear in mind that the United Kingdom and other US friends and Allies are 
also confronting the task of pursuing critical acquisition programs at a time of exceptionally 
tight defence budgets. Although in monetary terms, the task for Washington is of greater 
magnitude, the decisions that are facing London and other capitals are of equal significance 
on a national basis. However, it is clear that the impact of Department of Defense (DoD) 
decisions will reverberate in defence ministries around the world, while the converse is not 
necessarily the case.  
It remains beneficial for Allies to compare notes on valuable "lessons learned" from 
their individual acquisition experiences. There have been recommendations for change from 
domestic think-tanks and policy experts as well as from within the military. With resources 
dwindling, it arguably would be best to draw upon initiatives based on practice (and not just 
theory), and the best data to analyse would be the practice of other defence forces. If 
“business as usual” is no longer affordable, then it is useful to assess the practices of other 
defence forces to see what has worked elsewhere, provided more efficient management, 
and increased value for money.  
There are innovative initiatives which have been undertaken by the UK in the area of 
defence acquisition in recent years, some of which warrant attention and consideration by 
other defence forces. UK participation in some of the most current key defence equipment 
programs provides lessons and insights that may be valuable to other states, particularly 
regarding the future of multinational defence programs.  
Four critical areas and examples of UK defence acquisition are highlighted in this 
paper. First, the area of efficient capability management is examined, as demonstrated by 
the UK decision to acquire Boeing C-17s. Second, the example of UK defence industrial 
strategy is reviewed, indicating how it has moved the focus from a haphazard attempt to 
preserve as many jobs as possible to a serious assessment of which domestic military 
capabilities are essential for the nation. Third, the UK assessment of the general area of 
European defence cooperation practice is analysed, including commentary on the negative 
impact of the controversial "re-evaluation" under Congressional pressure of the US Air Force 
decision awarding Northrup Grumman/EADS the contract to meet future US aerial tanker 
requirements. Finally, the example of the UK experience with the Joint Strike Fighter 
program, particularly in the area of technology transfer, is assessed with a focus on 
implications on future multinational military cooperation led by the US. 
In his outline of the eight steps needed for successfully transforming an organisation, 
John Kotter (1995) stresses that the first step is establishing a sense of urgency. In the UK 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), and probably in most defence establishments, that requirement 
has presumably been met. What is now important is determining what type of change is 
required. Assessing the experience of other defence establishments is useful in making 
better informed decisions, and the UK has taken innovative approaches to address 
acquisition challenges that warrant consideration and analysis.  
Examining UK policy with an eye to possible use in the US is not a new exercise. In 
a recent report to Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2008, December) 
review on the DoD use of performance-based logistics included an extensive examination of 
the UK MOD's experience with performance-based contracting. Similarly, John Schank 
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(2006) testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee about the RAND evaluation of the 
trends in the UK Naval Shipbuilding Industrial base, recommendations to the UK, and the 
lessons for the US industrial base.  
There is no question that the UK still faces room for improvement in the area of 
defence acquisition, as has been emphasised by commentators like Bill Kincaid (2008). The 
MOD Major Projects Report from the UK National Audit Office (NAO) (2008a, p. 5) indicates 
that for the 20 largest MOD projects (with a combined estimated cost of £28 billion1), the 
estimated total cost of the projects increased during the 12-month reporting period by £205 
million, and there was an additional total slippage in the programs of 96 months. The 
projected total increase in costs for these 20 programs compared with the budgeted cost 
indicates an increase of 12%, or some £3 billion and an aggregate delay for the programs of 
483 months, 36% over the anticipated timetable at the time the project was approved (NAO, 
2008a, p. 5).  
However, the UK MOD has made a conscious effort to pursue innovative 
management processes and increase flexibility. There is also a willingness to seek out 
outside assessments and new approaches. It is notable that the MOD has frequently 
commissioned RAND to provide an outside perspective on projects ranging from the Type 
45 destroyer (Birkler, Schank, Arena, Smith & Lee, 2002) to the UK nuclear submarine 
industrial base (RAND, 2005).  
In a time of scarce resources, it is arguably important for defence establishments to 
seek out such different perspectives and compare national policies, practices and 
accomplishments. The common theme which runs through the four UK examples that follow 
is the value of pursuing innovative and flexible approaches to defence acquisition, which can 
arise from analysing the best practices of other defence forces. The UK has worked hard to 
try and pursue such an approach and be an exemplar of innovation. Its efforts, as well as 
those of other defence establishments, warrant greater research to address the challenges 
of defence acquisition.  
Air Transport 
All the indications to date are that the UK decision in 2000 to obtain Boeing C-17 
transports was a very sound decision, not only because it was cost-effective, but it also met 
the critical requirements of the UK military. The House of Commons Defence Committee 
(2007, July 5) assessment was that:  
The leasing of four C-17 large transport aircraft, which are to be purchased when the 
lease ends, has greatly increased the MOD's strategic airlift capability and performed 
extremely well. We welcome the fact that these four aircraft will be purchased once 
the lease ends and that the MOD is to purchase a fifth C-17 aircraft. (paragraph 62)    
In its response to the Committee report, the MOD (2007, October 12) echoed the 
view that the C-17 "has proved a great success on operations" (paragraph 12) and noted its 
announcement that it would purchase a sixth C-17 as part of its effort to enhance 
operational effectiveness. The acquisition of the C-17s (along with the earlier acquisition of 
                                                
1 On April 3, 2009, 1 UK pound sterling equalled 1.46 US dollars. 
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25 C-130Js) has more than met MOD requirements, despite their having intensified with 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the C-17s originally were intended to provide 
strategic lift capability, their operational use in those two countries has been essential to UK 
forces.  
The benefits of the C-17 decision have been amplified by the fact that the European 
A400M transport, launched in 1982, has still to commence flight testing. The House of 
Commons Defence Committee (2009) noted that once the MOD has a better fix on the 
extent of the delays in the A400M, it must decide whether "abandonment would be 
preferable, and to take timely decisions either to procure or lease other airlift assets so that 
a capability gap in air transport does not develop" (p. 3). Secretary of State for Defence 
Hutton stated in March 2009 that the government would make a decision with regard to 
continuing with the A400M in the beginning of July, adding that the UK "will not be content 
with a gap in capability" (Hollinger & Pfeifer, 2009).  
To provide some background: In 1994, the UK announced that it would replace its 
aging C-130K Hercules fleet. Those 50 transports had been in the Royal Air Force (RAF) 
inventory since the 1960s. The MOD decided on a two-part replacement program (NAO, 
2008b, p. 8). The first stage was replacement of 25 C-130Ks with 25 C-130Js from 
Lockheed Martin, which are an updated version of the Hercules. The second stage would be 
participation in the A400M program which would replace the other C-130Ks. Approval for 
participation in the A400M was achieved in 1997. 
The C-130Js came into the UK inventory in 1998 and were fully operational by 2001. 
As the A400M timescales became increasingly questionable, the MOD recognised that it 
would need to find an alternate solution to meet immediate requirements. There was 
concern in the UK that the purchase of the C-17s would destabilise the A400M project, 
which provided opportunities for British industry, particularly in the areas of wings and 
engines. After extensive evaluation, Secretary of State for Defence Hoon announced on 16 
May 2000 the decision to lease four C-17s.  
It is important to note that the C-17s have handled a wide variety of missions that 
would have required a diverse and much larger fleet of transports. The C-17 has been a 
solid contribution to the RAF fleet and has clearly met UK capability requirements. With 
further delays to A400M accrued and with extensive C-17 operating experience, the UK has 
now decided that an outright purchase of the leased aircraft is now a more cost-effective 
option and has expanded the fleet to reflect the operational demands.  
The C-17 decision and implementation are noteworthy for a number of reasons, 
particularly in view of the timeframe in which the decisions were taken. At the time transport 
options were being considered, Smart Procurement was still relatively new. To acquire these 
new capabilities, Smart Procurement had been introduced with the mantra of "cheaper, 
faster and better." Smart Procurement adopted a more streamlined approach to acquiring 
equipment capability by reducing the number of approval decision points (to Initial Gate and 
Main Gate) aligned to the new CADMID (Concept, Assessment, Development, Manufacture, 
In-Service and Disposal) procurement cycle. Smart Procurement was subsequently 
renamed Smart Acquisition, reflecting the wider scope of activities needed to deliver 
effective defence equipment capability. Guidance on an incremental approach to acquiring 
systems was also introduced with the process being managed by Integrated Project Teams 
(IPTs), comprising MOD, military and industry representatives.  
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At this time, the IPTs were also in the early stages of viewing decisions through the 
optic of best commercial practice. The MOD's Defence Procurement Agency had maintained 
its traditional focus on requirements, rather than capabilities, and was in the early phases of 
moving to a concentration on the latter. Despite that fact, the transport decision centred on 
capability requirements, resulting in acquisition of an air transport capability greater than 
sought which ultimately remained within budget. It is critical to note that although a strategic 
airlift capability was originally required, the C-17 also had a tactical capability that has 
subsequently been utilised and is reflected in the UK’s follow-on purchase on a further 
aircraft. 
The UK is working assiduously to implement Through Life Capabilities Management 
(TLCM). One key structural component is a change in process. TLCM takes a programme 
approach to delivering capability, with a single Capability Manager (the Programme 
Manager) having responsibility for all Strategic Mobility capability through life, including 
C130J/K, C-17 and A400M, focusing not on specific projects or equipment, but on the 
capabilities that need to be delivered. The Capability Manager, supported by a wide team 
across all the Defence Lines of Development (Infrastructure, Personnel, Equipment, 
Organisation, Doctrine, Training, Logistics and Information), is now in a better position to 
judge the trade-offs required to provide effective capability to the front line. This step change 
has been supported by a huge effort to embed a change of culture in the MOD, which takes 
an integrated view of acquiring capability, breaking down the traditional single-service stove-
pipes.  
While European defence cooperation is addressed later, it is useful to briefly review 
UK views regarding the A400M. France and Germany have decided to stay with the A400M 
as they believe it is imperative to establish a European airlift capability. However, in view of 
continued program difficulties and delays, it is arguable that the A400M may carry too high a 
price for London to pay just to establish the UK’s European credentials. It is also important 
to note that BAE Systems has divested itself of its stake in Airbus, leaving no significant UK 
industrial investment (though there are UK participating firms) in the A400M project.  
Europe has moved forward with efforts to promote defence cooperation, including 
the A400M. The organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) was created in 
1998 to facilitate and manage European cooperative armament programs. It is noteworthy 
that NATO (2009) and OCCAR signed an agreement on security of information on 5 
February 2009 which protects classified NATO data given to OCCAR to meet NATO 
requirements and conformity with NATO standardisation agreements. This is critical as 
NATO participates in three projects managed by OCCAR: the COBRA Target Locating 
Radar, the TIGER helicopter, and the A400M.  
But while the OCCAR Business Plan (2008, p. 5) indicates a staff of over 200 and a 
budget of some four billion Euros, its efforts to tighten performance targets have not had a 
major impact on the programs it manages. To return to the A400M, the transport 
requirement was announced in 1997 by eight European nations, the decision of the Airbus 
A400M was made in 2000, the decision on the engine was made in 2003, OCCAR (2008, p. 
11) lists the total program cost as 20.3 billion Euros—and the plane has yet to have its 
inaugural flight. The UK has reduced its original pledge to purchase 45 A400Ms down to 25, 
and there remains speculation it may be considering reducing the number even further. 
The UK showed great flexibility and innovation in addressing its air transport 
requirements. The key “lesson learned” from the C-17 experience is that the UK made a 
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decision focussed on capabilities. The US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have 
adopted a capabilities-driven acquisition process. Whatever the shortfalls in implementation, 
it is worthwhile for defence establishments to seriously consider and analyse the benefits of 
a capabilities-driven approach. The UK’s air transport decision is a good example of the 
results when the focus is not on equipment, but on capabilities. 
Defence Industrial Strategy 
The political imperative to protect domestic jobs and industries is always present and 
intensifies during hard times. When coupled with the legitimate concern about retaining key 
indigenous defence capabilities, protectionism in the defence industrial area is a powerful 
force. The fact that this political, economic and security priority is often at odds with the 
acquisition of the best military capabilities at the best price is an eternal problem. As all 
military forces seek to grapple with these difficult decisions, it is worth considering the 
approach taken by the UK in generating an innovative and extensive Defence Industrial 
Strategy (DIS) (MOD, 2005), released as a follow-on to the wider Defence Industrial Policy 
published in 2002. 
The DIS concisely notes that the strategy carefully considers: 
which industrial capabilities we need to retain in the UK to ensure that we can 
continue to operate our equipment in the way we choose to maintain appropriate 
sovereignty and thereby protect our national security. The Strategy sets these out, 
and explains clearly for the first time which industrial capabilities we require to be 
sustained onshore, noting that—as now—there are many that we can continue to 
seek to satisfy through open international competition. (Foreword) 
The DIS makes a concerted effort to outline in a more transparent manner how 
defence procurement decisions are made. It also seeks to assist UK industry in its future 
planning by seeking to be more open on future UK defence acquisition plans. Perhaps most 
important, the DIS puts an emphasis on the need for a change in the relationship between 
government and industry as well as a change in behaviour between the two. As a structural 
mechanism for actually monitoring progress of implementation of the DIS, the National 
Defence Industries Council is tasked to follow the extent of progress, and the DIS is 
reviewed in every defence spending review period.  
The DIS is comprised of three sections. Section A, the “Strategic Overview,” is 
extensive, and provides a thorough analysis of the key overriding factors in UK defence 
policy and acquisition. Section B is a “Review by Industrial Sector and Cross-cutting 
Capabilities.” The extensive assessment of 12 separate sectors and categories is the heart 
of the document, and provides an impressive detailed analysis. Section C concludes with 
discussion on “Implementing the Defence Industrial Strategy.” 
Perhaps the most critical aspect of the DIS is simply the effort undertaken by the 
MOD to seriously analyse and put forth in a coherent structure what is a critical domestic 
defence industrial capability. The 145-page document is an essential first step in generating 
a clear national policy on this critical issue. It assesses the various parameters and aspects 
of UK national defence requirements, determines areas where cooperation with non-UK 
firms carries an acceptable risk and benefit, and candidly recognises those areas where the 
UK cannot maintain a domestic industrial capability at an acceptable cost. The focus on 
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such a detailed analysis in the DIS is borne out by the fact that Section B is roughly half the 
document.  
Certainly the DIS and resulting UK policy seek to protect the defence industry, which 
the MOD has judged to be critical from threats to its viability. But there is no “buy British” 
backdrop to the DIS. To take a larger overview of UK defence acquisition policy, there is a 
UK willingness to enter into multinational arrangements when the need is clear. In 2006, the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) reported that a total of 6.66 billion Euros was spent on 
projects or programs involving two national defence structures, one of which is an EDA 
participating state. The UK was far and away the largest practitioner, with 2.58 billion Euros 
of such collaborative projects, well beyond the 1.63 billion Euros conducted by France 
(EDA, 2006a, p. 22). Of the specific subset of European collaborative procurement that 
year, the total spent by EDA states was 6.07 billion Euros, of which the UK comprised 2.26 
billion Euros (p. 23). Just over 30% of the UK’s total equipment procurement was conducted 
in a collaborative program with another EU member state (p. 24).  
There are key lessons from the DIS exercise and experience which are worth noting. 
One critical point is the fact that this issue received serious attention from senior MOD 
political and uniformed military leadership and led to the Defence Acquisition Change 
Programme which, in turn, introduced Through Life Capability Management and the merging 
of the previously separate Procurement and Support functions. A top-down process was 
critical to instituting a change in culture and attitudes among the MOD personnel working on 
acquisition. That may have been even more critical than the changes in processes and 
structures that were implemented.  
A clear, high-level political imprimatur was essential to generating a cooperative 
attitude from industry, a key outcome worth serious consideration. The UK does much more 
outsourcing of service contracts than other European states. In 2006, the UK comprised 
some 10 billion Euros out of a total reported outsourcing of 14.1 billion Euros (EDA, 2006a, 
p. 21). The UK also has pursued partnering initiatives, a good example of which is the 
establishment of the Complex Weapons initiative (House of Commons Defence Committee, 
2009, p. Ev102), which was part of the DIS. The MOD announced in 2008 that six study 
contracts would be undertaken by Team Complex Weapons, an industry grouping led by 
MBDA (UK), Thales UK, Roxel and QinetiQ, with the MOD as a partner.  
The focus of the Complex Weapons initiative is on missiles and guided weapons. 
The MOD pledged long-term support for key programmes and technology, with industry 
pooling resources and streamlining personnel. The common stated goal was to move from 
bespoke weapons development to flexible, modular weapons design. The six assessment-
phase contracts totalling £74 million were an effort to keep skills in these critical areas within 
the UK, and secure operational sovereignty. The effort is in its early days, and 
commentators (Hewson, 2008), note that a long-term source of steady funding is critical for 
success. But such efforts to establish a cooperative, rather than adversarial, relationship will 
be even more essential for defence and industry as funding becomes ever more difficult to 
obtain. 
To cite some other examples: a Private Finance Initiative is being considered to 
provide the RAF with refuelling tankers for normal operations, with surplus air-transport 
capacity available for lease for civilian use whilst retaining a surge capacity for major 
operations. Similarly, the RAF is considering putting its extra capacity for pilot training to use 
to train pilots for commercial airlines. 
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The MOD has also put the goals and guidelines of the DIS into practice on larger 
acquisition programmes. The block construction of the Type 45 destroyer, the first of which 
was recently unveiled to great public support, is the most high-profile example. The Type 45 
will provide the Royal Navy's primary anti-air warfare capability for over 30 years. And while 
the announced delays in the two planned Future Aircraft Carriers (CVF) tarnishes the 
programme, the cooperative effort with France is an indication of an effective international 
programme, and the work of the Carrier Alliance is a concrete example of a mutually 
beneficial relationship with industry.  
Once again, what is perhaps most noteworthy about the DIS is the fact that the UK 
made the concerted effort to organise its priorities and extensively assess requirements, 
costs and opportunities regarding defence industrial capabilities. Where the decision has 
been made on systems that need to be produced domestically, there is an effort to establish 
a long-term relationship with the suppliers to ensure that capability is maintained. One 
example is the MOD completion of a “Foundation Contract” with BAE Systems in 2007. 
Such arrangements admittedly change, if not eliminate, the requirement for competition, and 
can effectively lock in the status quo. However, the UK decision is the result of a policy 
calculation of what needs to be preserved, rather than an instinctive reaction that because it 
is domestic, a firm must be maintained.  
The UK MOD has been equally rigorous in analysing the down-side of allowing 
defence capabilities to be located off-shore. In a report provided by RAND (Arena et al., 
2005) for the MOD on the UK's naval shipbuilding industrial base, the authors addressed the 
consequences of foreign procurement of naval vessels. Emphasising that its focus was on 
UK shipbuilding capacity, the authors noted that there were several disadvantages. In 
addition to the domestic economic benefit of having ships built in UK shipyards, a foreign 
purchase would generate a concern that the UK would not be able to acquire the latest 
technologies such as advanced sensors. The UK also would run the risk that it would not 
acquire ships that would meet its requirements or leave it open to political pressure to delay 
or even cancel the sale (p. 157-158). 
It is noteworthy that in a subsequent study for the MOD, the RAND researchers 
concluded that the UK would "need to preserve and sustain several key technical skills in 
the maritime domain" in order to "preserve its ability to design, build, and support complex 
warships and submarines" (Pung, et al., 2008, p. xv). The authors focussed in particular on 
the need for "detailed designers and professional engineers involved in various stages of 
surface ship and submarine acquisition and support" (p. xv). Such considerations have 
clearly been taken into account in structuring and concluding various naval programmes, 
such as the Type 45 and the CVF.  
Certainly more needs to be done. In submissions to the House of Commons Defence 
Committee (2009), the Defence Industries Council noted that many steps have been taken 
toward embedding the principles of the DIS into business practice. But the "overall progress 
has been much slower than industry would have wished" (p. 67). The Committee highlighted 
the concern expressed from industry that there is still insufficient transparency about MOD 
plans. In particular, it noted that an updated version of the DIS should have been published 
in December 2007 and has yet to be presented. The Committee criticised the failure to 
publish the updated document, adding that it considers that "its continuing absence 
increases the risk that the UK Defence Industrial Base will not be able to meet the future 
requirements of our Armed Forces" (p. 76).  
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Unfortunately, since Lord Drayson, who as Minister (Defence Equipment and 
Support) was the main driving force behind the DIS, resigned in early 2008, the momentum 
behind the DIS has decreased. Political and economic uncertainty has increased the 
pressure for a Strategic Defence Review in the UK, and it appears unlikely that the next 
edition of the DIS will be published in the near future. There is also concern about whether it 
is possible to generate a follow-on DIS programme that is affordable. As noted above, 
industry now perceive a lack of commitment by the MOD to a sustainable industrial strategy 
and this impression has been reinforced by an ongoing lack of transparency in the MOD’s 
planning activities, despite promises to the contrary. 
The UK approach in the area of a defence industrial strategy is innovative and 
extensive. Like any other country, the UK is concerned about the possibility of being held 
hostage to foreign sources of key military equipment. It is also cognisant of the political 
pressure to protect “British jobs for British workers.” However, to summarise the "lesson 
learned" in this example, the value of the DIS is that it provides a more stable framework in 
which to conduct the policy discussion and reach the programmatic decision. Defence 
establishments that do not undertake such a study are more vulnerable to wide-ranging, ad 
hoc debates which focus on the latest set of unemployment figures, rather than strategic 
military considerations.   
European Defence Cooperation 
Political factors and job preservation are particularly relevant with regard to 
consideration of European defence cooperation, the third area in which UK experience and 
policy provide a number of noteworthy points about the utilisation of flexible, innovative 
approaches. First, as indicated by UK acquisition decisions and endorsed in the DIS, the UK 
is interested in pursuing worthwhile multinational projects. This is driven by the focus on 
capabilities. It is accentuated by the prospects with regard to overall defence spending and 
the need to focus on continuing operations, resulting in an even bleaker picture on available 
acquisition funding. 
However, the second point is that there are limits to UK support for European 
initiatives. The A400M delays and the difficulties which plagued the Typhoon/Eurofighter 
have diminished UK enthusiasm for such efforts. Certainly the UK will be open to hearing 
the case for European projects, and if they are well thought-out and in line with the DIS, will 
be willing to pursue such projects. The agreement with France on the CVF is an indication 
that the UK continues to be ready to conclude arrangements if the programmes meet policy 
goals and the numbers add up. On the other hand, the UK Type 45 destroyer programme 
resulted from a decision to withdraw from a European programme when work-share 
arrangements and misalignment of requirements did not satisfy the UK. Indeed, the Type 45 
programme arose because the UK was not satisfied with two European attempts to 
establish a joint destroyer programme: the NFR-90 and the Horizon CNGF.  
It is clear the UK will be closely monitoring the track record on European military 
programmes and will want to see if such efforts will become more efficient at delivering 
capabilities, rather than just parcelling out jobs and funding. It would appear that European 
states and trans-European organisations are taking steps in the right direction. The question 
is whether they are large enough steps. Many European actions continue to be merely 
restatements of lofty goals, without concrete action. This is exemplified by the November 10, 
2008, declaration of intent among 12 European countries to establish a European Air 
Transport Fleet. This project, taken within the EDA, recognises the importance of a 
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European airlift capability, but does nothing to move the generation of concrete capabilities 
forward. Citing another example, there are constructive initiatives undertaken by the EDA 
and individual states to promote European defence cooperation. The "Guide to the EDA's 
new European Defence Equipment Market" notes that the EDA's "Electronic Bulletin Board” 
provides an opportunity for European firms to bid for defence contracts in virtually all other 
EU member states, and is a small step toward generating a Europe-wide defence 
equipment market (EDA, p. 3).  
The question remains whether increased opportunities to bid will actually generate 
greater willingness for national governments to give contracts to firms from other nations. 
The EDA generated an Intergovernmental Regime in Defence Procurement, which operates 
within Article 296 of the EC Treaty and is aimed at enhancing international competition for 
public procurement. Similarly, the associated Code of Conduct is also aimed at promoting 
more equal treatment of suppliers, promoting transparency. However, the EDA itself makes 
clear that all these steps can only offer an improved approach for changing the way 
Europeans handle defence acquisition, and “It now falls to national governments and 
industry to take full advantage of it" (p. 8).   
As a result, it would appear that the public and political sentiment in the UK would be 
to acquire the last generation of US equipment, rather than the next generation of European 
capabilities. For example, if the clock could be rolled-back, there arguably would be general 
support for acquisition of destroyers with the Aegis system rather than initiating the Type 45 
destroyer project. There are other reasons for preferring acquisition from the US: national 
security policy, the desire to be on the cutting edge of military technology, history, etc. The 
numbers are clearly in favour of military cooperation with the US. The US spends twice as 
much on defence as Europe combined, outspends Europe six to one in defence R&D, and, 
most critically, targets 35% of its defence spending on investment compared to 20% in 
Europe. (EDA, 2006b, para 67). For all of these reasons, there is arguably a strong 
sentiment that cooperative efforts centred on the US may be the optimal way to achieve 
future military capabilities, especially at the high end of the scale. While each European 
state will make its own preferences known in its policy decisions, it would seem from the UK 
perspective that many, if not most, European countries would agree on the need to work 
with the US.  
However, only one state can prevent the US from assuming that essential role in 
military development and acquisition programs: the US. That is arguably the generally 
accepted UK view. And from a UK vantage point, it may well be the general European 
perception. While the JSF, which has a particular significance for the UK, will be addressed 
later, it is important at this point to address the ramifications of the action by the US 
Congress in 2008 to overturn the DoD decision to award the aerial tanker contract to the 
Northrup-Grumman/EADS proposal for the KC-30 tanker. Simply put, this decision has 
damaged the European desire to work with the US in the area of defence acquisition. 
To provide a short history: EADS had made no secret of its desire to enter the US 
market, and the DoD requirement to find a new aerial tanker to replace the KC-45 provided 
a unique opportunity which EADS ardently pursued. Boeing was the only obvious source for 
the new tanker, and there were no viable competitors. Indeed, Congress itself recognised 
and made clear its views on the importance of ensuring there was a competition. EADS then 
made extra efforts to acquire the political support it would need. It partnered with Northrup-
Grumman on the tanker proposal, emphasised the KC-30 would be an American tanker, and 
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proposed to maximise US domestic content by having the Airbus A330 airframe produced in 
the US.  
The Air Force decision of February 29, 2008, to award the contract to the Northrup-
Grumman/EADS consortium could well have marked a critical juncture in the promotion of 
multinational defence acquisition. From the UK perspective, the stereotypes of the way the 
US and Europe view each other with regard to defence acquisition carries a great deal of 
truth. The US believes it has the best military technology and Europe is pursuing 
protectionist policies which focus on jobs and money rather than military capabilities. In an 
“objective” competition, Europe would buy US equipment and get more value for money. For 
Europeans, there is a policy concern about becoming reliant on US military equipment and a 
political focus on European jobs. European defence industry believes it has the technology 
and capability to contribute to a modern military program. But as the prognosis for European 
defence spending is bleak, it wants an opportunity to enter the US market, since that is 
where the money can be found. In this respect, BAE System’s approach has been to re-
invent itself as a global company with wholly owned US subsidiaries who are able to market 
themselves in the USA as US companies under the BAE Systems, Inc., banner. 
The decision in favour of Northrup-Grumman/EADS was quickly met with a protest 
by Boeing, loudly supported by members of Congress, and was subsequently sustained by 
the Government Accountability Office [GAO] (2008b) in its June 18, 2008, decision. The 
GAO cited seven reasons for sustaining the Boeing protest, all of which focussed on 
shortcomings in the Air Force selection process, and recommended the competition be 
conducted again.  
It might be fair to state that the GAO decision has not been widely read by 
Europeans and that they only know that the GAO is an arm of the Congress. More 
important, the perception is that procedural flaws only became material when a "foreign" 
consortium won the competition. Such a perception can have an impact on defence 
industrial cooperation. First, it casts doubt on the US willingness to engage in an “objective” 
competition assessing cost and capabilities. Second, it validates the views of some that 
even if European firms partner with US defence contractors, they will still not be able to 
enter the US market. Third, the Congressional impetus for the re-opening the decision 
provides validation for those who argue that the US also will act to preserve its sovereign 
military capabilities as well as American jobs, so there is no reason for Europe to bow to US 
criticism on this count.  
Finally, the re-opening of the decision damages the goal of promoting competition, 
emphasised by Congress itself. There was no competitor to Boeing for the next generation 
of tankers, and it was Congress which pressed for a competition. A situation with no 
competing US firms may become increasingly common in the future, and in a situation in 
which there are few bidders, they have power due to the threat to not participate in the 
bidding process (Franck, Lewis & Udis, 2008, September 30, p. 36). In view of the outcome 
of the tanker decision, European firms will be reluctant to pursue the time and expense of 
trying to provide a competitive bid which it will not be allowed to win.  
The history of the aerial tanker decision has damaged the European perception of 
the opportunities to cooperate with US firms and enter the US market. It has also 
strengthened the case for European defence cooperation, particularly in areas where 
programs cannot be funded by individual defence budgets. As stated previously, the UK 
believes that there are many reasons to support cooperative military programs centred on 
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the US as the optimal path for increasingly expensive investments in defence programs. 
Discussion of UK support for such efforts leads to the program which currently has the 
greatest impact on views of US-led development projects: the JSF program.  
Joint Strike Fighter 
The fourth and final example which is valuable to analyse is the JSF, the largest 
multinational development program in history and a prime example of the UK commitment to 
pursuing innovative approaches to defence acquisition. It is a high-profile project which has 
numerous aspects, each of which could justify an entire discussion. There is, however, one 
key aspect which needs to be highlighted, particularly in a US forum: the impact of US 
technology transfer rules on future multinational military development programs.  
This is not simply the litany of long-standing complaints about US technology transfer 
rules and the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The high-profile US-UK 
dispute over JSF source codes, which needed to be resolved at the level of President and 
Prime Minister, is merely the most notable case of the difficulties faced by US partners in 
such endeavours. Simply put, the application of US technology transfer rules as exemplified 
in the JSF damages the prospects for multinational military development programs centred 
on the US If that is the perception from arguably the closest US ally, one which is committed 
to cooperative programs with the US whenever possible, that is an indication of the 
seriousness of the threat posed by US regulations and practice to the future of US-led 
programs. 
It is important to begin with a short history of the program to indicate why the JSF is 
such a significant commitment (if not a gamble) by the UK. In the 1990s, the US Navy, 
Marine Corps and Air Force were working on a next-generation strike aircraft. In 1996, the 
JSF project was announced by the US At about the same time, the British Royal Navy was 
also looking at new Future Carrier Borne Aircraft capability for its CVF programme. The US 
and UK combined efforts in this area. The requirements of the US services drove the 
program, but the UK focus was on an attack aircraft with advanced Short Takeoff and 
Vertical Landing (STOVL) capabilities so that it could operate from forward battlefields as 
well as from aircraft carriers. The UK preference for the JSF was confirmed in a 2001 MOU 
with the US In 2002, the UK selected the STOVL variant to meet its future requirements, 
with a positive review of the JSF program and the STOVL design completed in 2005 (NAO, 
2008b, p. 45). 
It was important that as an indication of US support for this endeavour, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defence sent down instructions that the JSF program should emphasise 
international participation, and there was a consensus that the UK would participate in the 
program (Franck, Lewis & Udis, 2008, January 29). The US and UK engaged in extensive, 
detailed exchanges on the nature of the program and the UK role, compiled in the US-UK 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Framework MOU. Comprised of agreements, 
letters and other supporting material, it provides the details of the US-UK relationship on 
JSF.  
While decisions on specific numbers of fighters to be purchased were not required at 
the outset, the Royal Navy and Air Force were looking at the purchase of some 150 STOVL 
fighters to replace the Harriers. The UK participation began at the outset of the program, 
and the UK is the only "Level 1" partner contributing some $2 billion to the system design 
and development phase (Bolkcom, 2009). That designation means that the UK has 
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significant access to most aspects of the program as well as the ability to influence 
requirements and design solutions. And the UK will not have to pay the non-recurring R&D 
cost recoupment charge that normally accompanies the purchase of US military equipment 
and will receive a share of the levies on sales to third parties.   
However, the UK commitment to the JSF is not primarily based on programmatic 
considerations such as cost savings, but on a key national security determination. The UK 
made a policy decision on the need to retain an aircraft carrier capability, and the 
requirement for carrier-based fighters derived from that critical decision. The recent 
announcement by the Defence Minister of a postponement of the aircraft carrier production 
schedule by another two years due to constraints on the defence budget is obviously critical 
for that specific programme. The delays mean that the two carriers now have projected in-
service dates of 2015/16 and 2016/17. However, that decision on the carriers is separate 
from the discussions on the JSF fighters that will operate on those carriers. 
There is no doubt that the UK has made a significant wager in tying itself to the JSF 
program, for if there are major problems with the fighter, the UK will need to generate a 
"Plan B" to avoid having its aircraft carriers merely serving as floating platforms. If the 
STOVL version of the JSF does not emerge, the UK would be faced with the challenge of 
re-designing ships so that, for example, they would have new catapults. As of April 2007, 
the UK plan had been to bring in a total of 138 JSF fighters, with the bulk of the acquisition 
to begin starting in calendar year 2012 (Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, 2007). The 
MOD is already in the process of working through modelling and simulation to optimise the 
safety and operability of the new aircraft carriers and the JSF when the fighters arrive (Scott, 
2009).  
The delays and cost increases associated with the Eurofighter program were a factor 
in the UK consideration of participation in the JSF. In the aftermath of the Eurofighter 
experience, the fact that the JSF was structured so that the most competitive firms would 
win contracts was appealing to the UK, and in line with the goal of pursuing more efficient 
acquisition programs. And the fact that the US was providing the overwhelming amount of 
funding for a program with cutting-edge military technology was significant to all the 
participating states, including the UK. 
Adding to the list of factors pressing the UK to participate in JSF, the Defence 
Industrial Strategy places great emphasis on the need for the UK to remain interoperable 
with Allies, particularly the US It is also noteworthy that British industrial participation 
amplifies the UK focus on the JSF project. BAE Systems is the largest non-American 
participant in the JSF and has hoped for around £14 billion in development and production 
contracts (McGhie & Gee, 2006). Such a high level of BAE participation is to be expected, 
as it does the majority of its business in the US and is one of the largest suppliers to DoD. It 
is also noteworthy that BAE participation in the JSF was viewed in the UK as a seal of 
approval on the British ability to participate in cutting-edge military projects. Trade and 
Industry Secretary Patricia Hewitt said that BAE participation “proves that British companies 
can compete with the best in the world for the big contracts” (”Jet contract,” 2001). And there 
are potentially significant economic benefits. A Congressional Research Service (2009, p. 
17) study notes that the DoD conducted a 2003 assessment which determined that partner 
nations could potentially earn between $5 and $40 of revenue for every $1 invested in JSF 
program contracts. 
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As the technology transfer issue came to dominate the discussions on the JSF, it is 
also important to note the backdrop for US-UK military cooperation. Franck, Lewis & Udis 
(2008, January 29) note that it is estimated that 99.8% of licenses for UK-US transactions 
are approved, which accounts for some 8,500 items with a value of $14 billion, indicating 
that the routine operation of bilateral defence cooperation and technology transfer proceeds 
without friction. Moreover, the extent of UK-US defence industrial interconnection has 
increased substantially. Aside from BAE, UK firms have acquired 50 aerospace and defence 
firms in the US since 2001, which constitutes some three-quarters of all foreign investment 
in the US defence sector (p. 20-21). Major American defence contractors are established in 
the UK or have acquired operations or set up a presence in the UK.  
With this backdrop of increasing cooperation, the specific problems that arose 
regarding access to JSF source codes generated doubts in the UK regarding US-led military 
cooperative efforts that could have been avoided. Initially, commentary on the JSF was full 
of praise as a model for future multinational defence cooperation. That turned to criticism of 
the JSF as an example of why such efforts may not pass an all-encompassing cost-benefit 
analysis.  
It is a key operational requirements as well as a matter of sovereignty for the UK to 
be able to have the information needed to integrate, upgrade, operate and sustain the JSF 
as required. As a practical matter, the UK cannot buy into a system which requires a US 
maintenance team to take care of any problems that may arise or to arrange for required 
modifications. The House of Commons Defence Committee (2005) reported that:  
It is vital that the UK gets all the information and access to technology it requires 
from the U.S. to have 'Sovereign Capability'—the ability to maintain the Joint Strike 
Fighter aircraft and undertake future upgrades independently. The UK must receive 
adequate assurances that it will get all the information and access to technology it 
requires before the programme is too far advanced. If these assurances are not 
given, it is questionable whether the UK should continue its involvement in the 
programme. (p. 3) 
The Committee (2005, p. 29) emphasised that the UK could not accept a situation in 
which it could not operate the JSF independently of the US and pressed the Defence 
Minister to act to ensure the UK would have operational independence. It noted its 
expectation that the MOD would set a deadline by which the assurances on sovereign 
capability would be obtained from the US In December 2006, as the source code issue was 
heating up, the Committee warned that an assurance from the US was needed by the end of 
the year that it would provide the UK with all the requested technical information. In the 
absence of such an agreement by the end of 2006, the committee called on the government 
to develop a “plan B” to obtain alternative aircraft (”MPs warn,” 2006).  
From the UK perspective, the history of the political discussions to resolve the source 
code issue is not the best advertisement for multinational programs. Indeed, the fact that 
such issues never seemed to be fully resolved added to the frustration with US policy and 
practice. The technology transfer dispute had already been addressed in 2004, when 
Secretary of State for Defence Hoon wrote to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on the issue 
and referred to the fact that the US had signed an outline agreement on defence technology 
cooperation in 2002 (O'Connell, 2004). It is noteworthy that PM Blair believed he had 
reached an agreement with President Bush in May 2006, but, however, the dispute lingered 
on unresolved until the end of the year (Baldwin, 2006). Indeed, in the Defence 
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress, aware of UK concerns over this issue, 
advised the Secretary of Defence to share technology consistent with the national security 
interests of the US and UK (Bolkcom, 2009, p. 18).  
The importance of technology transfer in cooperative arrangements with the US was 
already set out in the DIS, where the significance of the US defence market and US defence 
spending was acknowledged. The DIS observation on the technology transfer point warrants 
a full recitation: 
To meet our own sovereign needs, it is important that we continue to have the 
autonomous capability to operate, support and where necessary adapt the 
equipment that we procure. Appropriate technology transfer is therefore of crucial 
importance. This is so for any cooperative project, but in practice difficulties have 
arisen particularly with the U.S., whose technology disclosure policy we have found 
less adapted to the needs of cooperative procurement than those of our partners in 
Europe. To reiterate, this is not about gaining competitive advantage for UK industry; 
it is about being confident that the equipment we buy meets the capability 
requirements against which it is procured and can be modified effectively to meet 
emerging requirements through life. We fully recognise the need to ensure that 
intellectual property is protected, and that appropriate measures are put in place to 
ensure this; security is a key issue for us, just as it is for the USA. But a certain 
degree of technology transfer is required if we are to be able to fully cooperate with 
the USA (or any other partner) on our equipment programmes. What we are striving 
towards is an agreed framework which facilitates this whilst ensuring that our mutual 
security needs are met. (MOD, 2005, December, p. 45) 
Difficulties with US practice arise even when it is not the most sensitive technology. 
One Lockheed-Martin employee noted that the restrictions on technology transfer have been 
“far more cumbersome and impenetrable than originally envisioned” and that it is necessary 
to ask for Washington’s approval of “even unclassified information exchanges” (Metz, 2005, 
p. KN3-7). Such requirements make it difficult for partners to participate, and generates a 
large administrative burden on the team members, who face the requirement that “all 
information is releasable under penalty of jail terms—not a conducive atmosphere for co-
engineering a product” (p. KN3-7).  
It is worth noting that the report of the Inspector General (IG) of the Department of 
Defense (2008) on security controls regarding JSF classified technology assessed seven 
applications from Northrup Grumman and BAE systems for detailed review. In addition, the 
IG's office evaluated security reports on BAE Systems facilities. While the assessment from 
the IG's office was a frank statement that JSF advanced technology "may have been 
compromised by unauthorized access at facilities and in computers at BAE Systems" (p. ii), 
the specific criticism was that DoD did not always use sufficient controls to evaluate potential 
unauthorised access to such technology (p. i). Indeed, the specific recommendation with 
regard to BAE Systems is that the Defence Security Service (DSS) could have bolstered its 
efforts by collecting, analysing and retaining security audit reports completed by BAE 
Systems, a point on which the Director of DSS concurred. The other recommendations 
involved the actions of DSS. 
Now that the source code issue has been resolved, the JSF is once again a low-
profile project. The House of Commons Defence Committee (2009) simply noted that the 
MOD has assessed that the JSF program is "progressing well" and the Committee would 
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monitor the progress of the program (p. 47). Secretary of State for Defence Hutton 
announced in March 2009 that the UK would purchase three F-35B operational test aircraft, 
indicating the UK commitment to the Operational Test and Evaluation phase of the JSF 
(JSF, 2009).  
Unfortunately, that does not erase the contentious history. If the JSF is an example 
of the future of multinational military cooperative programs, the source code dispute has 
clouded the picture. In late 2006, with the issue of source codes at its most contentious, an 
unnamed UK MOD official was quoted as stating, “If we can’t trust the Americans to provide 
this, then you would have to ask what else we should be doing with them in defence terms” 
(Baldwin, 2006).  
It is unfortunate that the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, signed in 2007, 
is still on hold. In September 2008, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee deferred a 
decision on ratification of the defence trade treaties with the UK and Australia until 2009 due 
to "too many unresolved questions" about both treaties (Wagstaff-Smith, 2009). The goal of 
the treaty, to cut red tape in the bilateral exchange of defence goods services and 
information, would have been a productive step forward. 
On the other hand, such complaints about US policy are long-standing, and it is not 
clear how heavily they will weigh on the decisions of other nations to work with the US on 
military projects. As Franck, Lewis and Udis (2008, January 29) point out, “very few national 
military establishments can generate sufficient orders to sustain a weapons source of 
efficient size in any category” (p. 17). And with the rapid growth of military technology (and 
the concomitant growth of costs) the essential nature of the US in any development program 
will clearly increase.  
However, the US should consider whether it can afford to be indifferent to the 
willingness of other nations to participate in, and carry some of the costs of, such defence 
programs. Spreading the burden of large development costs would presumably be 
appealing to the DoD. Increasing costs also have ramifications with regard to the production 
phase of future programs. It is an open question whether DoD contracts alone would be 
sufficient to sustain US military contractors.  
The Congressional Research Service has noted that while the US aviation industry is 
positioned to compete in the growing global market for civil aircraft, "the extent to which 
such economic conditions may preserve an adequate US defence industrial base for the 
development and production of combat aircraft is debatable, however, given the significant 
differences between civilian and military aircraft requirements and technologies" (Bolkcom, 
2009, p. 17). Even US firms and the DoD may need to focus more on overseas sales to 
sustain programs. And if the US wishes to generate significant sales to other nations, then it 
is important that such equipment address the fundamental issues of operational 
requirements and sovereignty which have been critical to the UK in the JSF.  
If the JSF experience is an indication of wider structural problems, it suggests that 
multinational military development programs may be too difficult to be politically or 
economically feasible. Technology transfer issues may generate too much friction. Difficult 
decisions on the awarding of contracts may be too hard to overcome. Increased costs may 
not be sufficient to counter-balance political and programmatic challenges. The extent of the 
obstacles to multinational projects should be more thoroughly researched and analysed. 
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If these problems are indeed too difficult to overcome to allow for efficient 
multinational development programs, then perhaps the better option might be for 
multinational acquisition programs. In such arrangements, there would be fewer states 
participating in development and more states signing up for purchase of the equipment. This 
could reduce the impact of some of the more contentious issues while increasing 
interoperability. However, there would still be significant difficulties, especially political 
problems, and technology transfer problems would only be reduced, but not eliminated. 
Once again, it would be important to more thoroughly research and analyse the potential 
benefits of greater multinational acquisition programs. If the structure of such arrangements 
allows for more efficiency in development and production, and addresses the concerns of 
individual military establishments, it might be a more cost-effective option. 
Conclusion 
To return to a central theme of this paper, it appears to the UK that scarcer 
resources and increasingly expensive military projects make it imperative to look closely at 
innovative approaches to defence acquisition. While new theories should be welcomed and 
encouraged, it is far less speculative to study the concrete "lessons learned" from the 
practice of other defence establishments. The goal of examining these four critical areas of 
UK defence acquisition was not to indicate that the UK has a formula or solution. Instead, it 
was to highlight new approaches to new challenges and the results of some innovative 
practices.  
The C-17 decision indicates the benefits that can be obtained by focussing on 
capabilities. The UK Defence Industrial Strategy shows the value of a serious assessment of 
which domestic military capabilities are essential. The UK view of European defence 
cooperation theory and practice provides a sobering assessment of its shortcomings. And 
the UK experience with the JSF indicates the extent of the difficulties generated by US 
technology transfer and export control policies to promoting military development programs 
led by the US.  
The expectation is that commentators will have other views on these UK examples. 
From the UK perspective, that is the point: close scrutiny and analysis of practice in other 
nations is an important exercise for any defence force, particularly in these financially 
challenging times. It would be valuable to intensify research on the comparative policies and 
practices of various defence establishments. And it would be instructive to bear in mind the 
approach taken by the defence industry: increasingly ignoring national boundaries, and 
working to ensure that they can operate and transfer expertise across boundaries.  
At a time when defence budgets are under pressure and the use of the word "crisis" 
may not be an overstatement, it is important for military establishments to reassess how 
they are conducting defence acquisition and to consider new and innovative ways of doing 
business. In short, there is no more appropriate time to intensively research and analyse the 
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May 13, 2009 
Panel 10 - Implementing Open Architecture in Weapons System 
Development 
3:30 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
 
Chair: William P. Bray, Director, Integrated Combat Systems, PEO Integrated 
Warfare Systems 
Discussant: Victor Gavin, Executive Director, PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare 
Application of Model-based Systems Engineering Methods to 
Development of Combat System Architectures 
Mike Green, Naval Postgraduate School 
Software Licenses, Open Source Components, and Open Architectures 
Thomas Alspaugh, Hazeline Asuncion and Walt Scacchi, University 
of California, Irvine 
 
Chair: Mr. William P. Bray is currently the Director of Integrated Combat Systems for PEO IWS. In 
this position, Bray is responsible for systems engineering activities across the PEO, development 
and execution of the Surface Navy Open Architecture strategy, and the development of an 
integrated POM submittal for the PEO. As a collateral duty, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RDA) designated Bray as the Deputy for the Joint 
PEO Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) in September 2006. 
Bray was appointed to the Senior Executive Service (SES) in August 2006 and has 24 years of 
government service. 
During the period of August 2006 through November 2008, Bray was the Major Program 
Manager (MPM) for Surface Navy Combat Systems. This included the program management 
and execution for the development, deployment, and in-service management of Combat 
Systems on the AEGIS Cruisers and Destroyers and the Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) 
that is on Carriers and Amphibious class ships. In this capacity, he managed a budget of 
approximately $650 million a year, and $4.1 billion across the FYDP and across all 
appropriations, and managed a headquarters organization composed of approximately 70 
military and civilian personnel. 
Prior to this selection, Bray was the Director for Naval Architectures and Integrated Combat 
Systems in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Integrated Warfare 
Systems (DASN IWS) within the Office of the ASN RDA from April 2004 until August 2006. He 
was responsible for the oversight and execution of a select portfolio which included Joint 
programs and initiatives such as SIAP, Naval Integrated Fire Control–Counter Air (NIFC-CA), 
Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) and Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense (IAMD) Roadmaps and Navy Combat Systems. 
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In July 2003, Bray was the Mission Capability Manager in the Naval Sea Systems Command 
(SEA 06), Washington Navy Yard, DC, where he led efforts to assess the Sea Power 21 Pillars 
of Sea Shield, Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and FORCEnet for OPNAV. 
In January 2001, Bray accepted a position in the Aegis Program Office, Washington Navy Yard, 
as the Air Defense Systems Engineer and, later, became the Deputy Combat Systems 
Engineer, responsible for the development of Combat Systems for the AEGIS Cruisers and 
Destroyers. 
In 1998, Bray accepted a position with the STANDARD Missile Program Office (PMS 422), 
Arlington, VA, leading Program Office efforts in the areas of Performance Assessment, Test 
and Evaluation, and Reliability and In-service Engineering.  
Prior to accepting the position in the STANDARD Missile Program Office, Bray began his 
professional career at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division, CA in December 
1984 as missile flight analyst for STANDARD Missile. For the next 14 years, Bray held a series 
of progressively more responsible positions at NSWC Corona—including STANDARD Missile 
Branch Manager, Command Chief Scientist, and the Battle Group Reconstruction Division 
Manager.  
Bray graduated from The Pennsylvania State University in 1984 with a Bachelor of Science 
degree in Engineering. While at NSWC Corona, Bray earned a Master’s of Science in Systems 
Management from the University of Southern California. In addition, he is DAWIA Level III 
certified in Program Management, Systems Planning, Research, Development, and 
Engineering, and Test and Evaluation. He has been a member of the Acquisition Professional 
Community since February 1998. 
Discussant: Mr. Victor Gavin is currently Executive Director for the Program Executive Officer 
for Littoral and Mine Warfare, and was appointed to the Senior Executive Service on February 
2007. PEO LMW executes the Navy’s acquisition programs for Mine Warfare, Unmanned 
Maritime Vehicles, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Antiterrorism Afloat, Naval Special Warfare, 
Maritime Surveillance Systems, and the Mission Modules for the Littoral Combat Ship.  
Gavin’s previous position was as Technical Director, PEO Submarines. He was responsible for 
all Submarine Combat Systems acquisition and PEO-directed Research and Development. 
This includes modernization of all in-service submarines (5 classes) and new construction 
(VIRGINIA Class) submarines under the Submarine Warfare Federated Tactical System 
(SWFTS) family of systems. In addition, Gavin coordinated the integrated budget development 
for all Team Submarine programs.  
Gavin attended North Carolina Agricultural and Technology State University and graduated with 
a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering in 1985. He also obtained a Master of 
Science Degree in Systems Engineering from Virginia Polytechnic Institute in 1996.  
Gavin’s civilian service began in a cooperative education program between the Naval 
Underwater System Center and North Carolina A&T State University. After graduation, he 
returned to NUSC to serve as systems engineer for submarine combat systems. Here, he 
became a key participant in the development of the AN/BSY-1 Combat System, which was the 
primary combat system for second-flight fast-attack submarines.  
From 1988 to 1996, Gavin served as the on-site government representative at Lockheed Martin 
in Manassas, VA. As the leader of this multidiscipline organization, he provided the technical 
oversight necessary to deliver the combat system to twenty-three submarines.  
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Gavin joined NAVSEA headquarters in 1996 as the Chief Engineer for the Submarine 
Acoustics Programs. He led the Navy’s efforts to migrate sonar systems development from a 
Military Specification environment to a Commercial Off-the-shelf (COTS) environment as part of 
the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion Program (ARCI). In 2000, Gavin was selected as Assistant 
Program Manager for Submarine Acoustics, where he established the business processes for 
acquiring COTS-based systems.  
In 2002, Gavin was assigned the Assistant Program Manager for Combat Systems 
development. He planned and managed the development of combat systems for every US 
submarine variant, as well as for Collins Class submarines of the Royal Australian Navy. He 
later became the first civilian Program Manager of the Combat System Program Office.  
His awards include Navy Meritorious Civil Service Award, Navy Superior Civilian Service 
Award, and the Vice President Gore Hammer Award for Acquisition Streamlining.  
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Port Hueneme, CA 
Abstract 
Navy acquisition activities frequently produce combat system architectures based on 
existing systems rather than on stakeholder requirements. This approach limits software 
component reuse, which, in turn, limits potential application to other platforms. The objective 
of this Capstone project was to develop a methodology for creating complex combat system 
architectures that emphasize the use of Software Product Lines (SPLs), requirements 
traceability, integrated supportability and Modeling and Simulation (M&S) early and 
throughout the approach. To address this objective, an integrated methodology that utilizes 
Model-based Systems Engineering (MBSE) to create open, supportable combat system 
architectures was developed. The methodology was evaluated by applying it to a naval 
surface combatant Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) mission area. Application of the methodology led 
to the following major findings: (1) Proven systems engineering practices, languages and 
tools can be integrated with the MBSE approach for developing complex architectures; (2) 
Creation of domain-centered SPLs facilitates planned reuse and allows for assessment to 
candidate architectures; (3) Requirements traceability can be achieved by using a 
combination of modeling languages and tools; (4) M&S application can extend beyond 
operational scenarios to address lifecycle cost, and (5) Engineers and logisticians can 
effectively use MBSE to integrate supportability into design. Overall, this project 
demonstrated the benefits of an MBSE approach tailored to developing affordable and 
supportable combat system architectures that meet mission requirements. 
Overview 
This paper is a description of the Master of Science in Systems Engineering 
Capstone project completed by the students of Cohort Six from Naval Surface Weapons 
Center, Port Hueneme, CA. They were assigned this problem because Navy acquisition 
activities frequently produce combat system architectures based on existing systems rather 
than on stakeholder requirements. This approach limits software component reuse, which, in 
turn, limits potential application to other platforms. The development of systems tends to be 
by platform rather than by application or warfare area. A second system development issue 
is that Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 (2008) prescribes the early 
integration of supportability requirements; however, current methods or processes do not do 
so. Methodologies currently in use—such as the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
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framework—may identify supportability as a requirement but tend not to maintain it as a 
priority throughout the development process. 
In response to these issues, an integrated methodology that utilizes MBSE and the 
Agile process was defined to create open and supportable system architectures. This 
methodology incorporates a common modeling language, utilizes domain analysis to 
support Software Product Line (SPL) reuse, maintains traceability of requirements and 
architecture functionality, and integrates supportability, sustainment and lifecycle cost 
considerations. Also described in this project is a system engineering process that outlines 
requirements generation analysis, functional analysis and allocation, architecture definition, 
and Verification and Validation (V&V).  
The methodology was evaluated by applying it to an Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) mission 
thread—in particular, Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD). The AAW implementation included 
the development of a systems architecture and design artifacts, including Department of 
Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) views. The project demonstrated the benefits of 
an MBSE approach tailored to developing architectures that support Open Architecture 
(OA), SPL, and integrating supportability early in the system development process. 
Technical conclusions resulting from the research, development and application of the 
methodology are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
Problem Statement and Capstone Objective 
Recognizing that current DoD processes for developing combat system architectures 
are heavily influenced by legacy processes and systems—which inhibit the incorporation of 
supportability requirements up-front in design—project leaders assigned the students to 
meet the DoD objective of acquiring and fielding interoperable, supportable system 
architectures that utilized the Open Architecture (OA) paradigm. They were further tasked to 
address the use of Software Product Lines (SPLs) and capture the results in a form that was 
compliant with the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF). They were specifically told to 
develop a MBSE approach. In addition, they were to integrate supportability issues, 
requirements traceability and identify a structure which supports combat system software 
reuse. 
Project Organization 
Figure 1 shows the various organizational structures the students adopted as they 
progressed through the project. At first there was a reluctance to change, but eventually 
they learned that they had to adapt the organization to the task. Once that lesson was 
learned, the students became proficient in developing their work products. 
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Figure 1. IPT Structure Evolving with Capstone Project Need 
Two other lessons learned were that small teams were more efficient and that the 
project needs a chief architect. 
Methodology Overview 
The result of the literature searches into each element of the problem set is 













• No single process or solution
• M&S & Supportability limited
• Select correct modeling language
• DoDAF is not a process 
• MBSE provides significant benefits










Figure 2. Overview of the Model Development 
The initial research findings are significant in that the students came to understand 
that development of complex systems requires a through understanding of processes and 
tools available. Figure 3 illustrates how the students integrated the literature with practice. 
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Analysis: Does Proposed Architecture meet 
Stated Requirements?
 
Figure 3. The Big Picture 
Two of the takeaways from Figure 3 are these: 1) to deal with complex problems, 
one requires multiple frames of reference, and 2) integration of methods is needed to 
provide a more complete description of the potential solution. The following paragraphs 
provide more detail about the approach the students developed. 
Methodology Top-tier Process 
Figure 4 is the representation of how the students viewed the process of going from 
a specification to architecture. 
  
Figure 4. The Overall Methodology 
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They developed four main processes as shown in the figure above: (1) requirements 
generation and analysis, (2) functional analysis and allocation, (3) architecture definition, 
and (4) verification and validation. They verified these processes by developing an AAW 
Mission Architecture. The following paragraphs describe the four sub-processes. 
(1) Requirements Generation and Analysis Process 
Figure 5 provides the detail of the requirements generation and analysis step and 
how it interfaces with the other three steps in the methodology. Figure 6 shows the outcome 
of the requirements step.  
Requirements lessons learned can be summed up as follows: 
 It was necessary to expand the use of modeling because of the insights it 
provided in requirements decomposition and allocation. M&S can result in 
improved decomposition and allocation. 
 It was important to understand the relationship between requirements artifacts for 
traceability at the tier level and across artifact boundaries. 
 It was essential to keep the requirements tool set database current for both 
traceability and verification of allocation. 
 Process execution improved over time; i.e., the teams became more effective 
with experience. 
 The process resulted in valid artifacts that support Capstone objectives. 
 The tools, skill sets, and processes are not in place to lead requirements 
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Figure 5. The Requirements Generation Process 
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Figure 6. Requirements Results/Products 
(2) Functional Analysis and Allocation Process  
The approach to functional analysis was straightforward and is shown in Figure 7. 
Some of the key lessons learned were to plan tool usage. The process is iterative, and the 
data is developed in a drill-down manner. A second point was that to ensure that the result 
is correct, a subject-matter expert (SME) is important and should be readily available; 
otherwise, there is a tendency for engineers to map based on experience. The level of input 
is only as good as the SME’s knowledge. It should be noted that technical, language, 
method, and tool SMEs are different and that a blend of talent is required. 
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Figure 7. Functional Analysis Process Diagram 
Figure 8 shows some of the key artifacts developed during this part of the process. 
The artifacts provided powerful depictions for communicating and for analysis in design and 
development. 
In the execution of the process, the Hatley-Pirbhai method was integrated with the 
SysML language to provide a sound SE approach within the MBSE format. The outcome of 
this approach is a requirements model, as shown on the left side of Figure 9. The 
architecture process diagram illustrates how the students built the right side of the model. 
 =




Figure 8. Functional Analysis Results/Products 
 
Figure 9. The Hatley-Pirbhai Models 
(3) Architecture Definition Process  
The development of the architecture followed the process shown in Figure 10. In 
developing the architecture from the previous step, the students encountered some 
interesting issues. First, there was a lack of core knowledge in the architecture development 
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process. Use of the Hatley-Pirbhai paradigm provided an approach that overcame the 
inexperience issue. Figure 11 is the Hatley-Pirbhai architecture template. This template is 
reusable at every level of analysis and allows for a more formal approach than natural 
language descriptions. 
 
Figure 10. Architecture Process Diagram 
 
 
Figure 11. Hatley-Pirbhai Architecture Template 
There was also an issue with software architecture quality attributes not being fully 
defined or measurable. The student solution was the use of an objective hierarchy to assess 
architecture, as shown in Figure 12. One of the subtle realizations by the students was the 
applicability of Six Sigma techniques to all the steps discussed so far. 
The students initially had a problem with a lack of common task and function 
descriptions. This was caused by different teams working on different parts of the problem 
using different tools. This issue was resolved as the students reorganized and reduced the 
size of the team working on this area. 
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Figure 12. SW Architecture Objective Hierarchy 
This reorganization helped with developing the software architecture shown on the 
left side of Figure 13. Figure 13 shows the relationship of the software architecture to the 
production plan (much simplified in this diagram) to the product line library on the right. 
 
Figure 13. Project Software Architecture and SPL Library Framework 
(4) Verification and Validation Process 
As shown in Figure 14, modeling and simulation was used to identify both feasibility 
and configuration performance differences, as well as to verify requirements. The parallel 
analysis efforts for functional analysis and architecture development required adaptable 
models that could be updated as Systems Engineering artifacts were created. The students 
initially had problems with trying to put too much detail into the model rather than focusing 
on process execution. As they gained experience, they were able to use a block-oriented 
simulation language to develop model variations very quickly. 
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Figure 14. M&S Process Diagram 
Overall, M&S provided valuable insight into architecture design, requirements 
decomposition, and related performance issues. 
Capstone Conclusions and Recommendations 
The students made the following recommendations. First, provide logisticians with 
the background to participate early in the acquisition cycle. In this study, logisticians 
demonstrated the required skills to work in systems concept and development. Second, 
establish domain-specific components and quality attributes. Identify a QA weighting system 
to balance sustainment and performance by domain. Third, develop SPL library criteria and 
characteristics. Define data tags required to assess SPL reusability. Fourth, continue the 
research effort to a V&V methodology. Execution of the methodology to develop S/W, H/W 
and Interface Components will result in additional findings/lessons learned. Finally, leverage 
the methodology to estimate lifecycle cost and RAM through M&S, and use artifacts to 
support early LCCE and RAM KPP reporting requirements. 
Overall Project Summary 
Proven systems engineering practices, languages and tools can be integrated with 
the MBSE approach for developing complex architectures. Through decomposition of the 
objectives and associated research, the students were able to identify many solutions and 
methodologies available to support a top-down or bottom-up approach. Based on tenets 
from multiple authors, the student teams developed a new end-to-end methodology for 
system design—to include key aspects in requirements generation, architecture 
development, and modeling and simulation.  
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Requirements traceability can be achieved by using a combination of modeling 
languages and tools. Traceability is critical on large, complex systems due to the sheer 
volume of technical data and the likelihood of human error when trying to conduct V&V 
manually using engineering artifacts. Students achieved requirements generation and 
traceability using the Systems Modeling Language (SysML) as the modeling language and 
CORE as the architecture tool. They reduced manual V&V errors, given that SysML contains 
methods based on the allocation relationship depicted in the artifacts for verifying 
traceability. They used sample test criteria and events to successfully verify that CORE 
could be used to assess demonstration of requirements.   
M&S can provide significant value in conducting tradeoffs during design. However, 
the majority of M&S is focused on verifying operational parameters within scenarios vice 
optimizing system design. Students applied M&S using a top-down approach to verify 
system operational behavior and to validate initial operational requirements. They used the 
software tool Extend to perform the simulation of a raid scenario. Through multiple variations 
of models and simulations, it was found that there could be anomalies or elements that need 
adjustment in the architecture. The unexpected results from the raw data led to more 
extensive research of the initial inputs, which led to additional simulation runs. Defining 
objectives, processes and model development were all key milestones in building the 
Extend model.  
Engineers and logisticians can effectively use MBSE to integrate supportability into 
system design. The Navy advocates the integration of supportability early in the concept 
development and design phases, but very little training or guidance is provided on how to 
effectively do this. Many logisticians are not equipped with the knowledge or experience to 
adequately support initial system concept and architecture development. Similarly, many 
design engineers lack the training and experience of considering supportability during 
concept exploration, design and development. On this project, engineers and logisticians 
collaborated to meet the expressed objective of integrating supportability into design as 
depicted in the resulting artifacts. Supportability was considered during requirements 
generation, functional analysis and architecture composition. The integration of 
supportability early in design provided the maintenance concept and planning phases with a 
solid foundation for conducting tradeoff decisions between operational enhancements and 
lifecycle sustainment considerations.  
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Abstract 
A substantial number of enterprises and independent software vendors are adopting 
a strategy in which software-intensive systems are developed with an open architecture 
(OA) that may contain open source software (OSS) components or components with open 
APIs. The emerging challenge is to realize the benefits of openness when components are 
subject to different copyright or property licenses. In this paper, we identify key properties of 
OSS licenses, present a license analysis scheme to identify license conflicts arising from 
composed software elements, and apply it to provide guidance for software architectural 
design choices whose goal is to enable specific licensed component configurations. Our 
scheme has been implemented in an operational environment and demonstrates a practical, 
automated solution to the problem of determining overall rights and obligations for 
alternative OAs. 
1. Introduction 
It has been common for OSS projects to require developers to contribute their work 
under conditions that ensure the project can license its products under a specific OSS 
license. For example, the Apache Contributor License Agreement grants enough rights to 
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the Apache Software Foundation for the foundation to license the resulting systems under 
the Apache License. This sort of license configuration, in which the rights to a system’s 
components are homogenously granted and the system has a well-defined OSS license, 
was the norm and continues to this day. 
However, we more and more commonly see a different license configuration in which 
the components of a system do not have the same license. The resulting system may not 
have any recognized OSS license at all—in fact, our research indicates this is the most likely 
outcome. Instead, if all goes well in its design, there will be enough rights available in the 
system so that it can be used and distributed—and perhaps modified by others and 
sublicensed, if the corresponding obligations are met. These obligations are likely to differ 
for components with different licenses; a BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution)-licensed 
component must preserve its copyright notices when made part of the system—for example, 
while the source code for a modified component covered by MPL (the Mozilla Public 
License) must be made public—and a component with a reciprocal license such as the Free 
Software Foundation’s GPL (General Public License) might carry the obligation to distribute 
the source code of that component but also of other components that constitute “a whole 
which is a work based on” the GPL’d component. The obligations may conflict, as when a 
GPL’d component’s reciprocal obligation to publish source code of other components is 
combined with a proprietary license’s prohibition of publishing source code—in which case, 
there may be no rights available for the system as a whole (not even the right of use), 
because the obligations of the licenses that would permit use of its components cannot 
simultaneously be met. 
The central problem we examine and explain in this paper is to identify principles of 
software architecture and software licenses that facilitate or inhibit success of the OA 
strategy when OSS and other software components with open APIs are employed. This is 
the knowledge we seek to develop and deliver. Without such knowledge, it is unlikely that an 
OA that is clean, robust, transparent, and extensible can be readily produced. On a broader 
scale, this paper seeks to explore and answer the following kinds of research questions:  
 What license applies to an OA system composed of components with different 
licenses? 
 How do alternative OSS licenses facilitate or inhibit the development of OA 
systems?  
 How should software license constraints be specified to make it possible to 
automatically determine the overall set of rights and obligations associated with 
a configured software system architecture? 
This paper may help establish a foundation for how to analyze and evaluate 
dependencies that might arise when seeking to develop software systems that embody an 
OA when different types of software components or software licenses are being considered 
for integration into an overall system configuration.  
In the remainder of this paper, we examine software licensing constraints. This is 
followed by an analysis of how these constraints can interact in order to determine the 
overall license constraints applicable to the configured system architecture. Next, we 
describe an operational environment that demonstrates automatic determination of license 
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constraints associated with a configured system architecture, and thus offers a solution to 
the problem we face. We close with a discussion of the conclusions that follow. 
2. Background 
There is little explicit guidance or reliance on systematic empirical studies for how 
best to develop, deploy, and sustain complex software systems when different OA and OSS 
objectives are at hand. Instead, we find narratives that provide ample motivation and belief 
in the promise and potential of OA and OSS without consideration of what challenges may 
lie ahead in realizing OA and OSS strategies. Ven (2008) is a recent exception. 
We believe that a primary challenge to be addressed is how to determine whether a 
system, composed of subsystems and components each with specific OSS or proprietary 
licenses and integrated into the system’s planned configuration, is or is not open, and what 
license constraints apply to the configured system as a whole. This challenge comprises not 
only evaluating an existing system at run-time but also at design-time and build-time for a 
proposed system to ensure that the result is “open” under the desired definition and that 
only the acceptable licenses apply; another important aspect of this challenge is 
understanding which licenses are acceptable in this context. Because there is a range of 
types and variants of licenses (OSI, 2008), each of which may affect a system in different 
ways, and because there are a number of different kinds of OSS-related components and 
ways of combining them that affect the licensing issue, an essential first step is to 
understand the kinds of software elements that constitute a software architecture, and what 
kinds of licenses may encumber these elements or their overall configuration.  
OA seems to simply mean software system architectures incorporating OSS 
components and open application program interfaces (APIs). But not all software system 
architectures incorporating OSS components and open APIs will produce an OA, since the 
openness of an OA depends on: (a) how/why OSS and open APIs are located within the 
system architecture, (b) how OSS and open APIs are implemented, embedded, or 
interconnected, (c) whether the copyright (Intellectual Property) licenses assigned to 
different OSS components encumber all/part of a software system's architecture into which 
they are integrated, and (d) the fact that many alternative architectural configurations and 
APIs exist that may or may not produce an OA (Alspaugh & Antón, 2007; Scacchi & 
Alspaugh, 2008). Subsequently, we believe this can lead to situations in which new software 
development or acquisition requirements stipulate a software system with an OA and OSS, 
but the resulting software system may or may not embody an OA. This can occur when the 
architectural design of a system constrains system requirements—raising the question of 
what requirements can be satisfied by a given system architecture when requirements 
stipulate specific types or instances of OSS (e.g., Web browsers and content management 
servers) to be employed (Scacchi, 2002), or what architecture style (Bass, Clements & 
Kazman, 2003) is implied by a given set of system requirements.  
Thus, given the goal of realizing an OA and OSS strategy together with the use of 
OSS components and open APIs, it is unclear how to best align acquisition, system 
requirements, software architectures, and OSS elements across different software license 
regimes to achieve this goal (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008). 
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3. Understanding Open Architectures 
The statement that a system is intended to embody an open architecture using open 
software technologies like OSS and APIs does not clearly indicate what possible mix of 
software elements may be configured into such a system. To help explain this, we first 
identify what kinds of software elements are included in common software architectures, 
whether they are open or closed (Bass et al., 2003). 
 Software source code components—(a) stand-alone programs, (b) libraries, 
frameworks, or middleware, (c) inter-application script code (e.g., C shell scripts), 
and (d) intra-application script code (e.g., to create Rich Internet Applications using 
domain-specific languages such as XUL for Firefox Web browser (Feldt, 2007) or 
“mashups” (Nelson & Churchill, 2006)).  
 Executable components—These are programs for which the software is in binary 
form, and its source code may not be open for access, review, modification, and 
possible redistribution. Executable binaries can be viewed as “derived works” 
(Rosen, 2005). 
 Application program interfaces/APIs—The availability of externally visible and 
accessible APIs to which independently developed components can be connected 
is the minimum condition required to form an “open system” (Meyers & Obendorf, 
2001).  
 Software connectors—In addition to APIs, these may be software either from 
libraries, frameworks, or application script code, whose intended purpose is to 
provide a standard or reusable way of associating programs, data repositories, or 
remote services through common interfaces. The High Level Architecture (HLA) is 
an example of a software connector scheme (Kuhl, Weatherly & Damann, 2000), 
as are CORBA, Microsoft's .NET, Enterprise Java Beans, and LGPL libraries. 
 Configured system or sub-system architectures—These are software systems that 
can be built to conform to an explicit architectural design. They include software 
source code components, executable components, APIs, and connectors that are 
organized in a way that may conform to a known “architectural style” such as the 
Representational State Transfer (Fielding & Taylor, 2002) for Web-based client-
server applications, or may represent an original or ad hoc architectural pattern 
(Bass et al., 2003). Each of the software elements—and the pattern in which they 
are arranged and interlinked—can all be specified, analyzed, and documented 
using an Architecture Description Language and ADL-based support tools (Bass et 
al., 2003; Medvidovic, Rosenblum & Taylor, 1999).  
Figure 1 provides an overall view of an archetypal software architecture for a 
configured system that includes and identifies each of the software elements above, as well 
as including free/open source software (e.g., Gnome Evolution) and closed source software 
(WordPerfect) components. In simple terms, the configured system consists of software 
components (grey boxes in the figure) that include a Mozilla Web browser, Gnome Evolution 
e-mail client, and WordPerfect word processor, all running on a Linux operating system that 
can access file, print, and other remote-networked servers (e.g., an Apache Web server). 
These components are interrelated through a set of software connectors (ellipses in the 
figure) that connect the interfaces of software components (small white boxes attached to a 
component) and link them together. Modern-day enterprise systems or command-and-
control systems will generally have more complex architectures and a more diverse mix of 
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software components than shown in the figure here. As we examine next, even this simple 
architecture raises a number of OSS licensing issues that constrain the extent of openness 
that may be realized in a configured OA. 
 
Figure 1. An Archetypal Software Architecture Depicting Components (grey 
boxes), Connectors (ellipses), Interfaces (small boxes on components),  
and Data/Control Links 
4. Understanding Open Software Licenses 
A particularly knotty challenge is the problem of licenses in OSS and OA. There are 
a number of different OSS licenses, and their number continues to grow. Each license 
stipulates different constraints attached to software components that bear it. External 
references are available which describe and explain many different licenses that are now in 
use with OSS (Fontana et al., 2008; OSI, 2008; Rosen, 2005; St. Laurent, 2004).  
More and more software systems are designed, built, released, and distributed as 
OAs composed of components from different sources, some proprietary and others not. 
Systems include components that are statically bound or interconnected at build-time, while 
other components may only be dynamically linked for execution at run-time, and thus might 
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not be included as part of a software release or distribution. Software components in such 
systems evolve not only by ongoing maintenance but also by architectural refactoring, 
alternative component interconnections, and component replacement (via maintenance 
patches, installation of new versions, or migration to new technologies). Software 
components in such systems may be subject to different software licenses, and later 
versions of a component may be subject to different licenses (e.g., from CDDL—Sun’s 
Common Development and Distribution License—to GPL, or from GPLv2 to GPLv3).  
Software systems with open architectures are subject to different software licenses 
than may be common with traditional, proprietary, closed source systems from a single 
vendor. Software architects/developers must increasingly attend to how they design, 
develop, and deploy software systems that may be subject to multiple and possibly 
conflicting software licenses. We see architects, developers, software acquisition managers, 
and others concerned with OAs as falling into three groups. The first group pays little or no 
heed to license conflicts and obligations; they simply focus on the other goals of the system. 
Those in the second group have assets and resources, and, in order to protect these, they 
may have an army of lawyers to advise them on license issues and other potential 
vulnerabilities; or they may constrain the design of their systems so that only a small number 
of software licenses (possibly just one) are involved—excluding components with other 
licenses independent of whether such components represent a more effective or more 
efficient solution. The third group falls between these two extremes; members of this group 
want to design, develop, and distribute the best systems possible, while they respect the 
constraints associated with different software component licenses. Their goal is a configured 
OA system that meets all its goals and for which all the license obligations for the needed 
copyrights are satisfied. It is this third group that needs the guidance the present work seeks 
to provide. 
There has been an explosion in the number, type, and variants of software licenses, 
especially with open source software (OSI, 2008). Software components are now available 
subject to licenses such as the General Public License (GPL), Mozilla Public License (MPL), 
Apache Public License, (APL), Academic licenses (e.g., BSD, MIT), Creative Commons, 
Artistic, and others as well as Public Domain (either via explicit declaration or by expiration 
of prior copyright license). Furthermore, licenses such as these can evolve, resulting in new 
license versions over time. But no matter their diversity, software licenses represent a legally 
enforceable contract that is recognized by government agencies, corporate enterprises, 
individuals, and judicial courts, and, as a result, they cannot be taken trivially. As a 
consequence, software licenses constrain open architectures and thus architectural design 
decisions. 
So how might we support the diverse needs of different software developers with 
respect to their need to design, develop, and deploy configured software systems with 
different, possibly conflicting licenses for the software components they employ? Is it 
possible to provide automated means for helping software developers determine what 
constraints will result at design-time, build-time, or run-time when their configured system 
architectures employ diverse licensed components? These are the kind of questions we 
address in this paper. 
4.1. Software Licenses: Rights and Obligations 
Copyright, the common basis for software licenses, gives the original author of a 
work certain exclusive rights, which for software include the right to use, copy, modify, 
merge, publish, distribute, sub-license, and sell copies. These rights may be licensed to 
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others, including individuals or groups, and they may be licensed either exclusively so that 
no one else can exercise them or (more commonly) non-exclusively. After a period of years, 
the rights enter the public domain, but, until then, the only way for anyone other than the 
author to have access to the copyright is to license it. 
Licenses may impose obligations that must be met in order for the licensee to realize 
the assigned rights. Commonly cited obligations include the obligation to buy a legal copy to 
use and not distribute copies (proprietary licenses), the obligation to preserve copyright and 
license notices (academic licenses), the obligation to publish at no cost source code that 
has been modified (MPL), or the reciprocal obligation to publish all source code included at 
build-time or statically linked (GPL).  
Licenses may provide for the creation of derivative works (e.g., a transformation or 
adaptation of existing software) or collective works (e.g., a Linux distribution that combines 
software from many independent sources) from the original work by granting those rights, 
possibly with corresponding obligations. 
In addition, the author of an original work can make it available under more than one 
license, enabling the work’s distribution to different audiences with different needs. For 
example, one licensee might be happy to pay a license fee in order to be able to distribute 
the work as part of a proprietary product whose source code is not published, while another 
might need to license the work under MPL rather than GPL in order to have consistent 
licensing across a system. The result is the distribution of software under any one of several 
licenses, with the licensee choosing from two (“dual license”) or three (Mozilla’s “tri-license”) 
licenses. 
The basic relationship between software license rights and obligations can be 
summarized as follows: if you meet the specified obligations, then you get the specified 
rights. In other words, for the academic licenses, if you retain the copyright notice, list of 
license conditions, and disclaimer, then you have the right to use, modify, merge, sub-
license, etc. For MPL, if you publish modified source code and sub-licensed derived works 
under MPL, then you get all the MPL rights. These same relationships apply for other types 
of licenses. However, one thing we have learned from our efforts to carefully analyze and 
lay out the obligations and rights pertaining to each license is that license details are difficult 
to comprehend and track—it is easy to get confused or make mistakes. Some of the OSS 
licenses were written by developers, and often these turn out to be incomplete and legally 
ambiguous; others, usually more recent, were written by lawyers and are more exact and 
complete but can be difficult for non-lawyers to grasp. The challenge is multiplied when 
dealing with configured system architectures that compose multiple components with 
heterogeneous licenses so that the need for legal interpretations begins to seem inevitable 
(Fontana et al., 2008; Rosen, 2005). Therefore, one of our goals is to make it possible to 
architect software systems of heterogeneously licensed components without necessarily 
consulting legal counsel. Similarly, such a goal is best realized with automated support that 
can help architects understand design choices across components with different licenses 
and that can provide support for testing build-time releases and run-time distributions to 
make sure they achieve the specified rights by satisfying the corresponding obligations. 
4.2. Expressing Software Licenses 
Historically, most software systems, including OSS systems, were entirely under a 
single software license. However, we now see more and more software systems being 
proposed, built, or distributed with components that are under various licenses. Such 
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systems may no longer be covered by a single license, unless such a licensing constraint is 
stipulated at design-time and enforced at build-time and run-time. But when components 
with different licenses are to be included at build-time, their respective licenses might either 
be consistent or conflict. Further, if designed systems include components with conflicting 
licenses, then one or more of the conflicting components must be excluded in the build-time 
release or must be abstracted behind an open API or middleware, with users required to 
download and install to enable the intended operation. (This is common in Linux 
distributions subject to GPL, where, for example, users may choose to acquire and install 
proprietary run-time components, like proprietary media players.) As a result, a component 
license conflict need not be a show-stopper if identified at design time. However, developers 
have to be able to determine which components’ licenses conflict and take appropriate steps 
at design-time, build-time, and run-time that are consistent with the different concerns and 
requirements that apply at each phase (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008). 
In order to fulfill our goals, we need a scheme for expressing software licenses that is 
more formal and less ambiguous than natural language and that allows us to identify 
conflicts arising from the various rights and obligations pertaining to two or more 
components’ licenses. We considered relatively complex structures—such as Hohfeld’s 
eight fundamental jural relations (Hohfeld, 1913)—but, applying Occam’s razor, selected a 
simpler structure. We start with a tuple <actor, operation, action, object> for expressing a 
right or obligation. The actor is the “licensee” for all the licenses we have examined. The 
operation is one of the following: “may,” “must,” or “must not,” with “may” expressing a right 
and “must” and “must not” expressing obligations; following Hohfeld, the lack of a right 
(which would be “may not”) correlates with a duty not to exercise the right (“must not”), and, 
whenever lack of a right seemed significant in a license, we expressed it as a negative 
obligation with “must not.” The action is a verb or verb phrase describing what may, must, or 
must not be done, with the object completing the description. We specify an object 
separately from the action in order to minimize the set of actions. A license then may be 
expressed as a set of rights, with each right associated (in that license) with zero or more 
obligations that must be fulfilled in order to enjoy that right. Figure 2 displays the tuples and 
associations for two of the rights and their associated obligations for the academic BSD 
software license. Note that the first right is granted without corresponding obligations. 
 
Figure 2. A Portion of the BSD License Tuples 
We now turn to examine how OA software systems that include components with 
different licenses can be designed and analyzed while effectively tracking their rights and 
obligations. 
When designing an OA software system, there are heuristics one can employ to 
enable architectural design choices that might otherwise be excluded due to license 
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conflicts. First, it is possible to employ a “license firewall,” which serves to limit the scope of 
reciprocal obligations. Rather than simply interconnecting conflicting components through 
static linking of components at build-time, such components can be logically connected via 
dynamic links, client-server protocols, license shims (e.g., via LGPL connectors), or run-time 
plug-ins. Second, the source code of statically linked OSS components must be made 
public. Third, it is necessary to include appropriate notices and publish required sources 
when academic licenses are employed. However, even using design heuristics such as 
these (and there are many), keeping track of license rights and obligations across 
components that are interconnected in complex OAs quickly becomes too cumbersome. 
Thus, automated support needs to be provided to help overcome and manage the multi-
component, multi-license complexity. 
5. Automating Analysis of Software License Rights and 
Obligations  
We find that if we start from a formal specification of a software system’s 
architecture, then we can associate software license attributes with the system’s 
components, connectors, and sub-system architectures and calculate the copyright rights 
and obligations for the system. Accordingly, we employ an architectural description 
language specified in xADL (2005) to describe OAs that can be designed and analyzed with 
a software architecture design environment (Medvidovic et al., 1999) such as ArchStudio4 
(2006). We have taken this environment and extended it with a Software Architecture 
License Traceability Analysis module (Asuncion, 2008). This allows for the specification of 
licenses as a list of attributes (license tuples) using a form-based user interface, similar to 
those already used and known for ArchStudio4 and xADL (ArchStudio, 2006; Medvidovic et 
al., 1999).  
Figure 3 shows a screenshot of an ArchStudio4 session in which we have modeled 
the OA seen in Figure 1. OA software components, each of which has an associated 
license, are indicated by darker-shaded boxes. Light-shaded boxes indicate connectors. 
Architectural connectors may or may not have associated license information; those with 
licenses (such as architectural connectors that represent functional code) are treated as 
components during license traceability analysis. A directed line segment indicates a link. 
Links connect interfaces between the components and connectors. Furthermore, the Mozilla 
component, as shown here, contains a hypothetical subarchitecture for modeling the role of 
intra-application scripting—as might be useful in specifying license constraints for Rich 
Internet Applications. This subarchitecture is specified in the same manner as the overall 
system architecture and is visible in Figure 5. The automated environment allows for tracing 


























Figure 3. An ArchStudio 4 Model of the Open Software Architecture  
of Figure 1 
Figure 4 shows a view of the internal XML representation of a software license. 
Analysis and calculations of rights, obligations, and conflicts for the OA are done in this 
form. This schematic representation is similar in spirit to that used for specifying and 
analyzing privacy and security regulations associated with certain software systems (Breaux 













Figure 4. A View of the Internal Schematic Representation  
of the Mozilla Public License 
With this basis to build on, it is now possible to analyze the alignment of rights and 
obligations for the overall system: 
 Propagation of reciprocal obligations 
Reciprocal obligations are imposed by the license of a GPL’d component on any 
other component that is part of the same “work based on the Program” (i.e., on the first 
component), as defined in GPL. We follow the widely accepted interpretation that build-time 
static linkage propagate the reciprocal obligations, but the “license firewalls” do not. Analysis 
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 Obligation conflicts 
An obligation can conflict with another obligation contrary to it, or with the set of 
available rights, by requiring a copyright right that has not been granted. For instance, the 
Corel proprietary license for the WordPerfect component, CTL (Corel Transactional 
License), may be taken to entail that a licensee must not redistribute source code. However, 
an OSS license, GPL, may state that a licensee must redistribute source code. Thus, the 
conflict appears in the modality of the two otherwise identical obligations, “must not” in CTL 
and “must” in GPL. A conflict on the same point could also occur between GPL and a 
component whose license fails to grant the right to distribute its source code. 
This phase of the analysis is affected by the overall set of rights that are required. If 
conflicts arise involving the union of all obligations in all components’ licenses, it may be 
possible to eliminate some conflicts by selecting a smaller set of rights—in which case, only 
the obligations for those rights need be considered. 
Figure 5 shows a screenshot in which the License Traceability Analysis module has 
identified obligation conflicts between the licenses of two pairs of components 
(“WordPerfect” and “Linux OS,” and “GUIDisplayManager” and “GUIScriptInterpreter”). 
 
Figure 5. License Conflicts Identified between Two Pairs of Components 
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 Rights and obligations calculations 
The rights available for the entire system (use, copy, modify, etc.) then are calculated 
as the intersection of the sets of rights available for each component of the system.  
The obligations required for the whole system then are the union of the specific 
obligations for each component that are associated with those rights. Examples of specific 
obligations are “Licensee must retain copyright notices in the binary form of module.c” or 
“Licensee must publish the source code of component.java version 1.2.3.” 
Figure 6 shows a report of the calculations for the hypothetical subarchitecture of the 
Mozilla component in our archetypal architecture—exhibiting an obligation conflict and the 
single copyright right (to run the system) that the prototype tool shows would be available for 
the subarchitecture as a whole if the conflict is resolved; a production tool would also list the 
rights (none) currently available. 
 
 
Figure 6. A Report Identifying the Obligations, Conflicts, and Rights for the 
Architectural Model 
 =
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå= - 271 - 
=
=
If a conflict is found involving the obligations and rights of linked components, it is 
possible for the system architect to consider an alternative linking scheme—employing one 
or more connectors along the paths between the components that act as a license firewall, 
thereby mitigating or neutralizing the component-component license conflict. This means 
that the architecture and the environment together can determine what OA design best 
meets the problem at hand with available software components. Components with 
conflicting licenses do not need to be arbitrarily excluded but, instead, may expand the 
range of possible architectural alternatives if the architect seeks such flexibility and choice.  
At build-time (and later at run-time), many of the obligations can be tested and 
verified, for example, that the binaries contain the appropriate notices for their licenses and 
that the source files are present in the correct version on the Web. These tests can be 
generated from the internal list of obligations and run automatically. If the system’s interface 
were extended to add a control for it, the tests could be run by a deployed system. 
The prototype License Traceability Analysis module provides a proof-of-concept for 
this approach. We encoded the core provisions of four licenses in XML for the tool—GPL, 
MPL, CTL, and AFL (Academic Free License)—to examine the effectiveness of the license 
tuple encoding and the calculations based upon it. While it is clear that we could use a more 
complex and expressive structure for encoding licenses, in encoding the license provisions 
to date, we found that the tuple representation was more expressive than needed; for 
example, the actor was always “licensee” and seemed likely to remain so, and we found use 
for only three operations or modalities. At this writing, the module shows proof of concept for 
calculating with reciprocal obligations by propagating them to adjacent, statically linked 
modules; the extension to all paths not blocked by license firewalls is straightforward and is 
independent of the scheme and calculations described here. Reciprocal obligations are 
identified in the tool by lookup in a table, and the meaning and scope of reciprocality is hard-
coded; this is not ideal, but we considered it acceptable since the legal definition in terms of 
the reciprocal licenses will not change frequently. We also focused on the design-time 
analysis and calculation (rather than on build- or run-time), as it involves the widest range of 
issues—including representations, calculation of rights and obligations, and design guidance 
derived from them.  
Based on our analytical approach, it appears that the questions of what license (if 
any) covers a specific configured system, and what rights are available for the overall 
system (and what obligations are needed for them) are difficult to answer without automated 
license-architecture analysis. This is especially true if the system or sub-system is already in 
operational run-time form (Kazman & Carrière, 1999). It might make distribution of a 
composite OA system somewhat problematic if people cannot understand what rights or 
obligations are associated with it. We offer the following considerations to help make this 
clear. For example, a Mozilla/Firefox Web browser covered by the MPL (or GPL or LGPL, in 
accordance with the Mozilla Tri-License) may download and run intra-application script code 
that is covered by a different license. If this script code is only invoked via dynamic run-time 
linkage, or via a client-server transaction protocol, then there is no propagation of license 
rights or obligations. However, if the script code is integrated into the source code of the 
Web browser as a persistent part of an application (e.g., as a plug-in), then it could be 
viewed as a configured sub-system that may need to be accessed for license transfer or 
conflict implications. A different kind of example can be anticipated with application 
programs (like Web browsers, e-mail clients, and word processors) that employ Rich 
Internet Applications or mashups entailing the use of content (e.g., textual character fonts or 
geographic maps) that is subject to copyright protection—if the content is embedded in and 
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bundled with the scripted application sub-system. In such a case, the licenses involved may 
not be limited to OSS or proprietary software licenses. 
In the end, it becomes clear that it is possible to automatically determine what rights 
or obligations are associated with a given system architecture at design-time and whether it 
contains any license conflicts that might prevent proper access or use at build-time or run-
time, given an approach such as ours. 
6. Discussion 
Software system configurations in OAs are intended to be adapted to incorporate 
new innovative software technologies that are not yet available. These system 
configurations will evolve and be refactored over time at ever-increasing rates (Scacchi, 
2007); components will be patched and upgraded (perhaps with new license constraints), 
and inter-component connections will be rewired or remediated with new connector types. 
As such, sustaining the openness of a configured software system will become part of 
ongoing system support, analysis, and validation. This, in turn, may require ADLs to include 
OSS licensing properties on components, connectors, and overall system configuration, as 
well as in appropriate analysis tools (Bass et al. 2003; Medvidovic et al., 1999).  
Constructing these descriptions is an incremental addition to the development of the 
architectural design or alternative architectural designs. But it is still time-consuming and 
may present a somewhat daunting challenge for large, pre-existing systems that were not 
originally modeled in our environment. 
Advances in the identification and extraction of configured software elements at 
build-time and their restructuring into architectural descriptions is becoming an evermore 
automatable endeavor (Choi & Scacchi, 1990; Kazman & Carrière, 1999; Jansen, Bosch & 
Avgeriou, 2008). Further advances in such efforts have the potential to automatically 
produce architectural descriptions that can either be manually or semi-automatically 
annotated with their license constraints, and thus enable automated construction and 
assessment of build-time software system architectures. 
The list of recognized OSS licenses is long and ever-growing, and, as existing 
licenses are tested in the courts, we can expect their interpretations to be clarified and 
perhaps altered; the GPL definition of “work based on the Program,” for example, may 
eventually be clarified in this way, possibly refining the scope of reciprocal obligations. Our 
expressions of license rights and obligations are for the most part compared for identical 
actors, actions, and objects, then by looking for “must not” in one and either “must” or “may” 
in the other, so that new licenses may be added by keeping equivalent rights or obligations 
expressed equivalently. Reciprocal obligations, however, are handled specially by hard-
coded algorithms to traverse the scope of that obligation so that addition of obligations with 
different scope, or the revision of the understanding of the scope of an existing obligation, 
requires development work. Possibly these issues will be clarified as we add more licenses 
to the tool and experiment with their application in OA contexts. 
Lastly, our scheme for specifying software licenses offers the potential for the 
creation of shared repositories where these licenses can be accessed, studied, compared, 
modified, and redistributed. 
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The relationship between open architecture, open source software, and multiple 
software licenses is poorly understood. OSS is often viewed as primarily a source for low-
cost/free software systems or software components. Thus, given the goal of realizing an OA 
strategy together with the use of OSS components and open APIs, it has been unclear how 
to best align software architecture, OSS, and software license regimes to achieve this goal. 
Subsequently, the central problem we examined in this paper was to identify principles of 
software architecture and software copyright licenses that facilitate or inhibit how best to 
ensure the success of an OA strategy when OSS and open APIs are required or otherwise 
employed. In turn, we presented an analysis scheme and operational environment that 
demonstrates that an automated solution to this problem exists.  
We have developed and demonstrated an operational environment that can 
automatically determine the overall license rights, obligations, and constraints associated 
with a configured system architecture whose components may have different software 
licenses. Such an environment requires the annotation of the participating software 
elements with their corresponding licenses. These annotated software architectural 
descriptions can be prescriptively analyzed at design-time, as we have shown, or 
descriptively analyzed at build-time or run-time. Such a solution offers the potential for 
practical support in design-time, build-time, and run-time license conformance checking and 
the evermore complex problem of developing large software systems from configurations of 
software elements that can evolve over time. 
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